Essays in the economics of education and microeconometrics by Parey, M.
Essays in the Economics
of Education and Microeconometrics
Matthias Parey
A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fullment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
University College London (UCL)
London
January 2010
1Declaration
I, Matthias Parey, conrm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where
information has been derived from other sources, I conrm that this has been indicated
in the thesis.
Matthias Parey
23
Abstract
This thesis employs microeconometric methods to understand determinants and eects
of individual behavior relating to educational choice and consumer demand.
Chapter 2 studies the intergenerational eects of maternal education on a range of
children's outcomes, including cognitive achievement and behavioral problems. Endo-
geneity of maternal schooling is addressed by instrumenting with schooling costs during
the mother's adolescence. The results show substantial intergenerational returns to ed-
ucation. The chapter studies an array of potential channels which may transmit the
eect to the child, including family environment and parental investments.
The following chapter 3 investigates the eect of studying abroad on international
labor market mobility later in life for university graduates. As source of identify-
ing variation, this work exploits the introduction and expansion of the European
ERASMUS student exchange program. Studying abroad signicantly increases the
probability of working abroad, and the chapter provides evidence on the underlying
mechanisms.
Chapter 4 compares labor market outcomes between rm-based apprenticeships
and full-time vocational schooling alternatives, exploiting the idea that variation in
apprenticeship availability aects the opportunities individuals have when they grow
up. The chapter documents how variation in vacancies for apprenticeships aects
educational choice. The results show that apprenticeship training leads to lower un-
employment rates at ages 23 to 26, but there are no signicant dierences in wages.
Chapter 5 develops a new approach to the measurement of price responsiveness
of gasoline demand and deadweight loss estimation. It uses shape restrictions derived
from economic theory to match a desire for exibility with the need for structure in the
welfare analysis of consumer behavior. Using travel survey data, the chapter shows that
these restrictions remove the erratic behavior of standard nonparametric approaches.
Investigating price responsiveness across the income distribution, the middle income
group is found to be the most responsive.Contents
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Introduction
This thesis employs microeconometric methods to understand determinants and eects
of individual behavior relating to educational choices and consumer demand.
Chapter 2 investigates intergenerational eects of education. The objective of this
work is to provide a detailed analysis of how maternal education aects the human
capital accumulation and skill formation of children. Beyond studying outcomes relat-
ing to cognitive skills, this work highlights potential transmission channels which may
act as mechanism in transmitting the eect of maternal education. In particular, this
work studies parental investment behavior and family environment. Identication is
achieved through an instrumental variable strategy, using variation in schooling cost
during the mother's adolescence. The results indicate that maternal education signif-
icantly increases the child's performance in standardized tests for mathematics and
reading at ages 7-8, but this eect is not seen at older ages. Although mother's educa-
tion has a strong eect on maternal labor supply, the results indicate that, nonetheless,
more educated mothers invest more into their children along a number of dierent di-
mensions, for example by reading to the child. Conceptually, this work is closely related
to Currie and Moretti (2003), but using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
allows to study outcomes at dierent ages of the child, and to investigate the eect of
maternal education on a range of parental investments into their children. This work
141 Introduction 15
is also closely related to questions of transmission of intergenerational inequality.
Chapter 3 investigates the long-run eect of international mobility decisions during
higher education, motivated by the ongoing internationalization of higher education
and increased incidence of study abroad spells (see e.g. Freeman (2009)). Specically,
this chapter studies how international labor market mobility is aected by earlier
study abroad experiences during tertiary education. Identication is achieved through
exploiting the dierential introduction of the large-scale European ERASMUS scholar-
ship program, which strongly increases the incidence of study abroad spells. Studying
abroad is found to have substantial positive eects on the probability of working abroad
after graduation, and this eect is found to be robust in a range of sensitivity checks.
In terms of policy implications, these results indicate that an opportunity to attract
talented graduates is through student exchange opportunities. The chapter also sheds
light on the underlying mechanism for the eect. Descriptive evidence indicates that
location choices are sticky, i.e. that graduates tend to return to work where they pre-
viously studied abroad. Furthermore, students with study abroad experience are more
likely to state that they work abroad because of an interest in foreign cultures, a career
abroad, or because of their partner.
Chapter 4 investigates training choices of young school leavers from lower-track
schools in Germany, who decide between apprenticeship training and a full-time voca-
tional schooling alternative. Although there is a large descriptive literature comparing
these two forms of vocational training, little is known about the causal eect of these
alternatives (Ryan, 2001). This chapter argues that dierential availability of training
opportunities aects the choice of young people between these alternatives. The chap-
ter presents an open-economy framework in which aggregate price shocks aect local
training choices, but have no dierential eect on factor rewards; this provides an eco-
nomic framework which motivates an exclusion restriction. The chapter then exploits
local shocks to training availability to study how alternative training forms aect labor
market outcomes at ages 23 to 26 in the main labor market. The results indicate that1 Introduction 16
the main benet of (former) apprentices is through a lower initial probability of being
unemployed, while productivity (as measured by wages) is not statistically dierent.
Evidence from a rm closure experiment suggests that this attachment eect has a
strong rm-specic component, which is lost when the rm closes down. Overall, the
evidence indicates that the (former) apprentices have a transitory advantage in the
form of lower unemployment rates.
All of these chapters share a concern for appropriately addressing endogeneity
of the schooling choice and the possibility of a correlation between schooling choice
and unobservable characteristics. This selection problem is addressed by exploiting
dierences in the cost and availability of educational opportunities as exogenous shifters
in the educational choice, which can then be used to identify the treatment eect.
While not always statistically signicant, the dierences between a straightforward
comparison of means and the use of instrumental variables highlight the importance of
accounting for selection eects. A focus in this work is to understand heterogeneity in
eects, where the estimand captures the eect on the sub-population which is aected
by the instrument, following the work by Imbens and Angrist (1994).
Chapter 5 investigates how shape restrictions which arise from economic theory can
be imposed in nonparametric Kernel regression, in an application to consumer demand
for gasoline. This is motivated by the work of Hausman and Newey (1995), who em-
phasize the usefulness of nonparametric estimation in understanding gasoline demand
patterns. As has been noted previously, see e.g. Schmalensee and Stoker (1999), the
resulting demand estimates appear erratic in certain regions and are dicult to recon-
cile with the properties we would expect the demand function to have. In this work,
these patterns are interpreted as resulting from sampling variation. Instead of choosing
a particular functional form, this work imposes structure based on economic theory.
For this purpose, the Slutsky constraint is imposed on the estimated demand function.
This is implemented by making use of a re-weighting procedure suggested by Hall and
Huang (2001), which has a number of favorable properties relative to alternative meth-1 Introduction 17
ods of imposing constraints. Imposing the economic restriction leads to well-behaved
estimates of the demand function without the need for often arbitrary functional form
assumptions. This procedure appears to be attractive because it brings closer together
the estimation procedure and the underlying economic theory. The implications for
resulting Deadweight Loss estimates of taxation are explored. A substantial focus
of this chapter is on understanding how the price responsiveness of gasoline demand
varies across the income distribution. From a policy perspective, this is of great im-
portance because it informs us about how dierent parts of the income distribution
are aected by gasoline taxation. The results indicate that price-responsiveness diers
in a non-monotonic fashion across income, with the middle income group being most
responsive to price changes. | The last chapter concludes.Chapter 2
Maternal Education, Home
Environments and the
Development of Children and
Adolescents
2.1 Introduction
\... the forces that are driving the transition are leading to two dierent trajectories for
women - with dierent implications for children. One trajectory - the one associated
with delays in childbearing and increases in maternal employment - reect gains in
resources, while the other - the one associated with divorce and nonmarital childbearing
- reects losses. Moreover, the women with the most opportunities and resources are
following the rst trajectory, whereas the women with the fewest opportunities and
resources are following the second." (McLanahan, 2004)
The above quote is from Sara McLanahan's presidential address to the Population
Association of America, in which she documents a striking increase in inequality in
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children's home environments across families where mothers have dierent levels of
education.1 The trends documented in these and other papers, starting with Coleman
et al.(1966), are cause for great concern because the home environment is probably
the best candidate for explaining inequality in child development.2
To address this problem, McLanahan (2004) ends her paper by proposing a set
of changes to the welfare system. The eectiveness of such proposals is still to be
assessed. However, given that home environments are rooted in the experiences of
each family, they are probably dicult to change if we rely only on the welfare system.
Furthermore, more direct interventions require invading family autonomy and privacy
and are notoriously dicult to enforce. Therefore, one possible alternative is to target
future parents in their youth, by aecting their education, before they start forming a
family. In this work we assess the potential for such a policy, by estimating the impact
of maternal education on home environments and on child outcomes.
Our analysis is based on the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
of 1979, a data set with very detailed information on maternal characteristics, home
environments, and child outcomes. Since the data covers mothers and children over
several years it allows a unied treatment of dierent aspects of child development
across ages, including cognitive, noncognitive, and health outcomes.3 Furthermore,
using this single data set it is possible to estimate the impact of maternal education
not only on parental characteristics like employment, income, marital status, spouse's
education, age at rst birth, but also on several aspects of parenting practices. This
chapter provides a detailed analysis of the possible mechanisms mediating the rela-
1She examines trends in six dimensions of home environments over the last 50 years: age of mothers
of young children (below 5), maternal employment, single motherhood, divorce during the rst 10 years
of marriage, father's involvement, and family income. In this work we consider a more detailed set of
measures.
2For example, Jencks and Phillips (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), Fryer and Levitt (2004,
2006, 2007), Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005), Todd and Wolpin (2006) and others show how
dierences in home environments account for a large share of the black-white test score gap.
3The dynamic aspect of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation is emphasized in the recent
literature on child development, such as Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Cunha, Heckman, Lochner,
and Masterov (2005), Cunha and Heckman (2007), and Todd and Wolpin (2003).2 Maternal Education 20
tionship between parental education and child outcomes. The novelty of our work is
in the systematic treatment of a very large range of inputs and outputs to the child
development process, at dierent ages of the child, in a unied framework and data
set. We also compare the relative roles of maternal education and ability,4 and we
show how the role of maternal education varies with the gender and race of the child,
and with the cognitive ability of the mother.
We show that maternal education has positive impacts both on cognitive skills and
behavioral problems of children, but the latter are more sustained than the former.
This is perhaps because behavior is more malleable than cognition (e.g., Carneiro and
Heckman (2003)). Especially among whites, there is considerable heterogeneity in
these impacts, which are larger for girls, and for mothers with higher cognition.
More educated mothers are more likely to work and work for longer hours, es-
pecially among blacks. This is true independently of the child being in its infancy,
childhood, and adolescence. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that more educated
mothers do less breastfeeding, spend much less time reading to their children, or even
taking them on outings. This is important because some studies suggest that maternal
employment may be detrimental for child outcomes if it leads to reduced (quality) time
with children.
Due to the nature of the data, this work focuses on the eect of maternal, but not
paternal, schooling. Because of assortative mating, part of the eects we nd may be
driven by the father's schooling through a mating eect. However, unless the eect
of partner's schooling is incredibly large, assortative mating cannot fully explain our
main results, as suggested in some of the literature.
The key empirical problem we face is controlling for the endogeneity of mother's
schooling: factors that inuence the mother's decision to obtain schooling may also
aect her ability to bring up children or may relate to other environmental and genetic
4Maternal cognitive ability is a central determinant of child's cognitive achievement. According to
Todd and Wolpin (2006), racial dierences in mother's cognition account for half of the minority-white
test score gap among children.2 Maternal Education 21
factors relevant to child outcomes. To deal with this issue we exploit dierential
changes in the direct and opportunity costs of schooling across counties and cohorts
of mothers, while controlling both for permanent dierences and aggregate trends
as well as numerous observed characteristics such as mother's ability. The variables
we use to measure the costs of education include local labor market conditions, the
presence of a four year college, and college tuition at age 17, in the county where the
mother resided when she was 14 years of age. These variables have previously been
used as instruments for schooling by Card (1993), Kane and Rouse (1993), Currie
and Moretti (2003), Cameron and Taber (2004), and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil
(2006), among others. We also control for county xed eects, to allow for permanent
dierences in area characteristics and in the quality of oered education, as well as for
mother's cohort eects, to allow for common trends, thus leaving only the dierential
changes in local costs of education between counties and cohorts to drive the results.
To provide evidence in favor of our exclusion restrictions we show that our instruments
cannot predict early measures of mother's personality and health limitations.
One potential problem is that our instruments may be weak. We study the im-
portance of this problem in the context of a xed coecient model, since not much is
known about the eects of weak instruments in the estimation of a random coecient
model. In particular, we estimate some of our models by limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML), as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). The resulting estimates
are larger in absolute value than our original two stage least squares estimates and fur-
ther away from the OLS coecients, but also have larger standard errors (as predicted
by Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999)).
Recently, several papers have appeared on this topic dealing with the endogeneity
issue in dierent ways. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) compare the schooling attain-
ment of children of twin mothers and twin fathers (with dierent levels of schooling).
They nd that the eect of father's education is strong and large in magnitude, but
the eect of maternal education on child schooling is insignicant (see also Antonovics2 Maternal Education 22
and Goldberger (2005); Behrman and Rosenzweig (2005)).
Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005), Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2003),
Chevalier (2004), Chevalier, Harmon, O'Sullivan, and Walker (2005), Maurin and
McNally (2005), and Galindo-Rueda (2003) use an instrumental variables strategies
to estimate the eect of parental education on child outcomes, exploring changes in
compulsory schooling or in examination standards. Each paper focuses on dierent
outcomes, but child's education is common across papers. Their ndings are quite
diverse.
Currie and Moretti (2003) nd that maternal education has signicant eects on
birth-weight and gestational age. Maternal education also aects potential channels
by which birth outcomes are improved such as maternal smoking, the use of prenatal
care, marital status, and spouse's education. Related studies by Plug (2004), Sacerdote
(2002) and Bjoerklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006), which are based on adoptions data,
compare the correlation between parental schooling and the outcomes of biological
children, with the correlation between foster parents' schooling and adopted children's
schooling. Adoption studies inform the debate by separating the eect of environmental
and genetic factors (although their standard design can be problematic if there are
substantial interactions between genes and environments), but they do not tell us
directly about the causal eect of parental schooling on child outcomes. These studies
cannot distinguish between the role of parental schooling and ability in the provision
of better environments. Plug (2004) nds weak eects of adoptive mother's schooling
on child's schooling but large eects of father's schooling, and Bjoerklund, Lindahl,
and Plug (2006) nd strong eects of both adoptive father and mother's schooling.
Sacerdote (2002) argues that a college educated adoptive mother is associated with
a 7% increase in the probability that the adopted child graduates from college. The
general sense we get from the whole literature is that the results are quite disparate
and a consensus has not formed yet (see Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006)).5
5Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) replicate the diering ndings based on twin studies, adop-2 Maternal Education 23
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In the next section we describe the data,
followed by an explanation of our empirical strategy. Then we discuss our results on
the impact of mother's schooling on child outcomes, followed by results on the possible
mechanisms through which schooling may operate. Finally, we present a sensitivity
analysis and a concluding section.
2.2 Data
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). This is a
panel which follows 12,686 young men and women, aged between 15 and 22 years old
in the rst survey year of 1979. Surveys are conducted annually from 1979 until 1994,
and every two years from 1994 onwards. We use data up to 2002.
Apart from the main cross-sectional sample representative of the population, the
NLSY79 contains an over-sample representative of blacks and hispanics, an over-sample
of economically disadvantaged whites, and a sample of members of the military. In
our analysis we exclude the over-sample of economically disadvantaged whites and
the sample of the military. This ensures that our sample is drawn according to pre-
determined characteristics. Attrition rates are very low (see CHRR (2002)). As we
describe below, for our purpose only the females of the NLSY79 are of interest.
We measure mother's schooling as completed years of schooling. Since we observe
mothers over a number of years, we have multiple observations of years of schooling.
We are interested in the mother's schooling at the time when the outcome is measured.6
The data contains detailed information on family background of the mother, namely
her parents' schooling, and whether she was raised by both her biological parents.
Furthermore, we know the mother's score in the Armed Forces Qualication Test
tions, and instrumental variables within one Swedish data set, suggesting that the dierences cannot
be fully explained by country specics or sample characteristics.
6Occasionally, sample members do not answer this question in the year of interest. In order to
include these observations, we take as the measure of schooling the maximum number of completed
years reported up to the year of interest.2 Maternal Education 24
(AFQT), administered in 1980, which we use as a measure of mother's cognitive ability.
The original AFQT score may be inuenced by the amount of schooling taking up to
the test date, but it is possible to estimate the eect of schooling on the test score
(see Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004)), and then construct a separate measure of
ability (we apply the same procedure as in Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005)).
Throughout the chapter, we refer to the AFQT score as this schooling-corrected ability
measure, normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
In 1986, when the females of the NLSY79 were between 22 and 29 years old,
another data set, the Children of the NLSY79, was initiated. It follows the children
of the female members of the NLSY79 over time and surveys each child throughout
childhood and adolescence. Questionnaires are tailored to the age of the child, and
information is collected from both the mother and the child. We match the information
on each child of the NLSY79 to the data of the mother. Even though the NLSY79
surveys a random sample of potential mothers, the design of the children's sample leads
to an initial oversample of children of younger mothers, until all women are old enough
and have completed their child-bearing period. In 2000, the women of the NLSY79
have completed an average of 90% of their expected childbearing (CHRR, 2002).
Table 2.1 presents an overview of the dierent outcomes for reference. In order
to measure the child's cognitive ability we use the Peabody Individual Achievement
Tests (PIAT) in math and reading, which are widely used in the literature. Behavior
problems are measured using the Behavior Problems Index (BPI).7 We also construct
grade repetition8 and child obesity indicators.
In addition, we examine potential transmission channels: mother's age at birth, an
indicator variable for whether the mother is married, years of schooling of the mother's
7Based on data from the UK National Child Development Survey, Currie and Thomas (2001)
and Carneiro, Crawford, and Goodman (2007) show that early test scores and early measures of
behavioral problems are strongly associated with adolescent and adult labor market outcomes, health,
and engagement in risky behaviors.
8In the NLSY79, mothers are asked whether their child ever repeated a grade in school and which
grade the child repeated. We set observations to missing if the mother's set of answers to grade
repetition is not consistent.2 Maternal Education 25
Table 2.1: Outcome variables
Name Denition
Child outcomes (ages 7-8 and 12-14)
PIAT math Peabody Individual Achievement Test Mathematics. Age-specic score with population
mean 0 and variance 1.
PIAT read. Peabody Individual Achievement Test Reading Comprehension. Age-specic score with
population mean 0 and variance 1.
BPI Behavior Problem Index. Gender-age specic score with population mean 0 and vari-
ance 1.
Grade repetition Indicator for whether child has ever repeated a grade
Overweight Indicator for whether child is overweight: Takes value 1 if child's Body Mass Index
(BMI) is larger than the 95th percentile of age-gender specic distribution.
Family environment (ages 7-8)
Maternal age? Age of the mother at birth of the child (in years)
Number of children? Total number of children ever reported by the mother.
Marital status Indicator for whether the mother is married
Spouse's schooling Years of schooling of mother's spouse.
Hours worked Number of hours mother worked in past year
Log family income Log of total annual family income
Maternal aspirations Indicator for whether mother believes that child will go to college
Parental investment measures (ages 7-8 and 12-14)
Museum Indicator for whether child is taken to museum several times or more in last year
Musical instrument Indicator for whether there is a musical instrument child can use at home
Special lessons Indicator for whether child gets special lessons
Mother reads Indicator for whether mother reads to child at least three times a week
Newspaper Indicator for whether family gets a daily newspaper
Computer Indicator for whether child has a computer in his/her home
Adult home Indicator: takes the value 1 if adult is present when child comes home after school, and
0 if no adult is present or if child goes somewhere else.
Joint meals Indicator for whether child eats with both parents at least once per day.
Early child outcomes (ages 0-1)
Low birthweight Indicator for whether child's birthweight is 5.5 lbs or less
Motor skills Motor and social development scale (MSD), gender-age specic score standardized to
mean 0 and variance 1.
Early investments (ages 0-1)
Smoking during
pregnancy?
Indicator for whether mother smoked in the year prior the child's birth
Weeks breastfeeding? Number of weeks mother was breastfeeding
Formal child care Indicator for whether formal childcare arrangements were in place for at least six months
over past year
Hours worked Number of hours mother worked in past year
Mother reads Indicator for whether mother reads at least three times a week to the child
Books Number of books child has
Soft toys Number of cuddly, soft or role-playing toys child has
Outings Indicator for whether the child gets out of the house at least four times a week
Adolescent outcomes (ages 18-19)
Enrollment Indicator for enrollment status of the young adult
Conviction Indicator for whether the young adult has been convicted up to the age of interest
Number of own children Total number of own children born to the young adult up to the age of interest
Falsication exercise (ages 7-8)
Mother's sociability? Indicator for maternal sociability at age 6.
Mother's early health
problems?
Indicator for whether the mother had health limitations before age 5
Note: Age ranges (in italics) refer to the child and dene at which child age this outcome is included
in the outcome regression. Not all variables vary across time, but we follow the same sample selection
principle for consistency. Variables which do not vary across time are indicated by a star (
?).2 Maternal Education 26
spouse, log of total family income (for couples, it includes both husband's and wife's
incomes), number of hours the mother worked in a year, maternal aspirations of the
child's educational achievement, and number of children. We take the child's age as
the relevant reference point for observing the measures of interest.
One unusual feature of the data set we use is that it contains direct measures of
parenting behaviors, which can also be studied as mediating channels. In particular,
we look at whether: the child is taken to the museum; there is a musical instrument
at home; the child gets special lessons; the mother reads to the child; newspaper and
computer are available; there is adult supervision after school; and there are joint
meals with both parents (Table 2.1).
Finally, we study children's outcomes very early in life and in adolescent years.
Early measures include an indicator function for low birth-weight, and the standardized
score on the Motor and Social Development scale (MSD), an assessment of early motor,
social and cognitive developments. We focus on ages 0 to 2. As early investments, we
study smoking during pregnancy, weeks breastfeeding, use of formal child care and
hours worked, and indicators for whether the mother reads to the child, how many
books and soft toys the child has, and an indicator for whether the child gets out
of the house regularly. Adolescent outcomes are measured at ages 18-19 and include
school enrolment, criminal convictions and number of own children.
In the next section we discuss in detail our instrumental variable strategy, its justi-
cation and validity. Before we do so, we explain how the instruments are constructed.
The instruments for mother's schooling are average tuition in public four-year colleges
(in 1993 prices), distance to four-year colleges (an indicator whether there is a college
in the county of residence), local log wage and local unemployment rate. When as-
signing the instruments to mothers, our general approach is the following: we assign
values that correspond to the year when the mother was 17, in order to be relevant for
educational choices towards the end of highschool; in order to avoid any potentially
endogenous re-location around that period, we use maternal location at age 14. The2 Maternal Education 27
local wage variable is local log wages in the county of residence where the mother
resided at 14, but measured in the year when the mother is aged 17 (based on county
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, and ad-
justed to 2000 prices using the CPI). The state unemployment rate data comes from
the BLS.9 The unemployment variable is again assigned to state of residence at 14, and
measured at age 17. The distance variable, which is from Kling (2001), is an indicator
variable whether in 1977 there is a four-year college in the county of residence. Annual
records on tuition, enrollment, and location of all public two- and four year colleges
in the United States were constructed from the Department of Education's annual
Higher Education General Information Survey and Integrated Postsecondary Educa-
tion Data System 'Institutional Characteristics' surveys. By matching location with
county of residence, we determined the presence of two-year and four-year colleges.
Tuition measures are enrollment weighted averages of all public four-year colleges in a
person's county of residence, or at the state level if there is no college in the county.
The data set, limited to the subsamples of interest for which all maternal variables
are observed, contains information on a total of 4,379 white children from 1,948 white
mothers, and 3,051 children from 1,211 black mothers. For some children, we observe
the outcome more than once during the age range of interest. To increase precision
of our estimates, we pool all available observations within the specic age range. We
cluster all standard errors by cohort and county of mother's residence at age 14, thus
allowing for arbitrary dependence between repeat observations from a particular child,
and between outcomes of several children from one mother, and more generally for
arbitrary dependence within county-cohort cells.
To give a sense of what our sample looks like, the following Table 2.2 shows sum-
mary statistics for the covariates based on the sample from our PIAT math regression.
9State unemployment data is available for all states from 1976 on, and it is available for 29 states
for 1973, 1974 and 1975, and therefore for some of the individuals we have to use the unemployment
rate in the state of residence in 1976 (which will correspond to age 19 for those born in 1957 and age
18 for those born in 1958).2 Maternal Education 28
There are some strong dierences between the black and the white sample. Average
Table 2.2: Descriptive sample statistics
Whites Blacks
(1) (2)
Mother's yrs. of schooling 13.236 12.670
[2.185] [1.919]
Mother's AFQT (corrected) 0.367 -0.458
[0.882] [0.774]
Grandmother's yrs. of schooling 11.719 10.541
[2.278] [2.677]
Grandfather's yrs. of schooling 11.813 9.798
[3.114] [3.612]
`Broken home' status 0.207 0.437
[0.406] [0.496]
Child age (months) 95.166 95.821
[6.979] [6.937]
Child female 0.495 0.498
[0.500] [0.500]
College availability 0.519 0.598
[0.500] [0.491]
Local tuition 2.133 1.964
[0.851] [0.830]
Local unemployment 7.161 6.928
[1.752] [1.521]
Local wages 10.270 10.245
[0.186] [0.213]
Observations 2492 1271
Note: The table reports sample means and (in brackets) standard deviations for covariates and
instruments, based on the sample of our PIAT math outcome regression for children aged 7 to 8 (see
Tables 2.5 and 2.7).
years of schooling are 0.6 years higher for whites. Also, note the strong dierence in
the corrected AFQT score: since this variable is normed to have a standard deviation
of 1 in the population, the means of these two groups are more than 0.8 of a standard
deviation apart. The `broken home' status is an indicator for whether the mother grew
up with both biological parents status; it is more than twice as prevalent in the black
sample compared to the white.2 Maternal Education 29
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We assume that child outcomes (yi) are determined by mother's years of schooling (Si)
as well as a set of observable (Xi) and unobservable factors. Schooling is determined
by the same factors as child outcomes, and by a set of instruments (Zi) that reect the
measured direct and indirect costs of schooling. In interpreting the results we assume
that the eects of schooling on outcomes depends on unobservables and that the IV
estimates will represent Local Average Treatment Eects (LATE).10
We also allow the coecient on maternal schooling to depend on observable char-
acteristics. We dene four groups depending on the sex of the child and on whether
the mother is characterized by high or low ability based on her AFQT score. These
four group indicators will be denoted by Dij, and take the value 1 if observation i
belongs to group j (j = 1:::4). Ai denotes child age. Thus our estimating equation is
yi =
X
j
jDij Si +
X
j
1jDij Xmi +
X
j
2jDij +
X
j
3jDij Ai
+ 4 (county FE) + 5 (cohort FE) + ui (2.1)
where Xmi (indexed by m for maternal characteristics) include corrected AFQT score,
grandmother's schooling, grandfather's schooling, and an indicator for mother's broken
home status. The corresponding rst stage regressions (k = 1:::4) are:
SiDik =
X
j
1jDij Zi +
X
j
2jDij (Xmi  Zi) +
X
j
3jDij((cohort FE)  Zi)
+
X
j
4jDij Xmi +
X
j
5jDij +
X
j
6jDij Ai
+ 7 (county FE) + 8 (cohort FE) + i (2.2)
where the asterisk () denotes the Kronecker product. Note that in the rst term we
leave out the variable 'distance to college', because in our data set this variable does not
10see Imbens and Angrist (1994).2 Maternal Education 30
vary over time (since it is only measured in 1977). To estimate average eects across
groups, we apply the Minimum Distance procedure (Rothenberg, 1971; Chamberlain,
1984) using as weights the covariance matrix of the unrestricted coecients.
One part of the direct cost of schooling is the amount of tuition fees a student faces
and how far she has to travel to attend college. These variables have frequently been
used as instruments (e.g. Kane and Rouse (1993), Card (1993), Currie and Moretti
(2003), Cameron and Taber (2004), Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2006)). Another
major cost of acquiring higher education is foregone earnings. We proxy these variables
by using the local unemployment rate, reecting the speed with which someone can
nd work, and the local wages, as a direct measure of foregone earnings and as a
determinant of expectations about future conditions. Both these variable also capture
temporary shocks to family income. Therefore, it is not possible to determine a priori
whether these variables have a positive or negative eect on maternal schooling, and
the eect may well vary across individuals.11 A key element of our approach is that we
include both cohort and county xed eects, thus relying on the way the instruments
change across counties and cohorts to identify our eects.
Our instruments must be correlated with mother's schooling, but must not have an
independent eect on the outcome equation except through mother's schooling. We
discuss these conditions in turn.
Underlying the use of geographical variation in schooling costs is the presumption
that local variables matter for the schooling choice of the individual. In principle,
individuals might move to a dierent location for their studies, e.g. in order to avoid
high tuition costs. Still, it seems reasonable to believe that local variation matters:
Moving is costly for a variety of reasons: the student is prevented from the option
of living at home. Furthermore, movers may be disadvantaged in the form of higher
out-of-state tuition. Currie and Moretti (2002) report evidence that the majority of
students do not move to a dierent state to go to college (see also Hoxby (1997)).
11See Cameron and Taber (2004) and Arkes (2005).2 Maternal Education 31
Table 2.3 shows the eect of schooling cost variables on maternal schooling, where
for consistency the sample of interest are white children aged 7 and 8. Similar re-
Table 2.3: Maternal schooling choices and schooling costs
Dependent variable: Mother's years of schooling
Mother's AFQT (corrected) 0.937
[0.065]***
Grandmother's yrs. of schooling 0.158
[0.030]***
Grandfather's yrs. of schooling 0.149
[0.024]***
`Broken home' status -0.249
[0.144]*
Local unemployment -0.134
[0.071]*
Local wages -4.883
[2.120]**
Local tuition/1000 0.376
[0.365]
Observations 2492
F-statistic 2.01
p-value 0.000***
Note: This table shows the result for a regression of maternal schooling on her characteristics and
schooling cost variables, where schooling cost variables are also interacted with AFQT, grandparents'
schooling, broken home indicator, and mother's birth cohort dummies. County xed eects included.
The table reports estimated marginal eects of a change in the variable indicated, evaluated at the
mean. F-statistic and corresponding p-value refer to the joint test that all of these 47 schooling cost
variables are zero. The sample is selected to be identical to the PIAT math regression in our main
results, see Table 2.6. Standard errors, clustered by birth cohort and county are reported in brackets.
* indicates signicance at 10%, ** indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
See text for details.
sults hold for other ages. We do not yet interact with the four group indicators as we
do in the main results below. The table reports marginal eects of each regressor.12
Mother's ability level and grandparents' schooling are important determinants of ma-
ternal education. The instruments are jointly signicant at the 1% level although they
are not all individually signicant.
We have allowed the instruments to interact with a number of covariates reecting
maternal background to help improve the overall predictive ability of the instruments.
12The main eect of living near a college is not identied because it does not vary with time and
we include county xed eects. However we do interact it with a number of maternal background
characteristics as described above.2 Maternal Education 32
In our sensitivity analysis we show that our results are robust to very exible specica-
tion of the outcome equations by including polynomials in maternal covariates as well
as interactions between them; thus the interactions in the instrument set are not pick-
ing up non-linearities left out of the outcome equations, but allow better predictions
by modeling the heterogeneity in the schooling choice.
The second requirement for our instruments is that they should not have an inde-
pendent eect on the outcome, conditional on other covariates. Thus the dierential
changes in the costs of schooling should not predict child outcomes, conditional on
covariates. By controlling for county xed eects we avoid biases due to geographical
sorting. The latter relates to individuals moving to certain counties in a way which
creates a correlation between the characteristics of the region (e.g. local labor market
conditions, tuition fees, etc), and outcome relevant variables such as the unobserved
human capital of the person moving - the mother in our case. The fact that such
sorting takes place is well established (e.g., Solon (1999), Dahl (2002)).
The second concern relates to college quality as well as local labor market condi-
tions. If higher tuition fees are associated with higher college quality, and if higher
college quality makes mothers better at child rearing, then this could bias our results.
First, we use tuition from public colleges only; any link between cost and quality can be
expected to be weaker in comparison to private colleges. Second, a main determinant
of college quality is the quality of the students; this aspect is captured by including
an ability measure of the mother, and by including family background variables. But
perhaps most importantly we do not rely on comparing mothers who faced dierent
tuition levels. We exploit changing tuition, which relies on the trends being common
across regions, as in the di-in-di context. Therefore, it does not seem likely that,
after controlling for mother's ability, mother's family background, and county xed
eects, endogeneity of tuition due to college quality will pose a problem. A similar
argument can be made for the local labor market conditions.
Our instruments are designed to relate mainly to late schooling or college choice.2 Maternal Education 33
They should be unrelated to early background characteristics of the mother. In our
data there is a measure of mother's sociability at age 6, and a measure of mater-
nal health limitations before age 5, which can be used to check the validity of our
instruments.13
We next examine whether these instruments predict early sociability and health
conditional on our controls. We regress these two measures on maternal schooling and
the controls, instrumenting schooling with the variables described above. As in the
rest of the chapter, the unit of observation in each regression is the child at age 7 or 8,
even though the regression relates to the mother only. Therefore there may be more
than one observation per mother, since some mothers have several children.
Table 2.4: Instrument validity
Falsication exercise
Sociability at age 6 Early health limitations
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother's schooling: All 0.019 0.007 -0.014 -0.010
[0.009]** [0.022] [0.007]* [0.020]
Mother's schooling: Male child 0.014 0.020 -0.017 0.016
[0.010] [0.026] [0.009]* [0.024]
Mother's schooling: Female child 0.028 -0.006 -0.012 -0.035
[0.011]** [0.026] [0.008] [0.023]
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 0.019 0.023 -0.009 0.000
[0.012] [0.033] [0.008] [0.027]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.020 -0.008 -0.026 -0.023
[0.013] [0.032] [0.013]** [0.030]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.029 -0.020 -0.033 -0.045
[0.031] [0.036] [0.027] [0.031]
Observations 4322 4322 4395 4395
Mean 0.390 0.390 0.197 0.197
Standard deviation 0.488 0.488 0.398 0.398
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
Table 2.4 presents OLS and IV results for each early measure. Notice that nal
maternal schooling is strongly associated with both early sociability and early health
13Maternal sociability is an indicator for whether the mother indicates that at age 6 she was some-
what outgoing or extremely outgoing rather than somewhat shy or extremely shy. Early health limi-
tations is an indicator for whether the mother reported any health limitations that she had either all
her life or that began before age 5.2 Maternal Education 34
limitations of the mother in the OLS regressions, but not in the IV regressions. In the
latter the coecient on schooling is smaller and statistically not dierent from zero.
This is what we would expect if our identication strategy is valid.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Eects on Child Outcomes
Our main outcome variables are the PIAT mathematics and reading test, the BPI,
and binary indicators for grade repetition and child obesity. The PIAT tests and the
BPI are standardized to have mean zero and variance 1 in a nationally representative
sample. We measure these variables at both ages 7-8 and 12-14.
(a) White Children
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present our main results for white children. The rst line shows the
estimates for the whole sample, while the following four lines show eects for dierent
subgroups of interest. The last line of the table corresponds to the overall eect of
the mother's AFQT score on child outcomes. This variable is a very strong predictor
of children's test scores and it is useful to compare the role of maternal schooling and
ability in our results. Each estimate is computed as Minimum Distance estimates
based on equation (2.1). Standard errors are clustered at the county-cohort level.
OLS results indicate that one year of additional mother's education increases math-
ematics standardized scores by 5% of a standard deviation at ages 7 and 8, while the
IV coecient is 10% (the dierence between OLS and IV is signicant at the 8% level).
The results for the reading score at ages 7 and 8 are similar to those for the math score,
but somewhat smaller. However, at ages 12 to 14 the eect of mother's schooling on
both math and reading become small and insignicant in the IV results.
Mother's education also has strong eects on child behavioral problems (BPI) at
both ages. There is an interesting pattern in these results: the eects on math and2 Maternal Education 35
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reading decline with the age of the child, while the eect on behavior is increasing.
At face value it seems that a better educated mother may be able to help accelerate
academic achievement, an eect that is not sustained in the long run. However, the
impact on behavior is sustained and possibly reinforced with time. The dierence
across ages for the eect on the math test is signicant at the 11% level.
The results in columns (7) and (8) of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 examine grade repetition.
A one year increase in mother's education reduces the probability of grade repetition
by 2.8 percentage points for both age groups (IV). Child obesity is not inuenced
by maternal schooling at either age in the IV results. This is surprising, given the
consensus that child obesity is largely aected by eating habits and physical exercise.
At the bottom of each table we report the impact of the maternal AFQT score
on child outcomes. As expected and shown in other papers, the cognitive ability of
the mother is a strong predictor of the cognitive ability of the child. The IV results
show that the eect of mother's AFQT on child's performance in math and reading
is larger at 12-14 than at 7 to 8. At ages 7 to 8, each year of maternal education
produces a slightly larger increase in the math score of the child than a one standard
deviation in maternal AFQT, so that (very roughly) a 4 year college degree produces
the same increase in math at 7 and 8 as a 4 standard deviation increase in mother's
cognition (a large eect). Equally striking is the result that mother's AFQT does not
predict either child's behavior or child's grade repetition, although mother's schooling
is a strong determinant of both.
These results resemble the ndings of Cunha and Heckman (2006), who estimate
that parental background has a strong eect on the child's cognitive skill at early
ages which disappears later on, and a weaker initial eect on her non-cognitive skill
which becomes stronger as the child ages. In their model, cognitive and non-cognitive
skills are not equally plastic across ages and they estimate that cognitive skills are less
malleable than non-cognitive skills. This result has been argued to be true in other
papers (e.g., Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonko (2006)). Our estimates would2 Maternal Education 38
be consistent with such a model if we interpret maternal schooling as reecting mostly
environmental eects, and maternal cognition as being at least partly related with the
heritability of cognitive ability. We would expect the environment to strongly aect
child behavior at all ages, but to decrease its inuence on cognition as the child grows,
while the role of AFQT becomes stronger with child's age. Unless there is a strong
environmental component to AFQT after controlling for maternal schooling, maternal
AFQT may not be strongly related with the behavior of the child (unless cognitive
and non-cognitive innate traits are positively correlated in the population14).
We also present estimates for four dierent subsamples, dened according to the
gender of the child and the AFQT of the mother. We divide white mothers into two
groups: white high AFQT mothers have a score above or equal to 0.4, while white low
AFQT mothers have a score below 0.4. For blacks, we set the cuto point at -0.25.15
When we break down the results by gender and (separately) by AFQT we nd
that our estimates are highest for female children and for high AFQT mothers (except
for grade repetition at ages 12-14). The decline in the eect of mother's schooling on
the math score can be attributed to the impact on girls, which is very strong at age
7-8 but virtually vanishes later. A similar decline can be observed for high AFQT
mothers: they achieve a large improvement in the performance of their kids, but the
impact vanishes by ages 12-14. In contrast, the eect on the behavioral problems
index does not decline with age and the impact is substantial and signicant. The
lowest impact is on male children (not signicant in the IV regression). The impact
14Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) as well as Duckworth and Seligman (2005) argue that there
is little correlation between cognitive and non-cognitive traits of children and adolescents. That is not
the case in the data analyzed in Carneiro, Crawford, and Goodman (2007).
15This is done to account for the dierent distributions of AFQT between whites and blacks. There
are two reasons why the eect of maternal education on child outcomes can vary across these two
groups of mothers. First, this parameter can be a function of AFQT. Second, even within AFQT cells,
this parameter can vary across observationally similar mothers. In that case the instrumental variables
estimate will be an average of the eects of maternal education for the set of mothers aected by the
instrument, and this set can be very dierent in the high and low AFQT groups, since AFQT and
unobservable ability both determine the schooling decision of mothers. Unfortunately, our procedure
confounds the two phenomena, but it is still of great interest especially if we can interpret it as (within
each AFQT group) the eect of schooling for those mothers most likely to change schooling in response
to a decrease in the costs of attending university (measured by our set of instrumental variables).2 Maternal Education 39
of mother's education on grade repetition is also persistent across ages. Overall, at
ages 7-8, results are almost always stronger for mother's with high AFQT. At 12-14,
however, for BPI and grade repetition the results are stronger for low AFQT mothers.
Generally, the IV results for white children are higher than the OLS ones. This may
seem surprising because an ability bias intuition would tell us otherwise. However, this
result is common in the returns to schooling literature (Card, 1999), and also emerges
in the papers by Currie and Moretti (2003) and Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2003).
Part of the dierence can be explained by measurement error in maternal education
(Card, 1999), which could bias downwards the OLS results. Beyond these common
arguments the standard intuition that is valid in the xed coecient model no longer
applies when the impacts are heterogeneous. In this case IV estimates may well exceed
OLS estimates of the eect of maternal schooling on child outcomes. On the one hand,
with heterogeneous eects the OLS estimates do not have a clear direction of bias; on
the other hand the IV estimates, valid only under a suitable monotonicity assumption
(see Imbens and Angrist (1994)), pick up the eect on the marginal individual, which
can be larger than the average eect.
A natural concern is that our instruments may be weak; we discuss this in our
sensitivity analysis (section 2.4.4).
(b) Black children
It is well documented that there are large dierences in the processes of human capital
accumulation of blacks and whites.16 Furthermore, ethnic dierences in skill formation
are an important source of concern for education policies in many countries. Therefore
we compare the role of maternal education for white and black children.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present estimates of the eect of maternal education on outcomes
for black children. Results are similar to the ones for white children, with the impacts
16See, e.g., Currie and Thomas (1995), Jencks and Phillips (1998), Fryer and Levitt (2004), Carneiro,
Heckman, and Masterov (2005), Neal (2005), Todd and Wolpin (2006).2 Maternal Education 40
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on math and reading, BPI, and grade repetition being large and signicant, and the
impact on obesity being imprecisely determined. There are, however, some dierences.
First, estimated impacts are stronger at 12-14 than at 7-8, and we do not observe the
tendency of the math (and reading) impact to decline. Second, in the IV estimates
the impact on grade repetition for 12-14 year olds is twice as large for black children
than for whites, and the p-value for the dierence is 5.7%. For children of low AFQT
mothers, a year of education reduces the probability of grade repetition by almost 10
percentage points (which partly mirrors dierences in prevalence of grade repetition).
Third, maternal AFQT is a stronger predictor of child outcomes for blacks than for
whites. Fourth, the role of maternal schooling is larger for males than for females.
2.4.2 Home Environments
The impact of mothers education on child outcomes is strong in a number of dimen-
sions. Since we do not have an explicit model of child development, we cannot rmly
establish the role of these channels. However, our results in this section paint a picture
of how they may operate, and their detail makes them especially useful. The results
for whites are reported in Table 2.9. We comment on the IV results, while in the
Appendix 2.A we also report the OLS results for completeness. The maternal char-
acteristics examined are maternal age at birth, educational aspirations for the child
(does the mother believe whether the child will go to college), marital status, spouse's
years of schooling (for those with a spouse), number of children, hours worked, and
log family income (which includes spouse's income). All variables are measured when
the child is 7 or 8.
An increase in mother's schooling by one year leads to increases in: maternal age
at birth by one year, family income by 18%, the probability of being married of 4%,
spouse's years of schooling by 0.5. The eect on fertility is surprisingly small.17
Several economists have argued that it is important to account for the eects of
17Note that we only have incomplete fertility and that more educated mothers delay childbirth.2 Maternal Education 43
Table 2.9: Family environment { IV results: White children
IV estimates: White children (7-8 years)
Maternal Number of Marital Spouse Hours Lg family Maternal
age children status schooling worked income aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother's schooling: All 1.024 -0.017 0.041 0.549 55.633 0.177 0.048
[0.139]*** [0.057] [0.018]** [0.092]*** [38.528] [0.034]*** [0.018]***
Mother's schooling: Male child 1.074 -0.029 0.053 0.512 55.724 0.196 0.066
[0.192]*** [0.072] [0.021]** [0.121]*** [45.630] [0.046]*** [0.025]***
Mother's schooling: Female child 0.983 -0.008 0.029 0.572 55.524 0.157 0.039
[0.176]*** [0.065] [0.021] [0.104]*** [48.314] [0.047]*** [0.020]*
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 0.846 -0.107 0.045 0.486 24.112 0.177 0.057
[0.200]*** [0.088] [0.023]** [0.137]*** [53.715] [0.047]*** [0.020]***
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 1.205 0.059 0.034 0.608 86.592 0.176 0.028
[0.202]*** [0.080] [0.029] [0.132]*** [53.253] [0.050]*** [0.030]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.247 0.079 0.015 0.061 148.174 0.191 0.011
[0.218] [0.099] [0.029] [0.160] [59.570]** [0.056]*** [0.039]
Observations 4395 4395 4391 3335 4307 3796 1235
Mean 24.282 2.752 0.770 13.231 1152.305 10.361 0.764
Standard deviation 4.632 1.195 0.421 2.490 950.919 0.970 0.425
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
assortative mating because the causal eect of maternal education on child performance
may come through her ability to nd an educated father for the child. They also
argue that maternal education can have ambiguous eects because if on one hand the
child benets from better home environments and perhaps richer investments, she will
benet of less maternal time because more educated mothers spend more time in the
labor market. Two examples are Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) and Plug (2004),
who estimate small or no eects of maternal education on child's schooling, while
father's education has large and strong eects on this outcome. Unfortunately we do
not have good instruments for either of these variables and cannot directly assess the
validity of these arguments. However, we can examine the eect of maternal schooling
on spouse's schooling and on maternal labor supply.
As pointed out above, column (4) shows that an increase of one year in maternal
education leads to an increase of 0.5 years of spouse's education. If we attributed all the
eects of maternal education to assortative mating we would need father's schooling
to have almost twice as large eects as the ones we estimate for mothers. Therefore,
assortative mating eects are unlikely to fully drive our results. Column (5) looks2 Maternal Education 44
at the eects of maternal education on maternal employment measured in terms of
annual hours worked. Annual hours worked increase by 56 hours per additional year
of maternal schooling (5% of the mean of 1,152 hours worked per year), or roughly 1.5
weeks of full-time work per year, although the eect is imprecisely estimated. If we
compared a mother with a college degree and another without, our estimates suggest
that the former would work 6 more weeks per year than the latter. Cumulating over
several years of childhood, these will translate into much more family resources for the
mother with a college degree, but less time at home. The latter can have an osetting
eect on the former, although it depends on what kind of substitutes educated mothers
can nd for their time with their child.
Column (7) shows that more educated mothers are 5 percentage points more likely
to believe that their ospring will complete college. These expectations may translate
into dierent behavior on the side of the mother and the child.
The estimates presented in Table 2.9 are fairly similar for boys and girls, and for
children of mothers with high and low levels of AFQT. There are only a few cases of
interesting dierences across groups. In particular, the eect of maternal education on
maternal aspirations and marital status are small for low AFQT mothers, which may
be the reason why we found weak eects on child outcomes for this group of mothers.
One feature of the data set we use is the wealth of information on direct measures
of home environments and parental investments, as reported in Table 2.10. For white
children, an increase in mother's schooling by one year leads to increases in the proba-
bilities that: there is a musical instrument in the home by 5.4%; there is a computer in
the home by 5.7%; a child takes special lessons by 6.2%. Each extra year of schooling
also means that mothers are 4.5% more likely to read to their child at least three times
a week. There is no evidence that maternal education aects the amount of newspa-
pers in the home, adult supervision out of school, and time spent with the child in a
museum or sharing meals. Notice that more educated mothers do not seem to spend
less time in activities with their children, even though they spend more time working.2 Maternal Education 45
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This pattern emerges throughout this chapter, even much more strongly than here,
and we will comment on it with detail when we examine the child's early years.
The results for black mothers are slightly dierent, and they are shown in Tables
2.11 and 2.12. Relatively to white mothers, education not only aects maternal age at
Table 2.11: Family environment { IV results: Black children
IV estimates: Black children (7-8 years)
Maternal Number of Marital Spouse Hours Lg family Maternal
age children status schooling worked income aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother's schooling: All 0.896 -0.304 0.061 0.529 182.163 0.190 0.047
[0.147]*** [0.063]*** [0.020]*** [0.079]*** [33.790]*** [0.033]*** [0.019]**
Mother's schooling: Male child 0.929 -0.326 0.073 0.484 220.602 0.238 0.046
[0.200]*** [0.079]*** [0.024]*** [0.096]*** [52.013]*** [0.041]*** [0.025]*
Mother's schooling: Female child 0.867 -0.287 0.049 0.564 161.719 0.133 0.048
[0.187]*** [0.073]*** [0.024]** [0.089]*** [39.800]*** [0.043]*** [0.025]*
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 0.841 -0.257 0.059 0.484 138.268 0.257 0.036
[0.225]*** [0.089]*** [0.031]* [0.130]*** [46.324]*** [0.051]*** [0.028]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.937 -0.347 0.062 0.559 233.002 0.144 0.054
[0.195]*** [0.085]*** [0.024]** [0.105]*** [49.888]*** [0.042]*** [0.023]**
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.096 0.089 0.077 0.032 131.007 0.197 0.107
[0.286] [0.112] [0.042]* [0.227] [79.503]* [0.077]** [0.063]*
Observations 2647 2647 2646 943 2624 2129 422
Mean 22.070 3.097 0.375 12.688 1139.074 9.638 0.656
Standard deviation 4.489 1.413 0.484 2.095 991.853 0.930 0.475
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
birth, aspirations, marital status, spouse's schooling and income, but it also has large
eects on fertility and employment. Each additional four years in school (a four year
university degree) decreases the number of children born to each woman by 1.2, and
increase maternal employment by over 730 hours (or roughly 18 weeks) per year. The
eects of education on income are especially large for high AFQT mothers, while the
eects of education on employment and fertility are stronger for low AFQT mothers.
It is remarkable that each year of maternal schooling among blacks increases the
proportion of children going to a museum at least several times per year by 3.2%, and
the proportion of children who are read to at least three times a week by 5.4% (these
are time intensive activities). Part of this may be due to the fact that more educated
black mothers have less children to spend their time with. However, an extra year
of maternal education also makes it 5.1% less likely that black children have adult2 Maternal Education 47
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.2 Maternal Education 48
supervision when they arrive home after school, which can have detrimental eects on
their behavior (Aizer, 2004). This problem is worse for males than for females. The
fact that the eects of maternal education on child outcomes are not only strong, but
they are especially strong for black males, shows that mothers are able to overcome
the problem of low adult supervision through other means. When we examine the
remaining home environment variables, we only nd statistically signicant eects of
the presence of a computer in the home and enrolment in special lessons.
In summary, there exists strong evidence that maternal education aects home
environments and child outcomes. The size of several of our estimates in this sec-
tion is large, and suggests that we should seriously look at education policy as a
way of improving the home environments of future generations of children. Educated
mothers provide better surroundings for their children by postponing and decreasing
childbearing, by increasing family resources, and by assortative mating. There is also
strong evidence that educated mothers invest more in their children. However, edu-
cated mothers also spend longer periods outside the home working and earning. Still,
whatever the negative consequences of spending time away from the children may be,
they are outweighed by the positive eects. With the exception of adult supervision
for black children, more educated mothers do not spend less time with their children,
either because they have less children, or less leisure time. If anything, our results
indicate that the opposite is true.
At this point it is useful to compare our estimates of the eect of maternal ed-
ucation to those of other childhood interventions. The large class size reduction of
the STAR experiment (a reduction from 22 to 15 pupils per class, studied by Krueger
(1999)) yielded test score gains of 0.2 standard deviations, an equivalent of two years of
maternal schooling. Dahl and Lochner (2006) estimate that a $1,000 increase in family
income improves performance on the math test score by 2.1% of a standard deviation
(3.6% for reading). Using mother xed eects, Currie and Thomas (1995) estimate
that participation in Head Start increases performance in the PPVT vocabulary test2 Maternal Education 49
by almost 6 percentile points (which is about 20 to 25% of a standard deviation).
Bernal and Keane (2006) nd that additional formal child care does not improve the
average child test score performance, but may be benecial for children of poorly ed-
ucated mothers. Aizer (2004) estimates that adult supervision after school reduces
the probability of a child engaging in risky behavior by about 7 percentage points.
Dustmann and Sch onberg (2007) nd that increasing paid maternity leave does not
signicantly improve long-term child outcomes. Our claim is that, although the nature
of the dierent interventions diers quite a lot, the eects of maternal education are
large when compared to those of other interventions. If the objective is to increase
children's outcomes, additional maternal education may be a serious competitor to
the other types of interventions. Of course, in doing this kind of comparison, it is
important to keep in mind that each of the interventions have dierent costs and may
aect children along a variety of dimensions, and comparisons become dicult when
trade-os between dierent objectives are involved.
2.4.3 Early Childhood and Young Adulthood
In this section we investigate two issues. First, which of these eects are visible at
earlier ages of the child? This question is particularly interesting given the recent
academic and policy emphasis on the importance of the early years. Second, is there
any evidence of eects of maternal schooling on environments and behavior during
adolescence and young adulthood, when behavioral anomalies such as engagement in
criminal activities, early dropping out of school, or early child bearing, may be the
source of long run problems? Ideally, we would like to follow individuals well into their
adult lives, but unfortunately this is not yet possible with this sample.
(a) Early Childhood
Here we present estimates of the eect of maternal schooling on the probability of the
child having low birth-weight (weighing less than 5.5 pounds at birth), and the score2 Maternal Education 50
on the MSD scale, which assesses the motor and social skills development, both for
children up to 24 months. Results are shown for whites and blacks in Table 2.13.
Table 2.13: Early outcomes { IV results
IV estimates: Children 0-1 years
Whites Blacks
Low birthweight MSD Low birthweight MSD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother's schooling: All -0.004 -0.076 -0.012 0.084
[0.007] [0.035]** [0.013] [0.049]*
Mother's schooling: Male child -0.006 -0.080 -0.010 0.060
[0.010] [0.045]* [0.016] [0.056]
Mother's schooling: Female child -0.003 -0.072 -0.016 0.138
[0.011] [0.047] [0.020] [0.079]*
Mother's schooling: High AFQT -0.010 -0.054 0.008 0.013
[0.010] [0.043] [0.017] [0.065]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.002 -0.120 -0.036 0.157
[0.011] [0.061]** [0.018]** [0.066]**
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.008 0.025 -0.000 -0.242
[0.013] [0.071] [0.025] [0.137]*
Observations 5580 2136 2806 781
Mean 0.065 -0.039 0.130 0.184
Standard deviation 0.246 0.994 0.337 1.216
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
Currie and Moretti (2003) nd that one extra year of maternal education reduces
the probability that a child is born with low birth-weight by 1 percentage point. Our
estimates for whites are lower and insignicant, whether we use OLS or IV, although
we have a much smaller sample than Currie and Moretti (2003). Results are only
statistically strong for black mothers with low AFQT scores, for whom the coecient
is -0.036 (the incidence of low birth-weight is of 14.9% for this group).
Looking at the relationship between maternal education and early motor and social
skills of the child a new picture emerges. For whites, our estimates are small but
negative, especially for low ability mothers. This is the rst and only instance where
increases in maternal schooling may not be good for their children, perhaps because
of increased maternal employment and less time with the child.
Table 2.14 presents the results for early home environments of whites, where the
following outcomes are considered: smoking in the year prior to the birth of the child,2 Maternal Education 51
Table 2.14: Early channels { IV results: white children
IV estimates: White children 0-1 years
Smoking d. Weeks Formal Hours Mother Book Soft Outings
pregnancy breastfeeding child care worked reads toys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother's schooling: All -0.069 2.307 0.013 102.498 0.006 0.071 -0.198 -0.005
[0.016]*** [0.710]*** [0.007]* [29.598]*** [0.014] [0.030]** [0.421] [0.016]
Mother's schooling: Male child -0.064 1.976 0.004 121.941 0.001 0.063 -0.374 -0.011
[0.021]*** [0.941]** [0.010] [40.272]*** [0.020] [0.045] [0.525] [0.022]
Mother's schooling: Female child -0.074 2.717 0.022 86.187 0.011 0.077 0.059 0.000
[0.022]*** [1.043]*** [0.010]** [37.428]** [0.021] [0.042]* [0.624] [0.022]
Mother's schooling: High AFQT -0.062 1.059 0.016 109.035 -0.008 0.026 -0.284 0.001
[0.020]*** [0.968] [0.011] [39.213]*** [0.019] [0.040] [0.559] [0.020]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT -0.081 3.801 0.011 93.057 0.027 0.139 -0.075 -0.017
[0.028]*** [1.061]*** [0.009] [47.500]* [0.024] [0.051]*** [0.677] [0.029]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.065 0.763 0.020 81.880 0.053 0.136 2.507 0.021
[0.031]** [1.364] [0.010]* [42.710]* [0.030]* [0.062]** [0.775]*** [0.030]
Observations 2293 2220 4850 5942 2358 2382 2343 2380
Mean 0.287 15.370 0.066 926.749 0.607 3.240 16.654 0.691
Standard deviation 0.452 22.126 0.248 880.676 0.489 1.062 12.456 0.462
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
weeks of breastfeeding, use of formal child care arrangements, annual hours worked by
the mother, whether the child is read to, how many books and soft toys the child has,
and whether the child is taken on outings regularly.
The two health inputs, (not) smoking and breastfeeding, are strongly aected by
maternal schooling. Notice also that the eect on maternal hours worked is much larger
when measured during the child's early years than later on (as we saw in Table 2.9). At
the same time, the increase in formal child care is modest and only statistically strong
for girls. The strong increase in hours worked that results from additional education
is not accompanied by a strong increase in formal child-care, raising the question of
how these children are cared for. This could be seen as support to the argument that
more educated mothers spend more time working, with detrimental eects on child
development. Still, even if this is true, children seem to recover, so that BPI and grade
repetition at 12 and 14 are lower when maternal education is higher. Finally, there is
no evidence that, even though they work more, more educated mothers spend less time
breastfeeding, reading to their children, or taking them on outings. This is consistent
with recent ndings from time diary studies summarized in Blau and Currie (2003):2 Maternal Education 52
Table 2.15: Early channels { IV results: Black children
IV estimates: Black children 0-1 years
Smoking d. Weeks Formal Hours Mother Book Soft Outings
pregnancy breastfeeding child care worked reads toys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother's schooling: All -0.026 1.422 0.019 194.011 0.050 0.130 -0.115 0.002
[0.021] [0.626]** [0.008]** [28.539]*** [0.022]** [0.052]** [0.456] [0.019]
Mother's schooling: Male child -0.005 1.223 0.017 183.880 0.063 0.150 0.395 -0.002
[0.026] [0.749] [0.010]* [36.948]*** [0.026]** [0.060]** [0.584] [0.026]
Mother's schooling: Female child -0.048 1.717 0.023 205.266 0.030 0.099 -0.415 0.005
[0.026]* [0.871]** [0.012]* [38.655]*** [0.031] [0.070] [0.504] [0.026]
Mother's schooling: High AFQT -0.034 -0.148 0.035 180.036 0.057 0.092 -0.125 -0.025
[0.027] [1.014] [0.015]** [39.661]*** [0.032]* [0.067] [0.527] [0.023]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT -0.017 1.966 0.014 210.150 0.044 0.166 -0.097 0.044
[0.029] [0.684]*** [0.009] [42.733]*** [0.029] [0.065]** [0.642] [0.028]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All 0.024 0.680 0.009 140.934 0.013 0.208 -1.184 0.024
[0.048] [1.249] [0.015] [61.143]** [0.049] [0.100]** [0.950] [0.042]
Observations 861 855 2257 2965 894 897 889 897
Mean 0.278 5.513 0.070 767.310 0.371 2.337 11.227 0.661
Standard deviation 0.448 13.905 0.254 885.509 0.483 1.190 10.086 0.474
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
mothers who work more do not spend less time with their children; instead, they have
less leisure. It is also consistent with the analysis of (large) changes in maternity leave
laws in Germany by Dustmann and Sch onberg (2007) who nd no positive eect on
child outcomes. Notice also that young children of educated mothers have more books
than other children, especially if their mothers have low cognitive ability.
In summary, it is dicult to make the case that the large increase in employment
of white mothers that results from additional education has detrimental eects on
children. There may be some delays in their motor and social development, especially
for low AFQT mothers, but they do not appear to have any long term undesirable
consequences. In fact, it is for low AFQT mothers that maternal education has the
largest positive eects on home environments.
For black families this picture is even more evident. The main results are shown in
column (3) and (4) of Table 2.13. The impacts of maternal education on birth-weight
and motor and social development are positive and large, especially for low ability
mothers. An additional year of education leads to about 200 extra hours of work, but
also more regular use of formal child care arrangements, prolonged breastfeeding, more2 Maternal Education 53
time reading to the child, and more children's books in the home (Table 2.15).
The estimates displayed in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 tell a clear and important story:
improvements in maternal schooling promote much better home environments during
the early years of the child; although more educated mothers work more, they do not
spend less quality time with their children, and if anything the opposite is true; it is
striking that for many outcomes, for both black and white mothers, it is for low ability
mother that education has the largest impact on early home environments.
(b) Young Adulthood
Finally, we examine engagement in some risky behaviors in late adolescence: early
dropping out of school, early childbearing, and criminal activity. It is important to
keep in mind that many children of the NLSY79 cohort members have not yet reached
adulthood. Thus, the children we observe in this age range are mainly from the early
cohorts and from mothers with very low birth ages, and the sample size is smaller than
for the younger cohorts. Still, at the very least, the following demonstrates that the
eect of maternal education follows the children into adulthood.
Table 2.16: Young adults { IV results
IV estimates: Young adults (18-19 years)
White Black
Enrollment Conviction Own children Enrollment Conviction Own children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother's schooling: All 0.031 -0.002 -0.045 0.010 -0.018 -0.036
[0.021] [0.014] [0.014]*** [0.021] [0.013] [0.014]**
Mother's schooling: Male young adult 0.033 -0.004 -0.047 0.005 -0.039 -0.017
[0.032] [0.023] [0.020]** [0.031] [0.020]* [0.018]
Mother's schooling: Female young adult 0.030 -0.001 -0.043 0.016 -0.005 -0.070
[0.026] [0.017] [0.021]** [0.030] [0.016] [0.024]***
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 0.033 -0.012 -0.052 -0.017 -0.040 -0.036
[0.030] [0.020] [0.020]*** [0.033] [0.018]** [0.017]**
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.030 0.007 -0.037 0.034 0.007 -0.037
[0.029] [0.019] [0.020]* [0.030] [0.020] [0.023]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All 0.042 -0.046 0.010 -0.068 -0.049 0.000
[0.052] [0.031] [0.026] [0.058] [0.025]* [0.043]
Observations 935 1047 816 742 889 612
Mean 0.624 0.154 0.091 0.627 0.124 0.157
Standard deviation 0.485 0.361 0.296 0.484 0.329 0.398
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.2 Maternal Education 54
Table 2.16 present estimates of the eect of maternal schooling on several outcomes:
a dummy for school enrollment, a dummy for convictions, and the number of own
children, all at ages 18 and 19. Among whites, we only observe strong eects on
fertility. For blacks, the decrease in the conviction rate is notable for boys and children
of high ability mothers, and so is the decrease in fertility, especially for girls.
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our main results, presented in section
2.4.1 above. An important concern in this work is with the potential weakness of
the instruments (although the p-values of the instruments in the rst stage equations
are very low). Most of the literature on weak instruments deals with models of xed
coecients. In such cases, one standard recommendation is to estimate the model
using LIML instead of two stage least squares, as we have done so far (e.g., Staiger
and Stock (1997)). Therefore, we proceed by estimating the model by LIML. Here we
present results for the main outcomes for the sample of white children. Panel B in
Table 2.17 shows that, at ages 7-8, the LIML estimates are of the same sign than the
original two stage least squares (TSLS) estimates in the chapter, but they have larger
absolute magnitudes and they are more imprecise (which would be a prediction of most
of the literature).18 This means that the TSLS estimates are closer to OLS than LIML,
which is what we would expect if the instruments were weak. Notice also that, even
with the imprecise LIML estimates, the eect of maternal schooling on white children
cognitive development drops substantially from ages 7-8 to ages 10-12, while that is
not the case for grade repetition and BPI.
These results suggest that, although we may suer from a weak instruments prob-
lem, if anything our estimates understate the true impact of maternal education on
child outcomes since TSLS is biased towards OLS (and the latter are generally smaller
than the former in absolute value). However, we need to be cautious about conclusions
18Panel A reproduces our base case result for easy reference.2 Maternal Education 55
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from these results, since the literature on weak instruments we draw on refers to a xed
coecient model.
Another possible criticism of our procedure is that, since we are relying on interac-
tions between controls and instruments, if the outcome equation is misspecied then
some of our results might be driven by nonlinearities instead of genuine variation in
the instruments. Therefore we re-estimate our model with a more exible specication
of the outcome equations, where we add the following variables to the set of controls:
AFQT squared, grandmother's education squared, grandfather's education squared,
and all two-way interactions between AFQT, grandmother's education, grandfather's
education and whether the mother lived in a broken home at age 14. These additional
controls are also interacted with the four group indicators. The IV estimates of the
coecient on maternal schooling are presented in the rst row of Panel C of Table
2.17. The results are virtually unchanged by this additional set of controls.
All of our results presented included cohort xed eects. Another specication
check is reported in the second row of Panel C, in which we address the possible concern
that the four subgroups of interest may follow group-specic trends, by including group-
specic cohort indicators. Results are essentially unchanged except for PIAT reading
at 7-8 and grade repetition at 12-14. Panel D shows results where we vary the set
of instruments we use. We show results where we exclude the distance variable and
the corresponding interactions, and then both distance and tuition (and corresponding
interactions), so that the results rely only on opportunity cost variables. This kind of
experiment is interesting as dierent instruments may aect dierent subgroups, and
this approach has been used to compare returns for dierent groups (Cameron and
Taber, 2004). There is of course a loss of eciency connected to excluding some of
the instruments, so the precision of these estimates is somewhat lower. The return
in terms of PIAT scores for ages 7-8 goes up. When we exclude tuition as well, the
BPI coecient goes down and becomes insignicant. But overall, the results are very2 Maternal Education 57
similar to the base case.19
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we study the eect of maternal education on their children's outcomes,
including cognitive development as measured by test score performance, behavioral
problems, grade repetition, and health outcomes. We also examine home environ-
ments and parental investments. We instrument maternal schooling with local tuition
fees, distance to college, and local labor market variables. In the outcome equations
we condition on county and time eects, thus removing the impact of permanent dif-
ferences and aggregate trends. We obtain additional variation in the instruments by
allowing the eect to vary with family background of the mother.
Our results show that mother's education increases the child's performance in both
math and reading at ages 7-8, but these eects are not seen at ages 12-14. Maternal
education also reduces the incidence of behavioral problems and reduces grade repe-
tition, but we nd no eect on obesity. More educated mothers delay childbearing,
are more likely to be married, have substantially better educated spouses and higher
family income. They are more likely to invest in their children through books, provid-
ing musical instruments, special lessons, or availability of a computer. Even though
they work more, more educated mothers do not spend less time breastfeeding, reading
to their children or taking them on outings. Finally, the eect of maternal education
persists into adolescence, reducing the number of children born to the young adults at
ages 18-19, and the number of criminal convictions for blacks.
A policy implication is that intergenerational transmission is important for under-
standing long term policy eectiveness. This is important because many programmes
are struggling to improve outcomes for poor children. Programmes which manage to
increase mothers schooling are likely to be important not only for mothers now but
19We should also mention that we have estimated more parsimonious models where we include state
xed eects instead of county xed eects, which resulted in similar estimates to the ones we present.2 Maternal Education 58
also for their future children, and should be designed and judged with this in mind.
Our interest in understanding the eect of parental education on children's human
capital is closely related to the study of intergenerational mobility. Solon (1999) points
out that the high correlation between parental income and their ospring's income is
well-documented, but that the underlying causes are not very well understood. Our
ndings suggest that parental educational choices may be an important transmission
channel of intergenerational inequality. They imply that an additional year of parental
education increases a child's test score performance by about 0.1 of a standard devi-
ation. If a one standard deviation dierence in age 7 test scores translates into wage
increases of around 4% (Carneiro, Crawford, and Goodman (2007)), then the change
in child's earnings due to the additional year of parental education is about 0.4%. If
an additional year of parental education increases parental earnings by say 10% (Card,
1999), this mechanism implies that a one percent change in parental income is asso-
ciated with about a 0.04 percent change in children's earnings. Comparing this to an
empirical long-run elasticity between parental and children's earnings of around 0.4
(Solon (1999)), it becomes clear that parental education plays an important role in
transmitting inequality. Of course, this is only a rough calculation. Still, it implies
that parental education accounts for a substantive part of the intergenerational cor-
relation in earnings, and it supports the view that educational policy can inuence
intergenerational mobility.2 Maternal Education 59
2.A Appendix
Table 2.18: Family environment { OLS results: White children
OLS estimates: White children (7-8 years)
Maternal Number of Marital Spouse Hours Lg family Maternal
age children status schooling worked income aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother's schooling: All 0.984 -0.037 0.016 0.533 71.027 0.152 0.047
[0.053]*** [0.024] [0.006]*** [0.043]*** [13.050]*** [0.013]*** [0.008]***
Mother's schooling: Male child 0.936 -0.040 0.019 0.557 74.430 0.156 0.046
[0.064]*** [0.026] [0.007]*** [0.049]*** [16.365]*** [0.016]*** [0.011]***
Mother's schooling: Female child 1.041 -0.033 0.012 0.509 67.913 0.149 0.048
[0.069]*** [0.027] [0.007] [0.050]*** [15.874]*** [0.015]*** [0.011]***
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 0.959 -0.025 0.015 0.548 53.733 0.155 0.045
[0.070]*** [0.030] [0.007]** [0.059]*** [18.347]*** [0.017]*** [0.010]***
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 1.016 -0.057 0.017 0.517 91.878 0.148 0.050
[0.080]*** [0.039] [0.011] [0.063]*** [20.300]*** [0.019]*** [0.014]***
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.231 0.080 0.032 0.043 130.226 0.202 0.003
[0.183] [0.089] [0.023] [0.146] [50.983]** [0.049]*** [0.035]
Observations 4395 4395 4391 3335 4307 3796 1235
Mean 24.282 2.752 0.770 13.231 1152.305 10.361 0.764
Standard deviation 4.632 1.195 0.421 2.490 950.919 0.970 0.425
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.2 Maternal Education 60
Table 2.19: Family environment { OLS results: Black children
OLS estimates: Black children (7-8 years)
Maternal Number of Marital Spouse Hours Lg family Maternal
age children status schooling worked income aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mother's schooling: All 1.025 -0.190 0.034 0.460 175.560 0.156 0.071
[0.078]*** [0.032]*** [0.011]*** [0.073]*** [17.140]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]***
Mother's schooling: Male child 1.106 -0.210 0.048 0.446 178.186 0.169 0.081
[0.098]*** [0.040]*** [0.013]*** [0.084]*** [19.795]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]***
Mother's schooling: Female child 0.941 -0.181 0.023 0.468 171.745 0.122 0.053
[0.100]*** [0.034]*** [0.012]* [0.076]*** [22.375]*** [0.022]*** [0.023]**
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 1.154 -0.158 0.021 0.386 93.849 0.163 0.039
[0.129]*** [0.051]*** [0.019] [0.115]*** [29.230]*** [0.032]*** [0.027]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.942 -0.212 0.040 0.510 215.690 0.154 0.083
[0.102]*** [0.042]*** [0.013]*** [0.094]*** [20.712]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]***
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.148 0.017 0.095 0.086 154.825 0.208 0.100
[0.272] [0.108] [0.041]** [0.230] [77.030]** [0.073]*** [0.062]
Observations 2647 2647 2646 943 2624 2129 422
Mean 22.070 3.097 0.375 12.688 1139.074 9.638 0.656
Standard deviation 4.489 1.413 0.484 2.095 991.853 0.930 0.475
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.2 Maternal Education 61
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Table 2.22: Early outcomes { OLS results
OLS estimates: Children 0-1 years
Whites Blacks
Low birthweight MSD Low birthweight MSD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother's schooling: All -0.001 -0.044 -0.005 0.011
[0.003] [0.016]*** [0.007] [0.035]
Mother's schooling: Male child -0.004 -0.041 -0.006 0.019
[0.004] [0.018]** [0.008] [0.039]
Mother's schooling: Female child 0.004 -0.049 -0.003 -0.007
[0.005] [0.023]** [0.009] [0.053]
Mother's schooling: High AFQT -0.003 -0.046 0.004 -0.022
[0.004] [0.018]** [0.009] [0.058]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.003 -0.037 -0.014 0.028
[0.005] [0.029] [0.009] [0.042]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.007 -0.032 -0.003 -0.193
[0.012] [0.063] [0.023] [0.132]
Observations 5580 2136 2806 781
Mean 0.065 -0.039 0.130 0.184
Standard deviation 0.246 0.994 0.337 1.216
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
Table 2.23: Early channels { OLS results: white children
OLS estimates: White children 0-1 years
Smoking d. Weeks Formal Hours Mother Book Soft Outings
pregnancy breastfeeding child care worked reads toys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother's schooling: All -0.062 1.361 0.010 113.796 0.031 0.088 -0.185 -0.002
[0.006]*** [0.337]*** [0.003]*** [10.507]*** [0.006]*** [0.013]*** [0.173] [0.007]
Mother's schooling: Male child -0.065 0.925 0.008 121.788 0.037 0.104 -0.167 -0.008
[0.008]*** [0.393]** [0.004]** [11.946]*** [0.008]*** [0.018]*** [0.205] [0.009]
Mother's schooling: Female child -0.056 2.017 0.013 102.060 0.026 0.075 -0.218 0.004
[0.009]*** [0.454]*** [0.004]*** [13.418]*** [0.008]*** [0.016]*** [0.266] [0.009]
Mother's schooling: High AFQT -0.053 1.516 0.013 96.074 0.029 0.084 -0.211 -0.012
[0.008]*** [0.416]*** [0.004]*** [13.952]*** [0.007]*** [0.016]*** [0.226] [0.008]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT -0.079 1.081 0.008 135.521 0.038 0.098 -0.140 0.015
[0.011]*** [0.558]* [0.004]* [15.396]*** [0.012]*** [0.024]*** [0.301] [0.011]
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All -0.072 1.697 0.022 72.402 0.023 0.093 2.333 0.016
[0.028]** [1.185] [0.009]** [39.045]* [0.028] [0.053]* [0.668]*** [0.026]
Observations 2293 2220 4850 5942 2358 2382 2343 2380
Mean 0.287 15.370 0.066 926.749 0.607 3.240 16.654 0.691
Standard deviation 0.452 22.126 0.248 880.676 0.489 1.062 12.456 0.462
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.2 Maternal Education 64
Table 2.24: Early channels { OLS results: Black children
OLS estimates: Black children 0-1 years
Smoking d. Weeks Formal Hours Mother Book Soft Outings
pregnancy breastfeeding child care worked reads toys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother's schooling: All -0.044 1.528 0.021 175.101 0.059 0.183 0.324 0.007
[0.013]*** [0.386]*** [0.005]*** [14.367]*** [0.013]*** [0.030]*** [0.233] [0.011]
Mother's schooling: Male child -0.027 1.544 0.017 172.874 0.069 0.189 0.536 0.009
[0.015]* [0.447]*** [0.006]*** [17.046]*** [0.015]*** [0.037]*** [0.301]* [0.016]
Mother's schooling: Female child -0.066 1.505 0.025 177.183 0.043 0.177 0.162 0.005
[0.016]*** [0.493]*** [0.006]*** [16.732]*** [0.019]** [0.038]*** [0.275] [0.016]
Mother's schooling: High AFQT -0.054 0.824 0.025 135.635 0.072 0.203 0.521 -0.015
[0.016]*** [0.936] [0.008]*** [27.401]*** [0.022]*** [0.042]*** [0.431] [0.016]
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT -0.031 1.598 0.019 190.480 0.052 0.170 0.233 0.028
[0.020] [0.395]*** [0.005]*** [17.002]*** [0.017]*** [0.036]*** [0.287] [0.016]*
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All 0.040 0.396 0.007 152.300 0.002 0.133 -1.587 0.020
[0.045] [1.209] [0.015] [59.588]** [0.047] [0.095] [0.921]* [0.039]
Observations 861 855 2257 2965 894 897 889 897
Mean 0.278 5.513 0.070 767.310 0.371 2.337 11.227 0.661
Standard deviation 0.448 13.905 0.254 885.509 0.483 1.190 10.086 0.474
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
Table 2.25: Young adults { OLS results
OLS estimates: Young adults (18-19 years)
White Black
Enrollment Conviction Own children Enrollment Conviction Own children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother's schooling: All 0.025 -0.011 -0.022 0.031 -0.011 -0.042
[0.013]* [0.008] [0.009]*** [0.017]* [0.009] [0.011]***
Mother's schooling: Male young adult 0.019 -0.025 -0.008 0.027 -0.043 -0.028
[0.017] [0.013]** [0.013] [0.023] [0.014]*** [0.013]**
Mother's schooling: Female young adult 0.031 -0.001 -0.037 0.035 0.002 -0.067
[0.017]* [0.010] [0.013]*** [0.023] [0.010] [0.018]***
Mother's schooling: High AFQT 0.020 -0.014 -0.019 0.015 -0.018 -0.037
[0.017] [0.012] [0.014] [0.029] [0.015] [0.016]**
Mother's schooling: Low AFQT 0.031 -0.008 -0.025 0.038 -0.007 -0.045
[0.018]* [0.012] [0.012]** [0.020]* [0.011] [0.014]***
Mother's AFQT (corrected): All 0.047 -0.041 -0.005 -0.073 -0.047 0.007
[0.046] [0.031] [0.023] [0.059] [0.026]* [0.042]
Observations 935 1047 816 742 889 612
Mean 0.624 0.154 0.091 0.627 0.124 0.157
Standard deviation 0.485 0.361 0.296 0.484 0.329 0.398
Note: This table reports Minimum Distance estimates for the groups indicated based on equation
(2.1), see text for details. A description of the outcome variables is found in Table 2.1 on page 25.
Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by county-cohort. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.Chapter 3
Studying Abroad and the Eect
on International Labor Market
Mobility: Evidence from the
Introduction of ERASMUS
3.1 Introduction
International labor market migration has risen dramatically in the recent past, espe-
cially among university graduates. Lowell (2007), for example, shows an increase in
the emigration rate of university graduates from about 4 percent in 1980 to about 7
percent in 2000 for developed countries. The increased demand for skilled labor and
the importance of highly skilled individuals for innovation has induced many coun-
tries to implement policies geared to attracting skilled migrants from abroad (OECD,
2002). Understanding the determinants of migration is key to formulating such poli-
cies. While attention has traditionally focused on wage dierentials, going back to
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Hicks (1932)1, it is clear that other factors are important determinants of interna-
tional mobility. One possible determinant which has received particular attention of
policymakers over the past years is student mobility during tertiary education. In par-
ticular, it has been hypothesized that student mobility may act as a `stepping stone'
for later labor migration (Guellec & Cervantes, 2001). Numerous countries, including
the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, attempt to attract highly skilled
mobile workers through policies relating to student mobility programs (Guellec & Cer-
vantes, 2001). These are based on the assumption that student mobility has a genuine
eect on later labor market mobility. Despite the widespread belief in the link between
studying abroad and international labor market mobility, empirical evidence is very
limited. Establishing a causal link between studying abroad and labor market mobility
later in life is a challenging task because students who decide to study abroad are in
many ways dierent from students who undertake all of their education in their home
country. The unobserved heterogeneity may also aect the decision of working abroad
later in life. This may introduce a bias in OLS estimates of the eect of studying
abroad on subsequent international labor migration decision.
In this chapter, we provide evidence on the causal eect of studying abroad on
later labor market mobility by exploiting an exogenous change in student mobility:
the introduction of the ERASMUS student exchange program. This program has been
devised by the European Union to foster student exchange in Europe. Introduced in
1987 it oers the possibility of studying in another European country for up to 12
months at very low cost. Dierent universities and dierent departments introduced
the program at very dierent times. We exploit the variation in scholarship availability
as a source of exogenous variation in a student's probability to study abroad. In
order to ascertain a student's exposure to the ERASMUS program we construct a
unique data set, containing annual information on the number of exchange places for
each subject at every German university. In order to assess the eect of studying
1For surveys on determinants of migration, see Greenwood (1975, 1985, 1997).3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 67
abroad on international mobility later in life we merge this data to a survey of German
university graduates. We rst show that the ERASMUS program has a strong impact
on a student's probability of studying abroad. We then use the department level
variation in international student exchange programs to identify the causal eect of
studying abroad on the decision of working in a foreign country later in life. We nd
that studying abroad increases a person's probability of working abroad by about 15
percentage points. This result suggests that studying abroad has a strong causal eect
on labor market mobility later in life. Qualitative evidence suggests that besides career
concerns soft factors such as interest in foreign cultures or living with a foreign partner
are important determinants for the decision to work abroad, and we suggest that the
eect of studying abroad may work through these channels.
There are some papers analyzing the link between labor market mobility and previ-
ous mobility. Kodrzycki (2001) provides descriptive evidence on inter-state mobility in
the US and links it to the preceding decision of attending college out of state.2 Using
individual-level data from the U.S., Groen (2004) documents that studying in a given
state increases the probability of later working in that state, accounting for selection
by exploiting information on the set of states individuals applied for. Bound, Groen,
Kezdi & Turner (2004) estimate that increasing production of college graduates at the
state level leads to moderate increases in the stock of college-educated workers in that
state.
The link between international student mobility and the decision to work abroad
after graduation has rarely been studied to date. One reason is data availability:
Most surveys do not contain information on study abroad spells during a student's
undergraduate career, and graduates who work abroad are generally not sampled in
national surveys of the sending countries. Jahr and Teichler (2001) use data from a
survey of European university graduates who have been internationally mobile. They
2She nds that individuals who attended college out of state are 54 percent more likely to live
out-of-state ve years after graduation. These results, however, cannot be interpreted as causal eects
as she does not address the selection issues aecting mobility decisions.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 68
investigate the eect of studying abroad on later international labor market mobility
without controlling for possible selection of formerly mobile students. They nd that
formerly mobile students are between 15 and 18 percentage points more likely to work
in a foreign country after graduation. Dreher and Poutvaara (2005) investigate the
role of student mobility in explaining aggregate migration ows in a cross-country
panel study, focusing on migration to the United States. They nd strong eects of
previous period's number of foreign students on current period's number of migrants,
indicating that a ten percent increase in the number of foreign students increases
subsequent migration by around 0.5 percent.
The paper which is most closely related to this work is a study by Oosterbeek and
Webbink (2009). They employ a regression discontinuity design to control for unob-
served heterogeneity between internationally mobile and non-mobile students. Using
data on talented Dutch university students they nd that studying abroad increases
the probability of living in a foreign country by about 50 percentage points. A key
dierence to our work is that they look at a small sample of particularly talented stu-
dents, while we use a nationally representative survey of German university graduates.
Another important dierence is that Oosterbeek and Webbink investigate the eect
of postgraduate studies abroad. Students pursuing a postgraduate degree abroad may
remain in the receiving country while looking for work. Part of the eect they nd
may also be driven by the fact that some of the respondents abroad are still enrolled in
higher education at the time of the survey. In contrast, in our work, the intervention
is international mobility during the undergraduate career, after which students return
to complete their degree in Germany. Thus, our research design allows us { and in
fact forces us { to separate the two mobility investments (studying abroad and working
abroad). The eect we nd is therefore informative about the dynamic eects of earlier
mobility investments.
This chapter presents evidence that previous educational mobility is a very impor-
tant determinant of mobility later in life. We thus establish a causal link of previous3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 69
mobility decision to mobility later in life. This highlights the importance of taking
earlier mobility into account in economic modeling but also for policy decisions. The
European Union, for example, tries to foster labor market mobility in the EU (see
`Commission's Action Plan for skills and mobility' (2002)). Our research suggests that
supporting international student mobility is a very successful policy instrument to fos-
ter labor market mobility later in life. Our results on the eect of the ERASMUS
program on the probability of studying abroad also show that exchange programs are
indeed eective in promoting student mobility. This will be important to policy makers
as they spend large public funds on these programs.
We emphasize that our primary interest lies in understanding the role of studying
abroad as a determinant of individual international labor migration decisions, and the
use of the ERASMUS program is motivated by the variation it induces in students'
decision to study abroad. Our data does not allow to investigate the role of the ERAS-
MUS program on immigration of skilled graduates from other countries to Germany,
or the overall eect of studying abroad on the international distribution of human
capital, although these are potentially interesting and important questions.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The next sections briey describe the data we are
using and provides some institutional detail on the ERASMUS program. Section 3.4
outlines our identication strategy. In the following section we report our rst stage
results and provide evidence that our instruments are both powerful and operate very
precisely in the way we claim they do. Section 3.6 presents the main results and a
number of sensitivity checks. We present descriptive evidence into the channels which
lead students who studied abroad to work abroad later on. The last section concludes.
3.2 Data
We use data on German university graduates, which has been collected by the Higher
Education Information System (HIS) institute. This survey is conducted to provide3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 70
a nationally representative longitudinal sample of individuals who complete their un-
dergraduate education in Germany. A sample of university graduates has been drawn
from cohorts graduating in the academic years 1988-89, 1992-93, 1996-97, 2000-01, and
2004-05. In the following, we will refer to these ve cross-sections as graduate cohorts
1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005. Graduates in each cohort are surveyed twice. The
rst survey takes place about 12 months after graduation (the Initial Survey). The
same individuals participate in a follow-up survey about 5 years after entering the
labor market (Follow-Up Survey).3 The following Figure 3.1 illustrates the timing of
the dierent surveys.
Figure 3.1: HIS Data
The data contains detailed information on the students' background, study history,
and labor market characteristics. This allows us to relate study decisions, in particular
international educational mobility, to later labor market outcomes. A large advantage
3For the 2005 cohort, only the initial survey is available so far.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 71
of this dataset lies in the fact that individuals graduating from a university in Germany
are followed even if they move to a foreign country. This feature makes this dataset
particularly valuable to investigate questions concerning international mobility.
The data and the sampling process is described in detail in Briedis & Minks (2004).
The sample was drawn as follows: For each cohort, university-subject-degree combina-
tions where sampled randomly, and the respective universities mailed the questionnaire
to each student who had graduated within the corresponding academic year. This pro-
cedure ensures that the sample contains individuals from a large number of dierent
institutions and subjects. One key advantage of the data is that the population of
interest includes all university graduates who completed their undergraduate studies
during a given academic year at any institution of higher education in Germany.4 The
data contains no information on nationality of respondents. It contains, however, some
information on where the students obtain their highschool degree. We limit our sample
to all those individuals who obtain their highschool degree in Germany. The response
rate to the survey is around 25%. While of course a higher response rate would be
desirable, an analysis conducted by the HIS has come to the conclusion that the char-
acteristics of the survey respondents are close to those of the target population. The
total number of respondents corresponding to the ve cohorts is 12,457 (1989), 11,314
(1993), 9,586 (1997), 8,124 (2001), and 11,784 (2005).
The key information for our purposes is whether the student has studied abroad
during her undergraduate studies, and whether the graduate works abroad at the time
4The higher education system in Germany consists of a number of dierent university types catering
to dierent types of students. We include ve main types of higher education institutions in our estima-
tion. This includes not only the traditional universities (Universit aten) but also the so-called Universi-
ties of Applied Sciences (Fachhochschulen), the Comprehensive Universities (Gesamthochschulen), the
Colleges of Art and Music (Kunst- und Musikakademien), and the Theological Universities (Theologis-
che Hochschulen). All institutions in our sample would be called universities in most countries outside
Germany. Admission requirements dier by subject. For a subset of traditionally oversubscribed sub-
jects, admissions are awarded centrally based on nationwide quotas. For all other subjects, higher
education institutions may place local restrictions on admissions. These are likely to vary strongly
between subjects. Criteria applied for admission decisions vary, but include overall highschool grade,
waiting periods since graduating from highschool, and interviews. Further details and references on
the higher education system in Germany can be found in KMK (2008).3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 72
of the survey. We infer undergraduate mobility from the rst question of the question-
naire, which asks the student to report her complete enrollment history. Respondents
are instructed to report each change of degree program or university. The questionnaire
makes explicit reference to study abroad as one form of change in status in the 2001
survey. For the 2005 cohort it contains an explicit question regarding study abroad
spells. We use this information to construct an indicator of whether the student stud-
ied abroad during her undergraduate career. In order to exclude university mobility
after nishing the rst degree (e.g. to obtain a Master abroad), we only look at inter-
national mobility before the graduation date of the rst degree. It is important to note
that only students who obtain their degree in Germany are surveyed. We are, there-
fore, not able to observe students who rst enrol in Germany and subsequently move
to a foreign university and obtain their degree abroad. Also Germans who complete
all of their higher education abroad are not included in our sample. These individuals
may be dierent to students who study abroad as part of their degree in Germany. It
is quite likely that those who complete their higher education abroad are even more
likely to work in a foreign country after graduation than students who obtain their
degree in Germany. If this was true we would underestimate the eect of studying
abroad. Unfortunately, our data is not suitable to test this hypothesis.
For all students who have ever participated in the labor market, both the initial and
the follow-up surveys contain questions about the current (or the last) employment,
including the location of work. We infer from this question whether a former student
now works in Germany or abroad, and create an indicator accordingly.
The following gure shows the percentages of studying abroad and working abroad
(from the initial survey, one year after graduation) for the ve graduation cohorts. It
can be seen that both studying abroad and working abroad occurs more frequently
among students of later graduation cohorts. It is important to note that we include
dummies for the ve graduation cohorts in all our regressions. Therefore, we do not
identify the eect of studying abroad from the overall time-trend in the two variables.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 73
In fact, in our sensitivity analysis, we show that our results are robust to allowing for
not only a general time trend, but also for subject-specic time trends.
Figure 3.2: International Mobility in HIS Data
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These percentages can be compared to information on international mobility from
other data sources. Isserstedt & Schnitzer (2002) point out that dierent data sources
use dierent ways to collect data and dierent denitions of a stay abroad. These
dierences may result in dierent estimates of student mobility. With this caveat in
mind, we compare the incidence of international educational mobility in our data to
data from the 16th Social Survey (Sozialerhebung), a large-scale survey of German
students in 2000. Of all students surveyed in the Social Survey, about 13 percent of
advanced students indicate that they spent part of their studies at a foreign university.
The students surveyed in 2000 will mostly graduate before 2005. In the 2005 graduate
cohort data about 15 percent have studied abroad. This is very similar to the fraction
in the Social Survey. The gures from the Social Survey also replicate the strong
over-time increase in the fraction of students who study abroad.3 Studying Abroad and the E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With similar caution we use data from the OECD Factbook 2006 to investigate the
reliability of our data with respect to international labor market mobility. The OECD
estimates that about 7.1 percent of Germans holding a university degree worked as
expatriates in a foreign country in the year 2005. This number is higher than the
percentage of people working abroad for the 2005 cohort in our dataset. This is due
to the fact that the OECD gure measures stocks of expatriates while we consider the
ow of university graduates to foreign countries.
We conclude that both the percentage of people studying abroad and the percentage
of people working abroad in our data are comparable to estimates from other data
sources. This is reassuring as there may be a worry that response rates to the HIS
survey may dier for people living abroad. Unfortunately, there is no direct way
of testing for dierential response rates as we do not have any information on the
individuals who do not respond to the HIS survey. One way of addressing this concern is
to show that other data sources with dierent sampling frames exhibit similar numbers
to our data.
In addition to the international mobility variables we also use a number of other
control variables measured at the individual level. All sampled graduates received
their rst university degree. In the earlier cohorts students received a traditional
German degree (Diplom or Staatsexamen). A small proportion from the 2005 cohort
was awarded a bachelor degree.5 We therefore include an indicator for obtaining a
bachelor degree in our regressions.
Furthermore, we create a measure of potential experience since graduation, dened
as the number of months from graduation to the time of answering the questionnaire.6
5This reects the recent introduction of bachelor and master degrees at most universities. Tradi-
tionally there was no distinction between bachelor and master degrees in the German higher education
system. Students would enroll at a university after high school and study for about four to seven years
obtaining one degree at the very end of their studies.
6There is some variation in experience because students were sampled according to whether their
graduation fell in a particular academic year. Students graduating at the beginning of the academic
year therefore have more potential experience than those graduating towards the end of the year.
In addition, there is some variation with respect to when the questionnaires were sent out and how
quickly graduates responded. We take this measure of potential experience rather than actual labor3 Studying Abroad and the E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Other controls include a female indicator, age at beginning of university studies, and
an indicator for whether the student completed an apprenticeship before beginning her
university studies. We also use variables which control for a student's earlier mobility
decisions. In particular we include a variable which controls for whether the student's
rst university enrollment occurs in the state (Bundesland) where she obtained her
nal high school degree. Furthermore, we include the distance between the state of
her university enrollment and the state where she obtained her high school degree.
We use a number of variables to control for a student's parental background. To
control for parental education we use a variable that indicates the highest grade com-
pleted by either parent, where we split parental education into three categories to ac-
count for the characteristics of the education system in Germany.7 We also construct
indicator variables in ve categories for each parent to control for parental occupa-
tion. As a proxy for credit constraints we use a variable measuring the proportion of
expenses which the student covers by federal nancial aid (BAFOEG). Students are
eligible to this assistance if parental income is below a certain threshold. This thresh-
old varies according to the number of children who are enrolled in a formal education
program.
Our data also contains information on industry and occupational status of the sur-
veyed graduates. Although our main analysis does not make use of this information, it
may still be of interest to compare the respective distributions between internationally
mobile individuals and individuals who remain in Germany.
In order to implement our Instrumental Variables strategy we combine the HIS
market experience, because actual labor market experience could be aected by a study period abroad
and might then be endogenous to our outcome.
7The omitted category contains students with parents who obtained up to 13 years of education.
This group consists of students with parents who did not receive a school degree (very few), parents with
lower types of secondary schooling (Hauptschule or Realschule) usually followed by an apprenticeship,
and parents who obtained a high school degree but no further education (very few). The second group
is comprised of students where the better educated parent either obtained an advanced craftsmanship
degree (Meister) or some higher education, such as a degree from a university of applied science
(Fachhochschule) but not a degree from a university. The third group includes students who have at
least one parent holding a university degree. Using a linear years of parental education variable or
controlling for mother's and father's education separately does not aect our results.3 Studying Abroad and the E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graduate survey data with a unique dataset of ERASMUS participation. There is
no readily available data on the ERASMUS exchange program for our time period of
interest. We obtained data on the number of ERASMUS scholarship holders for each
year and each participating institution on a subject-by-subject basis from 1993/94
to 2004/2005 from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). To obtain the
data for the earlier years we proceeded as follows: The DAAD provided us with the
number of scholarships allocated to each ERASMUS inter-university agreement (Inter-
university Cooperation Program, ICP). We combined this information with published
listings of all ICPs, which give details about the participating universities and the
subjects covered for each inter-university agreement (see, for example, DAAD (1992)).
This allows us to construct a panel data set at the university-subject-year level that
covers the entire history of the ERASMUS program in Germany. The typical (median)
student goes abroad three years prior to his graduation, and we assign to each student
the exposure to the ERASMUS program in that corresponding academic year.8
We restrict our sample to those observations for which all variables of interest
are observed. As mentioned before, students from the graduate cohorts 1989, 1993,
1997, and 2001 have been surveyed twice, the rst time one year after graduating
from university and a second time ve years after graduation. We thus have two
observations for the location of work for most individuals from those cohorts. In
the estimation below, we pool the observations from the initial and the follow-up
survey for eciency reasons.9 This allows us to use the information provided in both
questionnaires. Means and standard deviations of our estimation sample are reported
in Table 3.1. It is evident from comparing columns (2) and (3) that individuals who
studied abroad are also more likely to work abroad later in life. One can also see that
8This approach is preferable to simply assigning ERASMUS characteristics at a xed point in the
student's study period (say the second or third year): since our graduates are sampled when they exit
university, and since there is substantial variation in length of studies, there might be a systematic
relationship between individual study duration and other unobservable factors.
9By clustering the standard errors at the institution level, we fully account for the resulting depen-
dence in the error terms.3 Studying Abroad and the E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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Study Study Work Work
All Abroad = 0 Abroad = 1 Abroad = 0 Abroad = 1
Working abroad 0.032 0.027 0.102 0.000 1.000
(0.176) (0,163) (0.303) (0.000) (0.000)
Undergraduate study abroad 0.062 0.000 1.000 0.057 0.198
(0.241) (0.000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.399)
ERASMUS indicator 0.490 0.472 0.767 0.485 0.637
(0.499) (0.499) (0.423) (0.500) (0.481)
ERASMUS ratio 0.031 0.028 0.068 0.030 0.044
(0.056) (0.053) (0.081) (0.055) (0.064)
Female 0.450 0.445 0.512 0,449 0.474
(0.500) (0.497) (0.500) (0.497) (0.499)
Age when starting studies 21.637 21.682 20.959 21.655 21.082
(2.559) (2.603) (1.595) (2.577) (1.831)
Experience 2.686 2.700 2.466 2.670 3.160
(2.074) (2.074) (2.066) (2.067) (2.231)
Apprenticeship 0.301 0.313 0.194 0.309 0.206
(0.461) (0.464) (0.396) (0.462) (0.405)
Mother's Education (years) 12.283 12.168 14.024 12.240 13.582
(3.322) (3.288) (3.356) (3.315) (3.282)
Father's Education (years) 13.707 13.597 15.387 13.665 14.992
(3.554) (3.544) (3.275) (3.557) (3.200)
Final University Grade1 2.041 2.057 1.812 2.048 1.848
(0.681) (0.681) (0.633) (0.682) (0.604)
Credit Contrained2 0.119 0.120 0.098 0.120 0.099
(High Financial Assistance) (0.324) (0.325) (0.297) (0.325) (0.298)
% in respective Industry:3
Agriculture, Energy 2.6 2.6 1.7 2.6 2.9
Manufacturing 21.4 21.8 14.8 21.4 21.2
Services 40.9 40.9 40.9 41.0 37.7
Education, Culture 23.7 23.1 31.7 23.4 32.4
Administration, Organisations 10.7 10.7 10.5 10.8 4.9
Other 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
% in respective Occupation:4
Manager 5.8 5.9 3.5 5.7 6.7
employee 69.6 69.4 71.4 69.2 81.7
self-employed 8.8 8.7 9.2 8.8 7.6
civil servant 11.8 11.9 9.6 12.1 1.7
other 4.1 4.0 6.3 4.2 2.3
Observations 54079 50741 3338 52355 1724
1The nal university degree is only available for 52830 students in our sample. (The
best grade is 1.0 the worst 4.0) 2The question on nancial assistance has only been
administered between 1993 and 2001. In 1989 the students were directly asked about
their nancial situation. We therefore have the information on credit constraints for
45307 individuals. 3The industry information is available for 53427 individuals. 4The
information on occupation is available for 53190 individuals. Note: This table contains
sample means and (in brackets) standard deviations. For industries and occupations
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individuals with more exposure to ERASMUS (as measured by ERASMUS ratio or
ERASMUS indicator, which are described in further detail below) are more likely to
study abroad. In the following section we explain how we use the ERASMUS program
to identify the causal link between studying abroad and international labor market
mobility later in life.
3.3 The ERASMUS Program
Our identication strategy relies on the large scale introduction and expansion of the
ERASMUS program. In 1987, the Council of Ministers of the European Community
passed the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students
(ERASMUS). The main objective of ERASMUS is `to achieve a signicant increase
in the number of students [...] spending an integrated period of study in another
Member State' Council of the European Communities (1987). Student mobility was
to be increased through the creation of a European university network, individual
scholarships, and mutual recognition of academic credits Smith (1988). Since then,
ERASMUS has continually expanded. Looking across all participating countries, 1.37
million students have taken part in ERASMUS in the period of the academic years
1987/88 to 2004/05, with 15.7% of those outgoings coming from Germany. Figure 3.3
shows the number of German outgoing students for each year since the introduction
of the program.
Due to this dramatic expansion, students in our ve graduate cohorts are aected
quite dierently by the program. The expansion of ERASMUS has signicantly con-
tributed to the overall incidence of studying abroad. Our data shows that about 8
percent of the students in the 2001 graduate cohort have studied abroad as part of
their undergraduate degree. It can be calculated that about 5 percent of the 2001
graduation cohort have studied abroad with an ERASMUS scholarship.10 The ERAS-
10This number is obtained as follows: In the 2001 graduate cohort, the median student started her3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 79
Figure 3.3: ERASMUS in Germany
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ERASMUS Students from German Universities
MUS program therefore accounts for more than half of international undergraduate
mobility in Germany in the 2001 cohort.
Students participating in the ERASMUS program apply for an exchange scholar-
ship at their home university usually one year before they intend to study abroad.
The department then decides who is awarded an ERASMUS scholarship. The criteria
for obtaining an award are mostly based on academic achievement and motivation
(as demonstrated in a written statement of interest and/or an interview). In very
rare cases the places are allocated on a rst come rst serve basis.11 The award of
the scholarship not only secures them a place at a certain partner university abroad
but also provides them with a small mobility grant. In the academic year 2001/2002
(the year a typical student from the 2005 graduation cohort went abroad) an outgoing
tertiary studies in the academic year 1995/96. In that year, about 262,000 students entered university.
The typical exchange student in that cohort studied abroad in the third year of her studies. In that year
13785 students from German universities participated in the ERASMUS program. This corresponds
to about 5% of the entire cohort.
11For more information on the allocation process see Maiworm, Steube, and Teichler (1993).3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 80
student from Germany received about 146 Euros per month for her stay abroad. In
addition to receiving the mobility grant the ERASMUS student receives a tuition fee
waiver at the foreign university. Another important benet of ERASMUS is that it
signicantly reduces the student's application costs and the time the student needs to
apply in advance to be able to organize a stay at a foreign university.
University participation in ERASMUS operated through Inter-University Cooper-
ation Programs (ICP), in which groups of university departments from dierent coun-
tries formed a network covered by an ICP agreement, typically initiated through an
active professor who happens to have contacts with professors at foreign universities.
If new universities join the ICP additional places may become available. Many depart-
ments would at some point enter ERASMUS with a few links to departments at foreign
universities. Over time other foreign departments would be taken into the network in-
creasing the number of exchange places for German students. Similarly the German
department itself would enter other (possibly new) cooperation networks. One way to
interpret the evolution in ERASMUS scholarships is to think of the cooperations as
an emerging network.
The professors involved in the organization of the ERASMUS student exchange
program agree on the number of incoming and outgoing ERASMUS places for each
participating university. These agreements are usually longer-term contracts covering a
number of years. Thus, the number of exchange places with a certain foreign university
stay constant for some years. Sometimes not all admitted students take up their place
because they receive another scholarship or because they change their mind about
wanting to study abroad. As the ICP agreements are long term agreements this does
not aect the number of slots in the following year.
In order to give a insight into the variation, which is exploited in our identica-
tion strategy, we show the raw data on the number of ERASMUS students at four
departments at the two large universities in Munich in the following gure.12
12We choose the Ludwig-Maximilians University and the Technical University Munich for this de-3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 81
Figure 3.4: ERASMUS in Munich
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ERASMUS Places Munich
The introduction of the ERASMUS program at a certain department occurred at
dierent points in time at the two universities even though the universities are of very
similar quality. This indicates that a large degree of the variation in ERASMUS places
is due to idiosyncratic shocks triggered by the contacts of some active professors.
3.4 Identication Strategy
To provide a simple conceptual framework, we start from the description of the indi-
vidual migration decision from Borjas (1987). A university graduate deciding to work
scriptive analyis because they are located in the same city and are of similar quality and reputation.
This is exemplied by the fact that these two unversities were among only three universities to be
selected as winner of the `Initiative for Excellence' in 2006. This initiative allocates federal funding to
German universities which are considered to have the potential to become world-class research univer-
sities. This potential was evaluated based on the universities' past performance and on their strategic
plans for the future.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 82
abroad or at home, facing wages at home (w0) and wages abroad (w1) as follows
log(w1) = 1 + u1 (3.1)
log(w0) = 0 + u0 (3.2)
where (u1;u0) denote idiosyncratic error terms around means (1;0). The individual
decides to work abroad if the return to migration exceeds the cost of migration (C).
Thus, the resulting decision rule is
Work abroad = 1flog(w1)   log(w0 + C) > 0g  1fu1   u0 >  (1   0   C=w0)g:
(3.3)
The key prediction of this Roy model in this context is that the probability of working
abroad decreases with cost of migration C. Our focus lies in understanding the role of
studying abroad as one important determinant lowering the cost for later labor market
migration. There are a number of channels how studying abroad may reduce the cost
for later migration decisions. Studying abroad allows the students to improve their
foreign language skills. This would greatly reduce their costs of nding work in the
foreign country. Furthermore, they will acquire a better knowledge of the foreign labor
market and maybe get in contact with potential employers. Also personal contacts
through friends in the foreign country may facilitate nding a job in a foreign country.
We show below that individuals often return to work in very same country where they
have studied abroad. This supports the hypothesis that these channels are indeed
important. Other channels how studying abroad may lower the cost of migration
are more subtle. The study abroad spell may act as a trial period of whether one
likes to live in a foreign country and thus increase the interest in foreign cultures.
Furthermore, studying abroad may foster private relationships abroad which draw the
student to working abroad later on. Below we provide some suggestive evidence that
these channels may indeed be aected by studying abroad.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 83
In order to investigate the relationship between studying abroad and later labor
market mobility we therefore estimate the following equation.
Work Abroad = 1 + 2 Study Abroad + 3 X + 4 Cohort FE
+ 5 Subject FE + 6 University FE + u (3.4)
Where Work Abroad and Study Abroad are dummy variables indicating whether an
individual worked abroad or studied abroad, respectively. X is a vector of personal
characteristics, which may aect the decision to work abroad, such as gender, age, work
experience or an individual's family background. We also include a full set of dummies
for each graduate cohort, a student's subject, and university. Our main interest lies in
obtaining consistent estimates of 2.
The summary statistics presented above clearly indicate that students who study
abroad dier systematically in their observable characteristics from those who remain
in Germany throughout their undergraduate studies. Although our data set is rich in
observed characteristics of the student, many dimensions which are likely to aect the
students' mobility decision remain unobserved. A possible factor could be, for example,
the students' unobserved motivation. If these unobserved factors are correlated with
the outcome, estimating equation (3.4) using OLS would yield biased estimates, be-
cause we would mistakenly attribute the eect of the unobserved covariates to the stay
abroad. While it is generally dicult to characterize these unobserved components in
its entirety, there is some direct evidence of what factors may play a role. In their
sociological analysis of determinants of studying abroad, Muessig-Trapp & Schnitzler
(1997) identify as critical factors aecting the decision to study abroad the student's
nancial situation, whether she holds any part-time job, foreign language skills, the
expected labor market benet of going abroad, and her motivation and personality
structure. Clearly, many of these dimensions will be unobserved to the econometri-
cian. Thinking about our outcome of interest it is likely that the same unobserved3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 84
factors which drive the decision to study abroad will also aect the decision of where
to look for a job. It is therefore not clear what at all can be learned from a comparison
of means of those who study abroad versus those who do not. This underlines that this
context requires a credible identication strategy to learn about the causal impact of
the study period abroad. We use the ERASMUS program as an instrumental variable
to identify the causal eect of studying abroad. As our rst stage we estimate the
following equation:
Study Abroad = 1 + 2ERASMUS + 3X + 4Cohort FE
+ 5Subject FE + 6University FE +  (3.5)
ERASMUS is a variable measuring a student's exposure to the ERASMUS pro-
gram. In addition to the main variables of interest we include the same control vari-
ables as in equation (3.4).
It is important to be precise about the variation we exploit to identify the eect of
studying abroad. We account for systematic dierences between universities by includ-
ing university xed eects. Our empirical strategy thus relies on over-time changes in
scholarship availability. At the same time, we include dummies for our ve graduate
cohorts, so that any dierence that is common to all students in a cohort is taken out
as well. This ensures that we are not relying on any long-term trends (which may
possibly aect both the instrument and the outcome). In addition to that we include
subject xed eects in our estimation. This accounts for any systematic dierence in
international mobility of students in dierent subjects. We therefore rely on over-time
changes in program intensity at a given subject and university combination. Prob-
ing the robustness of our ndings we also include subject specic time trends in our
specications. These allow for a separate linear trend in the probability of studying
abroad for each subject. The nature of our results is not aected by including those
time trends. In another robustness check we further control for possible unobserved3 Studying Abroad and the E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heterogeneity by including xed eects for the interaction of a student's faculty (such
as humanities or science faculty) and her university. We show below that our ndings
are robust to using these xed eects.
We construct dierent measures of a student's exposure to the ERASMUS program.
The rst ERASMUS measure is an indicator, which takes the value 1 if the student's
department oered an ERASMUS scholarship in the relevant year. In most cases this
variable is 0 until a certain department joins the ERASMUS program and 1 thereafter,
because very few departments leave the program after they have joined. We denote
this variable ERASMUS indicator, which varies in the dimensions university, subject,
and year. Using the ERASMUS indicator as an instrument amounts to a classical
dierence-in-dierences estimator comparing students before and after the introduction
of an exchange program for their subject at their university.
The second variable measures the exact number of ERASMUS scholarships, oered
by each department at every university in a given year. In order to account for dier-
ences in size of dierent departments, we normalize the number of scholarships with
the number of students enrolled in the respective department. We use the department
level number of rst year students in the fall semester of the academic year 1992/93 for
this normalization. In the following we refer to this variable as ERASMUS ratio. This
measure for a student's exposure to the scholarship program varies at the university,
subject, year level as well.
The ERASMUS indicator is less powerful than the ratio because it does not capture
changes in the number of ERASMUS scholarships, which certainly aect a student's
probability of studying abroad. On the other hand, however, this disadvantage may
be an advantage if student demand at a department aects the number of ERASMUS
places. This would aect the credibility of any instrument using the actual number of
ERASMUS scholarships. Even though we believe that this is not an important concern
in practice the ERASMUS indicator is a way of dealing with this concern. The only
way in which student demand may aect this instrument is through triggering the3 Studying Abroad and the E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introduction of ERASMUS in the relevant department, which we believe is extremely
unlikely. Administrative hurdles when setting up the program stand in the way of any
short term responses to student demand. If a certain department wants to join the
ERASMUS program, the university has to apply for a certication at the European
Commission. Moreover, the department has to nd partner universities, which are
willing to exchange students with the given department. Clearing these administrative
hurdles takes time. Another time lag is introduced by the fact that students have to
apply for a certain ERASMUS slot almost one year before they actually study abroad.
It is therefore very unlikely that departments are able to set up a new ERASMUS
program in time for a certain cohort to be able to benet from that introduction.
In the following, we address a number of possible concerns regarding the exclusion
restriction. In particular, we consider the `university quality' argument, the `big push'
argument, and the `student selection' argument.
One concern may be that university quality aects both scholarship availability
and the outcome: If good universities oered more ERASMUS scholarships, and if at
the same time good universities produced higher skilled graduates who are more likely
to nd a job in a dierent country, the exclusion restriction would be violated. We take
care of this problem by including university xed eects (FE) in all our regressions,
which control for any permanent university attribute. A closely related criticism is
that even within a given university some faculties, such as sciences, may be better
than other faculties. We show that our results also hold if we include faculty times
university xed eects, which control for any permanent dierence between faculties
even within a given university.
A common concern in IV estimation is that using a particular policy may carry
the risk of not accounting for other policies which were implemented at the same time.
For example, the university could engage in more active exchange activities also out-
side Europe and possibly implement other measures which increase the employability
abroad at the same time. We show below that ERASMUS had a very narrow eect and3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 87
does not seem to be correlated with other policies. To check for the correlation with
other programs we use information of where students went to study abroad, grouped
into three categories (Europe, United States, and other areas). We show below that
the ERASMUS program only aected the exchange to Europe but not to other areas.
Similarly, one may be worried that active professors who play an important role
in expanding a department's exchange network may also be more involved in placing
their students internationally once they graduate, having a direct eect on the outcome.
We can assess this directly since our data contains information on whether students
obtained their rst position through intermediation of a professor. We nd no evidence
that there is any systematic relation between this job nding channel and ERASMUS
scholarship availability, suggesting that ERASMUS exposure in a department is not
correlated with a department's job placement activities.13
Another concern is that students may choose a particular university-subject com-
bination because of scholarship availability. Particularly mobile students might choose
universities and departments oering a large number of ERASMUS scholarships. This
would again bias our IV results. We do not think that this is likely to occur, how-
ever. Since most of our sampled individuals started their university career long before
the widespread availability of the internet, information about exchange programs was
extremely dicult to obtain. Even nowadays it is hard to obtain information on the
availability of ERASMUS scholarships on departmental websites of German univer-
sities. It is much more likely that enrollment decisions are based on factors such as
reputation of the university or closeness to home. We also address the student selec-
tion argument by controlling for distance between the state of a student's highschool
degree and her university. Controlling for earlier mobility does not aect our results.
Another way of addressing these concerns more directly is to dene our measure
13In a simple Pearson's 
2 test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this job nding channel and
the ERASMUS indicator are independent (p=0.62). When we regress an indicator for obtaining
the rst position through intermediation of a university professor on our ERASMUS measures in a
full specication corresponding to our main model, we nd no signicant eects of the ERASMUS
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of ERASMUS exposure without exploiting the specic choice of university the student
made.14 For this purpose, we dene a third measure (ERASMUS subject ratio) as the
ratio of ERASMUS scholarships in the student's subject across all universities, relative
to the overall number of students in that subject (again across all universities). This
measure does not depend on the specic university a student chooses. As a variant
we use the subject ratio measure but substract the ERASMUS slots in the student's
own department.15 In the tables this measure is denoted as ERASMUS subject ra-
tio, excluding own department. As this measure does not include the student's own
ERASMUS slots it will be completely unaected by a possibly endogenous selection of
a certain department with more ERASMUS places. We show below that our results
are very similar when we use this alternative measure of ERASMUS.
A related worry is that students may change university or department after they
gured out that their university and/or department oers little opportunity to study
abroad.16 Using the ERASMUS measures from a student's rst enrollment enables us
to avoid any problems of selective mobility after university entry of the student.
In summary, we believe that in our empirical framework ERASMUS scholarship
availability provides us with exogenous variation in the student's decision to study
abroad. In all regressions reported below we account for any dependence between
observations by clustering all results at the university level. This leaves the error
correlation within clusters completely unrestricted and allows for arbitrary with-in
cluster dependence. The clustering, therefore, not only allows arbitrary correlations of
errors for students from a graduate cohort at a certain university but also allows the
14This approach is based on our understanding that a school leaver's decision process can be thought
of as rst deciding on a subject, and then selecting between dierent universities given the subject.
This is reected, for example, in the subjects where university admissions are centrally administered:
students can apply for one subject only, but in their application give a preference ranking for a number
of dierent universities in this subject (ZVS 2009).
15This way of dening exposure is related to the instrument of Bartik (1991) for local labor demand
conditions.
16Partly owing to the comparatively long duration of studies, it is more common for students to
transfer between universities during the undergraduate studies than e.g. in the U.S. or the U.K.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 89
errors to be serially correlated. An alternative way of addressing the possible serial
correlation of error terms is to collapse the data into a pre and post period as suggested
by Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004). We show in column (5) of Table 3.10
that this alternative way of obtaining standard errors yields very similar results to
clustering at the university level.
In order to visualize how students are aected by these shocks of being faced with
more or less exchange opportunity, we perform the following event study: For each
student's initial university and subject choice, we observe whether there was at any
point an ERASMUS cooperation in the time period we observe. We group students by
whether they entered the university before or after the introduction of the ERASMUS
scheme, and by how many years. In the following gure we plot the time dierence
between the introduction of ERASMUS and university entry against the probability
of going abroad. Keeping in mind that students usually start two or three years
before going abroad, we get the following prediction: According to our hypothesis,
the probability of studying abroad should be at for the cohorts starting more than
three years before the introduction. The cohorts starting three or two years before the
introduction of ERASMUS would then be the rst ones to be aected, and we expect
an increase in the proportion of students studying abroad from then on. The results
can be seen in Figure 3.5.
This gure provides evidence that the ERASMUS scheme aects the dierent co-
horts in a very precise way. Closely following our prediction, the probability of studying
abroad is low and at before the introduction of ERASMUS, and goes up steeply after-
wards. Furthermore, our data provides evidence that institutions which have not yet
introduced ERASMUS are similar to those which never introduce ERASMUS: Stu-
dents at institutions which never introduce ERASMUS have a probability of studying
abroad of 2.2%, which closely matches the average for the not-yet-aected students in
the graph above. In the following section we show how the exposure to ERASMUS
aects the probability of studying abroad.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 90
Figure 3.5: Event Study ERASMUS
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3.5 First Stage Results
Table 3.2 presents the results from our rst stage estimates. In this context the rst
stage regressions are interesting in their own right as one can learn about the factors
aecting an individual's decision to study abroad. We regress an indicator for studying
abroad on our measure for exposure to the ERASMUS program and other control
variables. In column (1) we use the ERASMUS indicator as our measure for a student's
exposure to the program. The coecient on ERASMUS is highly signicant with an
F-statistic of 40.5. The coecient indicates that a student's probability of studying
abroad increases by about 2.5 percentage points if her department participates in the
ERASMUS program. Analyzing the eect of our control variables one can see that
a student's gender does not seem to aect her probability of studying abroad. The
quadratic in age indicates that students who begin their studies at a higher age are
much less likely to study abroad (in the relevant age range).3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 91
Table 3.2: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Ratio
Instrument Dummy Ratio Subject Ratio excluding own
department
ERASMUS 0.0247 0.4490 0.9121 0.8382
(0.0039)** (0.0639)** (0.1364)** (0.1297)**
Female -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Apprenticeship -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Age (when starting Studies) -0.0096 -0.0103 -0.0101 -0.0101
(0.0027)** (0.0027)** (0.0027)** (0.0027)**
Age Squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
Experience 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Bachelor 0.0119 0.0123 0.0127 0.0130
(0.0328) (0.0318) (0.0326) (0.0327)
Follow-up Survey (Dummy) X X X X
Graduate Cohort FE X X X X
Subject FE X X X X
University FE X X X X
N 54079 54079 54079 54079
R-squared 0.087 0.092 0.090 0.089
F-stat of Instrument 40.536 49.394 44.688 41.746
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Study Abroad. ** denotes signicance at the 1%, * denotes signif-
icance at the 5% level. All standard errors are clustered at the university level.
In column (2) we use the ratio of ERASMUS places to the number of students in the
relevant cohort as our measure for exposure to the ERASMUS program. Once again
the coecient on the ERASMUS measure is highly signicant with an F-statistic of
49.4. The coecient indicates that an increase in the ratio of ERASMUS places from
say 5 percent to 10 percent increases an individual's probability of studying abroad by
about 2.2 percentage points. The coecients for the control variables are very similar
to the ones reported in column (1).
In columns (3) and (4) we report the rst stage for the ERASMUS subject ratio
and the subject ratio, excluding own department. As we would expect, the strength of
the instrument is somewhat lower than for the ratio, but the F-statistic is still above3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 92
40.17
In the following we show that the ERASMUS program has a very specic eect on
studying abroad, as it only aects the probability of studying abroad in a European
country but not in countries outside Europe. This is a clear indication that the in-
troduction of ERASMUS was not one of many policies to improve university quality,
which in turn could aect the outcome as well. In order to demonstrate the precise
eect of studying abroad we create three indicator variables, which take the value 1
if an individual studied abroad in Europe, the USA, or in any other foreign country
respectively. We expect that our instrument only aects the probability of studying
abroad in Europe as the ERASMUS program only oers scholarships for studying
abroad in European partner universities. In columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.3 we re-
place the dependent variable of our usual rst stage regression (studying abroad in any
country) with an indicator for studying abroad in Europe.18 ERASMUS is a strong
and highly signicant determinant of studying abroad in Europe. The magnitudes
of the ERASMUS coecients is similar to the one obtained when we use the general
denition of studying abroad.
The regressions reported in columns (2) and (5) use an indicator for studying abroad
in the US as the dependent variable. The coecients on the ERASMUS measures is
not signicantly dierent from 0. Furthermore, the point estimates of the ERASMUS
measures are very close to 0. In columns (3) and (6) we report specications where
we use an indicator for studying abroad in any country outside Europe or the US as
the dependent variable. Again the coecients on ERASMUS are small and not sig-
nicantly dierent from 0. The evidence from Table 3.3 strongly suggests that the
introduction of the ERASMUS program was not correlated with the introduction of
17One common concern in IV estimation is a potential bias due to weak instruments (see Bound,
Jaeger & Baker (1995) and Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)). The F-statistics from the rst stage,
reported at the bottom of Table 3.2, show that weak instruments are not likely to pose a problem in
our analysis.
18We do not observe study abroad destinations in the 1989 cohort, so that our sample in this analysis
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Table 3.3: Falsication Exercise: First Stage with Dierent Destinations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument Dummy Dummy Dummy Ratio Ratio Ratio
Study Abroad in Europe USA Rest Europe USA Rest
ERASMUS 0.0200 -0.0016 0.0013 0.3861 0.0102 0.0281
(0.0036)** (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0597)** (0.0156) (0.0144)
Controls
Follow-up Survey (Dummy) X X X X X X
Graduate Cohort FE X X X X X X
Subject FE X X X X X X
University FE X X X X X X
N 41065 41065 41065 41065 41065 41065
R-squared 0.075 0.023 0.039 0.080 0.023 0.039
F-stat of Instrument 30.80 0.77 1.18 41.83 0.43 3.79
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Study Abroad in a certain area. ** denotes signicance at the 1%,
* denotes signicance at the 5% level. All standard errors are clustered at the university level.
a broader set of policies, which might themselves aect later labor market outcomes.
These results increase our condence for using the ERASMUS program as an instru-
mental variable for studying abroad. In the following section we use this IV to obtain
estimates of the eect of studying abroad on the probability of working in a foreign
country later in life.
3.6 Main Results and Sensitivity Analysis
The OLS results reported in column (1) of Table 3.4 conrm that graduates who spent
some time at a foreign university are more likely to work abroad later in life. Our
OLS result indicates that the eect of studying abroad is about 6.5 percentage points.
As discussed before we do not want to attribute causality to the OLS results. This
is because the factors aecting an individual's decision to study abroad are likely to3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 94
aect her decision to work abroad later on as well. Therefore, we now turn to our IV
results.19
Table 3.4: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation Method OLS IV IV IV IV
Abroad 0.0646 0.2439 0.1224 0.1488 0.1346
(0.0066)** (0.1078)* (0.0450)** (0.0598)* (0.0671)*
Female -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Apprenticeship -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0050
(0.0023)* (0.0024)* (0.0023)* (0.0023)* (0.0023)*
Age (when starting Studies) -0.0052 -0.0035 -0.0046 -0.0044 -0.0045
(0.0018)** (0.0022) (0.0018)* (0.0019)* (0.0019)*
Age Squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000)* (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)*
Experience 0.0067 0.0067 0.0067 0.0067 0.0067
(0.0012)** (0.0012)** (0.0012)** (0.0012)** (0.0012)**
Bachelor -0.0013 -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0021
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Follow Up Survey (Dummy) X X X X X
Graduate Cohort FE X X X X X
Subject FE X X X X X
University FE X X X X X
Instruments: Subject Ratio
ERASMUS Dummy Ratio Subject Ratio excluding own
department
N 54079 54079 54079 54079 54079
R-squared 0.034
F-stat First Stage 40.537 49.394 44.688 41.746
Dependent Variable: Working Abroad. ** denotes signicance at the 1%, * denotes signicance at
the 5% level. All standard errors are clustered at the university level. Note: Dependent variable is
an indicator for whether the respondent works abroad at the time of the survey. Study abroad is an
indicator for whether the student spends part of her university career at a foreign university. See text
for further details.
In column (2) of Table 3.4 we present the rst set of IV results using the ERASMUS
indicator as an instrument. We nd that studying abroad increases an individual's
probability to work in a foreign country by about 24 percentage points. The eect is
signicant at the ve percent level. We nd no signicant dierence in terms of gender.
19In Table 3.10 in the Appendix 3.A, we also present the reduced form estimates corresponding to
the main results. Column (5) of Table 3.10 shows the results from collapsing the data into a pre and a
post period as suggested by Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) using the ERASMUS dummy
measure. The corresponding uncollapsed reduced form is presented in column (1). The results are
very similar.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 95
Furthermore, we nd that individuals who completed an apprenticeship before they
enrolled at university are about 0.5 percentage points less likely to work abroad. People
who complete an apprenticeship may be more likely to go back to work at the same rm
where they completed their apprenticeship, which will usually be located in Germany.
We also nd that labor market experience has an eect on the probability of working
abroad. The coecient indicate that individuals with one more year of experience in
the labor market are about 0.7 percentage points more likely to work abroad. Within a
survey wave, there is relatively little variation in potential experience, and this estimate
also captures the increased probability of working abroad from the initial to the follow-
up survey. Over and above this annual measure of potential experience, the indicator
variable for the follow-up survey does not show up signicantly.
In column (3) we present the results from using the ERASMUS ratio as instrument.
Making use of the additional variation in number of scholarships increases precision
signicantly. The point estimate goes down as well compared to column (2), but is
still substantially higher than the OLS estimate. The eect is statistically signicant
at the one percent level. It is important to note that the point estimate is highest
when we use the ERASMUS indicator. Given these results we are condent to say
that our results reect a supply-side increase in scholarship availability, rather than
students' demand. If the number of ERASMUS places was driven by the demand of
very motivated students we would expect higher coecients on ERASMUS when using
the ERASMUS ratio instrument.
We further probe our results by using the ERASMUS measures which exploit sub-
ject level variation rather than conditions at the actual department (columns (4) and
(5)). It is reassuring to nd that the estimates are similar to the ones reported in the
previous columns. In the following, we show that our results are robust to a number
of specication checks.
There may be a worry that students from dierent family backgrounds not only
choose universities with dierent provision of ERASMUS scholarships but also exhibit3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 96
dierent propensities to work in a foreign country. As long as this eect is constant over
time we deal with this problem by estimating all equations including university xed
eects. It could be possible, however, that people from dierent backgrounds react
dierently to the introduction of an ERASMUS program or changes in the number of
scholarships. In order to address this concern we add controls for parental education
and occupation to our main specication. It is evident from looking at the second
panel of Table 3.5 that including the measures for parental background hardly aects
our estimates of the eect of studying abroad. The results indicate that students from
better educated parents are between 0.5 and 1 percentage points more likely to work
abroad.
Another concern is that students with a taste for mobility choose universities or
departments with a lot of ERASMUS scholarships. Our IV estimates would be biased
if these individuals were more likely to work abroad later in life. In the following we
present a powerful test, which directly addresses this concern. We add two variables
which control for a student's mobility at the start of her university career. The rst
variable indicates whether the student enrols in university in the state (Bundesland)
where she obtained her highschool diploma (Abitur). The second mobility variable
measures the distance from the state where she obtained her highschool diploma to
the state of her rst university enrolment. The coecients on the distance measures for
early mobility are not found to be signicant. Including those two mobility variables
hardly aects the estimates for the eect of studying abroad as can be seen from the
third panel in Table 3.6.
Individuals may be more likely to work abroad if they know more foreigners. There
are at least two channels through which the number of contacts to foreigners may aect
the likelihood of working abroad. One channel may be an increased number of contacts
to future business partners. A further channel may be that contacts to foreigners
increase an individual's taste for foreign cultures which may aect her probability of
working abroad. As the ERASMUS program is at least partly reciprocal, universities3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 97
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oering more ERASMUS scholarships may also enroll more foreign students. This
could then increase the student's propensity to work abroad later on and therefore
bias our IV results. In the fourth panel of Table 3.5 we present the results from
adding the university wide ratio of foreign students over the total number of students
in a student's cohort20 to our specication. Adding this control does not change the
coecient on studying abroad at all. The coecient on our measure for the exposure
to foreign students is highly signicant, but rather small in magnitude. The estimated
coecient indicates that increasing the percentage of foreign students at a student's
home university from say 5 to 15 percent increases her probability of working abroad
by about 0.03 percentage points. This exercise is interesting also because it adds
university-specic covariates which vary over time, and it is reassuring that the results
remain unchanged.
In the following we check whether our results are driven by time trends in our
variables of interest. Including graduate cohort FE (as in all specications) guarantees
that we do not identify the eect of studying abroad on working abroad from overall
time trends. There may be a worry, however, that students studying certain subjects
exhibit time trends in both studying abroad and working abroad. To address this issue
we include linear subject specic time trends. The results of this exercise are reported
in the second panel of Table 3.7. Apart from the specication reported in column
(3) the inclusion of the subject specic time trends hardly aects the coecient of
studying abroad.
It may be the case that groups of departments within a university dier in quality or
in their ability to foster international exchange. We address this concern by including
a full set of department group times university xed eects. We thus use separate xed
eects for say sciences or languages at a certain university. Including this ne level
of FEs hardly aects the estimates using the ERASMUS ratio instrument. Again, we
20We use the ratio at the middle of the average student's university career as the relevant measure
for contacts to foreigners.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 100
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nd that the magnitude of the estimates to be very similar to our main specication.
It is reassuring that the inclusion of time trends or a ner set of xed eects does
not have a huge impact on our estimates. This and the fact that our estimates are
hardly aected by including controls for parental background, for early mobility, and
for the number of foreign students at the home university makes us condent that using
the ERASMUS program as a source of exogenous variation is a credible identication
strategy to estimate the causal eect of studying abroad on later labor market mobility.
One dening feature of our results is that the IV results are substantially higher
than the corresponding OLS result. We have tested whether the IV estimates are sig-
nicantly dierent from the OLS estimates. The results indicate that the IV estimates
are not statistically dierent at a 5% level, which reects the lower precision of the IV
estimates.21 Although the dierence in the estimates needs to interpreted in the light
of this test, we are nonetheless interested in understanding why our point estimates
are consistently higher than the OLS estimates, and we interpret this nding in terms
of heterogeneity in returns: It is unlikely that all students will be aected in the same
way by the intervention of studying abroad. It is much more plausible that the eect of
studying abroad itself varies across the student population. We follow Imbens & An-
grist (1994) and interpret our estimates as a Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE):
The IV results show the average eect for the subgroup which has been aected by the
instrument. In the context of our instrument, this group is well-dened: It is the group
of students who would not have studied abroad without the ERASMUS program, but
study abroad when the ERASMUS is implemented. Since they are the students who
have been aected by the ERASMUS program, our estimates are of immediate interest
to policy makers.
We therefore investigate heterogeneity in returns along two important dimensions:
parental education and whether the student was credit constrained during her studies.
21In our main specication, the IV dummy specication is statistically dierent from the OLS
estimate at 10%.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 102
Parental education may be important because students with better educated parents
may be better informed about the benets from studying abroad. Furthermore, we
investigate heterogeneity according to the nancial situation of the student. In the
absence of credit constraints all students for whom the cost of studying abroad is
above the returns from studying abroad will not study in a foreign country. Some
credit constrained students, however, will not be able to invest in studying abroad
even though this investment oers a positive return. The introduction of ERASMUS
can be understood as a price change which makes the investment into studying abroad
worthwhile for these marginal students.
In order to investigate heterogeneity in returns we therefore split our sample into
four dierent subgroups: students with high parental education who have not been
credit constrained, students with high parental education who have been credit con-
strained, students with low parental education who have not been credit constrained,
and lastly the most disadvantaged group: students with low parental education who
have been credit constrained. We classify students to being from a high parental ed-
ucation background as those whose parents have at least 16 years of education, i.e.
both parents have at least a university degree. Low parental education is dened as
all those with parents who have less than 16 years of education. Credit constraints
are proxied with an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the student covers
50 percent or more of his expenses with federal nancial assistance (BAFOEG).22 We
then follow Kling (2001) in interpreting the IV estimate as a weighted average of the
causal eect of studying abroad, where the weight of each subgroup j is given by the
following formula:
22Unfortunately, we do not have any information on the student's nancial situation for the 2005
wave. In 1989 the question on BAFOEG was not administered but the students were asked to evaluate
their nancial situation on a 1 to 5 scale. We classify all those who answered 5 (unsatisfactory nancial
situation) as being credit constrained. This corresponds almost exactly to the sample proportion who
indicate that they nanced 50 percent of their expenses with BAFOEG in the later cohorts.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 103
weightj =
wjj(StudyAbroad)j P
j wjj(StudyAbroad)j
(3.6)
Here wj is the sample fraction of each subgroup j, j is the variance of the instru-
mental variable for subgroup j conditional on all other regressors x, and (StudyAbroad)j
is the impact of the ERASMUS instrument on the probability of studying abroad for
subgroup j. The last term is obtained from estimating the rst stage regression sepa-
rately for each subgroup.23 We use this decomposition to compute the corresponding
weight for our four subgroups.
In our sample about 39% of all students come from the most advantaged back-
ground (see column (1) in Table 3.8), and this group is found to respond strongest to
the introduction of ERASMUS (see column (2)). Even though the conditional vari-
ance of ERASMUS is lowest for them (column (3)) they contribute about 46% to the
nal IV estimate which is more than their sample proportion. The other group that
contributes more than proportionately to the IV estimates is the group of students
with the most disadvantaged background. Column (5) reports the corresponding IV
estimates if the regression is estimated separately for the four subgroups. The much
smaller samples lead to a loss in precision; comparisons of the point estimates for the
four subgroups should therefore be made with caution. With this caveat in mind it is
evident that the least advantaged group of students seems to have the highest return
from studying abroad. This suggests that credit constraints and information asym-
metries may indeed prevent some students from realizing the return from studying
abroad.
23See Kling (2001) for further details.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 104
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3.7 How Studying Abroad Aects International Labor
Market Mobility
The results presented in the previous sections indicate that individuals who study
abroad are more likely to work in a foreign country. It is interesting to understand
how studying abroad aects an individual's decision to migrate to a foreign country
later in life. We address this in two ways: First, we make use of observed location
choices to study the type of skills acquired during the stay abroad. Second, the survey
provides us with direct qualitative evidence on why graduates move abroad, and we
show how this varies depending on whether the student studied abroad earlier.
We can think of the eect of studying abroad as aecting the set of skills the
student acquires during her studies. One important question is whether these skills
have a strong location-specic component. We can shed some light on this question
by investigating whether individuals who have studied abroad return to work in the
same country when they decide to work in a foreign country. There are a number
of reasons why mobile graduates may be more likely to work abroad in the countries
where they studied abroad before: While they were studying abroad they may have ob-
tained skills that are of particular relevance in that specic labor market, e.g. language
skills, knowledge about the local labor market, or personal contacts which facilitate a
match. On the other hand, it is possible that studying abroad aects the probability
of working abroad equally for dierent work destinations. This would be the case, for
example, if studying abroad widens the horizon of the student generally and leads her
to search for a job internationally, independent of where she studied before. Especially,
studying abroad could operate as a stepping stone to increase the set of feasible des-
tinations. This question is also highly relevant from a policy perspective: The ability
of the ERASMUS scheme or other student mobility programs to achieve an integrated
European labor market depends on the assumption that students who went abroad to
study in Europe are internationally mobile after graduation, but remain in Europe.3 Studying Abroad and the E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Here we present descriptive evidence to address this question from the 2005 co-
hort.24 For each study abroad treatment and study abroad location, Table 3.7 shows
the conditional probability of being in each work location. The table provides evi-
dence that choices about study abroad locations are sticky, that is that students tend
to return to work to the country or region where they studied abroad. A 2-test
of independence between the study abroad location and the work abroad location is
rejected at the 0.01% level with a test statistic of 768.7.
We now turn to qualitative evidence from the survey on why graduates moved
abroad. As these qualitative questions were only administered to the 1997 cohort
we cannot apply our instrumental variable strategy here. We therefore provide a
descriptive analysis, which { if only suggestive { may shed light on the way studying
abroad aects later labor market mobility.
Graduates who had worked in a foreign country for at least one month in the ve
years since graduation were asked to identify the reasons for their decision to work
abroad. In Table 3.9 we present the percentage of the people who indicated that a
certain reason had been important in their decision to work abroad. The table shows
that the main reasons for working abroad are interest in foreign cultures, interesting
oers from abroad, and the initiative of the employer. We split the sample into those
who complete all their university education in Germany and those who study abroad
for some time during their undergraduate education. Interestingly, while the means are
similar in some categories, there are a number of noteworthy dierences. Those who
have studied abroad are more likely to indicate that their interest in foreign cultures
has led them to seek employment abroad. It may be the case that studying in a foreign
country increased the individual's taste for living abroad, which may in turn increase
her probability of migrating later in life. Students who have studied abroad are also
signicantly more likely to indicate that they chose to work abroad to be with their
24We only observe country by country locations for the studying abroad and the work abroad spell
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Table 3.9: Reasons for working abroad
Study Study Dierence in
All Abroad = 0 Abroad = 1 means (p-value)
Interest in Foreign Cultures 52.95 50.93 67.21 0.000
(1.59) (1.71) (4.27)
Received Interesting Oer 35.85 35.35 39.34 0.389
(1.53) (1.63) (4.44)
At Employer's Instance 33.40 34.07 28.69 0.239
(1.51) (1.62) (4.11)
Better Career Prospects 25.36 25.81 22.13 0.382
in Germany after Return (1.39) (1.49) (3.77)
Obtain Qualications Abroad 16.80 16.86 16.39 0.897
(1.19) (1.28) (3.37)
International Research Project 14.77 14.65 15.57 0.788
(1.13) (1.21) (3.30)
Partner 10.90 9.77 18.85 0.003
(0.99) (1.01) (3.56)
Employment Outlook Abroad 8.66 8.02 13.11 0.061
(0.90) (0.93) (3.07)
Career Prospects Abroad 6.52 5.70 12.30 0.006
(0.79) (0.79) (2.99)
Number of Observations 982 860 122
Note: Based on all respondents from the 1997 follow-up survey who have work experience abroad.
Table shows percentage of respondents who indicate that a particular reason led them to take up work
abroad. Example: 50.93% of respondents indicate that interest in foreign cultures led them to take
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partner. The answers to this question may suggest that people who studied abroad
may have met their partner while studying abroad and therefore consider to work
abroad later in life. Of course, this dierence may also be driven by assortative mating
with more mobile people having more mobile partners, and the way this question was
asked makes it impossible to distinguish between these alternatives. Meeting a partner
abroad may, nonetheless, be a possible channel of the eect of studying abroad. The
summary statistics also indicate that those who have studied abroad are somewhat
more likely to say that they work abroad because of better employment opportunities
in the foreign labor market, where we obtain a p-value of 0.06 when we test for a
signicant dierence in the means of the two groups for this response. It is possible
that a stay at a foreign university makes it easier to realize opportunities in foreign
labor markets, either because those who studied abroad have better information on
the foreign labor market or because employers are more willing to oer employment to
those individuals. Interestingly, rather than the employment outlook, it is the career
prospects abroad where the means are signicantly dierent at the 1% level, suggesting
that those with international study experience seem to be more likely to consider a
career abroad.
The statistics presented here provide some suggestive evidence of how studying
abroad may alter later international labor market mobility. Further research is nec-
essary to get a better insight into the channels of the eect of studying abroad on
working abroad later on.
3.8 Conclusion
Using exogenous variation in scholarship availability, we are able to identify a causal
eect of undergraduate student mobility on later international labor migration. Our
strategy exploits the introduction and expansion of the ERASMUS scholarship pro-
gram. The extent to which students were exposed to the scholarship scheme varied3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 109
widely. We exploit cross-sectional and over time-changes in scholarship availability.
Accounting for permanent dierences between dierent institutions, dierent subjects,
and dierent graduate cohorts, our identication relies only on dierential over-time
change, and can be interpreted as a Di-in-Di estimator. Our rst-stage shows that
the ERASMUS scheme has indeed a strong eect on the students' decision to go abroad,
which is not surprising given its scale. We show that the instrument is precise in that
it only aects the decision to study in Europe, but not in other locations. Our event
study adds further credibility to our instrument, by showing that the probability of
studying abroad is low and at before ERASMUS is introduced, and increases strongly
for those students aected by the scholarship.
Our OLS results indicate that the group of students who studied abroad are about
6 percentage points more likely to work abroad later on, controlling for a set of back-
ground characteristics, institution and time xed eects. Our IV results are sub-
stantially higher than that, and indicate that the eect of study abroad is about 15
percentage points. We interpret the dierence between OLS and IV as an indication
of heterogeneity in eects: The population which is aected by our instruments reacts
particularly strongly to the incentives of the mobility program. This Local Average
Treatment Eect (LATE) interpretation is of particular interest to policy makers, since
it evaluates the eect for the aected sub group. We show that the most disadvan-
tages students have the highest returns from studying abroad suggesting that credit
constraints and information asymmetries play a role in this setup.
Our results show that educational mobility programs may have a potentially large
role in aecting students' behavior in their labor market mobility decision. These
results imply that an opportunity to attract talented graduates is to provide student
exchange opportunities. Attractive universities and scholarship programs may yield a
return through attracting students, part of whom will remain as skilled workers later
on. In the context of the policy change under consideration, ERASMUS is successful
in that this student mobility scheme appears to contribute to the development of an3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 110
integrated European labor market. This is especially so if we take into account the
descriptive evidence from the previous section that location choices are sticky, i.e. that
mobile students tend to return to the country where they studied before.
More generally, our work allows insights into the dynamic implications of educa-
tional mobility decisions. Our results indicate that the eects of educational mobility
programs go far beyond aecting the decision to study abroad for some time period,
but rather reach far into the labor market, and it will be interesting to follow the
sample of graduates as their careers unfold. But already at this early stage our re-
sults indicate that even short-term mobility investments can lead to signicant further
mobility investments later on.3 Studying Abroad and the Eect on International Labor Market Mobility 111
3.A Appendix
Table 3.10: Reduced Forms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS BDM
ERASMUS 0.0060 0.0550 0.1357 0.1128 0.0065
(0.0027)* (0.0221)* (0.0573)* (0.0583) (0.0030)*
Instruments: Subject Ratio
ERASMUS Dummy Ratio Subject Ratio excluding own Dummy
department
N 54079 54079 54079 54079
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Working Abroad. ** denotes signicance at the 1%, * denotes
signicance at the 5% level. Standard errors in columns (1) to (4) are clustered at the university level.
In column (5) the data is rst collapsed into pre-post subject times university cells as suggested by
Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004).Chapter 4
Vocational Schooling versus
Apprenticeship Training:
Evidence from Vacancy Data
4.1 Introduction
Recent research has emphasized the occupation-specic nature of human capital (John-
son and Keane, 2007; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008), indicating that human capital
is encapsulated in the ability to perform specic tasks. This suggests that the way
young labor market entrants are taught the skills they need in the workplace is crucial
for their labor market outcomes. At the same time, little is known about how these
skills are best conferred. Alternative templates (Goldin, 2001) compete with respect
to structured vocational training: full-time vocational schooling, largely rm-based
apprenticeships1, and on-the-job training. The co-existence of these alternatives, and
the pronounced dierences between countries in the approach to vocational training,
1Ryan (1998) denes apprenticeship as `employer-sponsored programmes which integrate part-time
schooling with part-time training and work experience on employers' premises [...] within an externally
dened curriculum which contains mandatory part-time schooling, leads to a nationally recognised
vocational qualication and takes at least two years to complete'.
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as documented by Ryan (2001), underlines that no consensus has been reached on how
to best equip young people with the skills they are likely to need in the workplace.
In this chapter, we compare labor market outcomes between apprenticeship train-
ing and full-time vocational schooling, focusing on wages, unemployment and measures
of mobility. As identifying source of variation, we exploit the following idea: The ap-
prenticeship system fundamentally links the educational opportunities of young people
to the provision of apprenticeship places by rms. Conceptually, the same individual
will make dierent educational choices, depending on where and when she grows up
and the corresponding uctuations in apprenticeship places. Using unique data on
apprenticeship vacancies from Germany, together with detailed panel data on labor
market outcomes, we document how apprenticeship choice is aected by the availabil-
ity of apprenticeship places. We show that at the margin, young people substitute
between apprenticeship-based training and full-time vocational schooling, rather than
between apprenticeship and direct entry as unskilled worker. Thus, the variation we
exploit is informative about the relative eect of apprenticeship versus schooling-based
training. We then employ this variation in the opportunities of young people as in-
strumental variable to learn about the causal eect of the apprenticeship scheme. To
motivate this instrumental variable, we provide a simple small open economy model
with educational choice, in which aggregate price shocks aect the local number of
apprentices, but have no dierential eect on factor rewards.
Our main results indicate that vocational schools and apprenticeship training pro-
vide similar levels of productivity as measured by wages in the age range between
23 and 26. This suggests that these two alternatives are similar in the skills they
confer. At the same time, the probability of unemployment is substantially lower for
apprenticeship graduates. Investigating the pattern of unemployment over time, we
nd that the eect is transitory, and fades out over time. This suggests that appren-
ticeship training provides a benet to participants in that it improves labor market
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We perform our analysis on data for Germany, where full-time vocational schools
exist as alternative next to the dual apprenticeship system2. This allows us to in-
vestigate the relative return in a within-country framework. The early tracking of
pupils allows us to abstract from the college-going decision: As we describe below,
individuals are tracked at ages 10{12 into either a university-bound upper track or a
lower- or medium-schooling track, so that the decision to go to university is already
pre-determined through the tracking decision earlier on. With respect to alternative
entry as unskilled worker, we treat this as an empirical question, and document in sev-
eral ways that our measure of apprenticeship availability moves individuals between
apprenticeship training and full-time vocational school.
In a policy context, understanding the implications of these dierent templates is
crucial for a number of reasons. Given the increased demand for skilled labor, a well-
trained workforce is believed to be central to a productive and competitive economy.
In many countries, governments and individuals invest heavily into vocational training
schemes, and it is important to know if this money is well spent or could be better
invested elsewhere. Vocational schooling plays a large role in many countries: On aver-
age across OECD countries, 48% of youth are enrolled in vocational or pre-vocational
programs at upper secondary level, of which about a third is a combination of school-
and work based programs (OECD, 2008). There is wide variation among countries:
In some countries, formal vocational training is entirely or mostly school-based (e.g.
Sweden, Belgium), while in others, rm-based programs play an important role (e.g.
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland). In the U.S., 16% of high school graduates obtain
more than a quarter of their credits in career/technical education (CTE) courses3, and
vocational training plays an important role in community colleges.
Young adults who are not college-bound benet from knowledge about the eects of
taking alternative paths, and from the provision of the most eective training scheme.
2The term dual refers to the shared provision of training through both the rm and a part-time
vocational school, in which the student typically spends one to two days per week.
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From a social policy perspective, a well-functioning school-to-work transition can avoid
potentially damaging unemployment or inactivity and the social problems associated
with that. It is not surprising that this transition is often found at the heart of policy
proposals. In a number of cases, policy initiatives focus on fostering the role of rms
in training young adults through apprenticeship{type programs, as for example in the
School-to-Work Opportunity Act of 1994 in the US, or the 1995 Modern Apprenticeship
program in the United Kingdom.
Investigating the eects of apprenticeship-type training is of broader importance.
The apprenticeship system shares important features with other institutions in dier-
ent countries and at dierent educational levels: As Becker (1962) points out, there
are essential similarities between apprenticeships and the training of lawyers or physi-
cians. College students around the world attempt to gain practical experience through
internships. These activities come at substantial costs to individuals, who work at low
or sometimes without pay, and often increase duration of their studies. In the United
States, many colleges oer Cooperative Education programs.4 In a 1996 representative
survey of 500 U.S. colleges and universities, the American Council on Education (ACE)
nds that 91% of institutions oer unpaid internships, 69% oer paid internships, and
57% oer cooperative education programs (NCCE, 2008b).
Empirically, establishing which of the dierent templates for vocational skill for-
mation is most eective is dicult because in countries where alternatives coexist,
individuals select into the dierent paths based on individual unobservable character-
istics and preferences. Simple comparisons of means between the dierent paths are
likely to be misleading because these characteristics aect labor market outcomes at
the same time. These selection problems are well known. Ryan (2001, p.74) high-
lights these challenges with respect to vocational schooling and rm-based training
and concludes that `a large microeconometric evaluation literature is correspondingly
4NCCE (2008a) denes Cooperative Education as a `structured educational strategy integrating
classroom studies with learning through productive work experiences in a eld related to a student's
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uninformative'. As a result, in trying to understand the implications of the dierent
templates, large emphasis has been placed on evidence from comparative studies. In
the comparison of apprenticeship with vocational schooling, the within-country stud-
ies which do address selection have regularly relied on excluding family background
variables to identify the model, which is dicult to reconcile with the evidence that
parental characteristics have a direct eect on a range of parental investments and
child outcomes.5
Bonnal, Mendes, and Sofer (2002) and Winkelmann (1996) study the transitions
immediately after completion of the training period, and nd that apprentices are less
likely to transit into unemployment. Sollogoub and Ulrich (1999) nd that 4.5 years
after graduation, apprentices have lower wages (after correcting for selection), but have
spent a larger fraction of this period in work. Plug and Groot (1998) nd that earnings
and earning growth are not statistically dierent. Blanchower and Lynch (1994) use
the NLSY to estimate the eect of dierent forms of training on wage growth in a
rst-dierence framework between ages 20 and 25.
This chapter makes a number of contributions. The small open economy framework
with educational choice provides an economic setting which generates the exclusion
restriction that is required for an instrumental variable strategy. We discuss identica-
tion in a multinomial choice setting, and argue that a univariate instrument may still
recover a well-dened alternative-specic treatment eect in a potentially important
special case. We show that in this application, we cannot reject that this condition is
satised. This allows us to account for selection in a transparent manner, and identify
an eect along a clearly dened margin that is of interest to policy-makers. We trace
out the dierential eect of training form along a number of important labor market
outcomes. The panel nature of our administrative data allows to follow individuals
for longer than typically possible in school-to-work transition surveys, and provides us
5See, for example, Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Currie (2007), and the evidence presented in chapter
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with a large representative sample. This work also empirically investigates the dieren-
tial responsiveness to negative shocks between apprenticeships and vocational schools,
which has been an inuential argument in the literature which compares dierent forms
of vocational preparation.
A number of recent papers investigates the role of apprenticeship training along
other margins. Comparing apprenticeship training as alternative to on-the-job train-
ing, Adda, Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2006) estimate a dynamic discrete choice
model of apprenticeship choice. The length of vocational training is investigated in
Oosterbeek and Webbink (2007) using a reform of compulsory schooling laws, and in
Fersterer, Pischke, and Winter-Ebmer (2008), who study the variation of apprentice-
ship length induced by rm failures. A paper which compares vocational education
and academic schooling is the work by Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2008); they do not
distinguish between vocational schooling and apprenticeship training.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the arguments relat-
ing to the relative merits between apprenticeship training versus full-time vocational
schooling, and then provides a brief background on the German educational system.
Following on, we briey describe the data. Section 4.4 addresses identication. Section
4.5 documents how individuals' educational choice responds to availability of appren-
ticeship vacancies. Section 4.6 contains the main results. Section 4.7 presents a number
of sensitivity checks, and the last section concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Dierences between apprenticeship training and full-time school-
ing
In this part we briey review the main arguments in the comparison between vocational
schooling and apprenticeship training.
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instruction. This relates to the literature which investigates rm incentives to provide
training, starting from the seminal work of Becker (1993). Firms will not invest in the
workers' general human capital, since in a competitive labor market the rm will not
be able to recover the revenue from this investment. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
show rms may be willing to provide some general training, since the informational
advantage of knowing the worker's quality results in a rent to the rm; but investment
in general training is still ineciently low. A number of authors highlight the role of the
apprentice as a form of unskilled worker to the rm. Within the regulatory constraints
and contractual commitments to the trainee, rms maximize prots through the use
of the apprentice as unskilled worker at low wages (Heckman, 1993). Along similar
lines, the employee-type status of the apprentice gives the rm discretion, even given a
regulatory framework, and this in turn may lead to commitment problems on the side
of the rm. The central drawback of apprenticeship training is that it is thought to be
too rm-specic, and may not be suciently portable to other rms. The large number
of moves young people make in their transition from school to work is well documented
(Topel and Ward, 1992), and in the context of technological and structural change,
transferability and the ability to acquire further skills are important criteria.
A number of advantages of apprenticeship training are of educational nature. Ap-
prenticeship training is believed to be the more practical approach to learning, which
contextualizes knowledge in the workplace. This may be especially relevant for less
academically able young adults, and may increase motivation (Ryan (1998, 2001)).
School-based instruction relies essentially on a simulated work environment, which
may make it harder to link theory and practice. The combination of two learning
places in dual systems may on the one hand lead to additional returns from the inter-
action of two forms of learning. On the other hand, it carries the risk of two uncon-
nected approaches. In terms of skills, apprenticeship training may confer additional
work-related skills, like team-work, discipline, the ability to integrate into a working
environment and the corresponding working hours and conditions. Firms may know4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 119
better what skills are required and are more likely to employ the latest technology and
practices. Firm involvement in nancing training may lead to eciency gains (Plug
and Groot, 1998). Furthermore, apprenticeships may serve a useful function in terms
of job search and matching. Firms learn about the quality of the worker, and appren-
tices also benet from a reduction of uncertainty about the employer. The on-the-job
aspect of apprenticeship training is likely to provide not only more information than
can be transferred through certicates, but also information about the specic value
of the rm-worker match.
4.2.2 Institutional background on the German educational system
In this section, we provide a brief review of the relevant institutional background in
which our study is conducted.6 When aged between 10 and 12, students are typically
tracked into three school streams: the Gymnasium as the track for later university stu-
dents, and the lower and medium school (Hauptschule and Realschule) leading towards
vocational education. Mobility between tracks is rare; since this chapter focuses on
vocational education, we limit attention to the lower and medium schooling track. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the structure of the educational and vocational system for these groups.
Students complete general secondary school after grade nine or ten, and usually enter
vocational education after that. The dual apprenticeship system is particularly well
known. In this system, young adults can train and obtain a vocational degree in one
of a large number of occupations. Apprenticeships have a full duration of at least two
years, with most apprenticeships having a full duration of three, or three and a half
years.7 Apprentices and rms write a contract, which is registered and supervised by
the Chambers of Industry and Commerce or the Chamber of Handicrafts. The contract
6For further reference, key features of the apprenticeship system in Germany are described in
Winkelmann (1996), Soskice (1994), Witte and Kalleberg (1995) and Dustmann (2004). Summary
descriptions of the German vocational system can also be found in KMK (2008).
7Of the 25 most popular apprenticeship degrees for males in Western Germany in 2004, all but one
have a regular duration of at least three years, and only one lasts for two years (data for 2004 for males
in Western Germany. Source: Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (2006, 2008)).4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 120
Figure 4.1: Diagram of the German education system up to vocational degree
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typically species an initial probationary period, after which ring from the rm's side
is dicult. Apprentices spend about one third of the time in school-based instruction,
which typically amounts to one or two days per week and is run by the regional gov-
ernment. Two thirds of the time are spend in the rm, where the apprentice works
and the employer provides training. The three most frequent apprenticeship degrees
are `motor vehicle mechatronics technician', `industrial mechanic', and `management
assistant for retail services'.
Firms can report their apprenticeship vacancies to the local employment oce with
a request for placement. This typically involves that the rm contacts the employment
oce and reports their apprenticeship vacancy. The employment oce attempts to
assist in the matching for this vacancy through advertising it to young adults, and
possibly through suggesting candidates to the rm. The rm can then interview the
candidate and can, but is under no obligation to do so, oer the apprenticeship to the
young adult. The rm is not charged for using this service. Although the rm does
not have to report apprenticeship vacancies, this service is regularly used by rms. As
an indication, we can compare the number of vacancies reported to the employment
oce with ocial statistics on new apprenticeship contracts, on which reliable data
is available since apprenticeship contracts need to be specially registered. For exam-
ple, in the year 1985, which is in the middle of the period we consider here, rms
reported 481,000 apprenticeship vacancies in the twelve months up to September 1985.
At the end of September, 697,000 new apprenticeship contracts had been registered,
and 31,000 apprenticeship vacancies were still unlled (BA, 1991, Table 45). Hence,
vacancies reported to the employment oce make up a large share of all apprentice-
ships.
Full-time vocational schooling is an alternative form of vocational preparation.8
These schools have a duration ranging from one to three years. One-year vocational
8Two main types are the full-time vocational schools (Berufsfachschulen) and the schools of health
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courses (Berufsgrundbildungsjahr or Berufsvorbereitungsjahr) are preparatory courses
and do not lead to vocational degrees on their own, but can typically be credited
towards further vocational training, especially apprenticeship training. Two or three
year courses lead to a recognized occupational certicate, and can lead to the same
occupational degrees as apprenticeship training (KMK, 2006). There are a number of
vocational degrees which can only be obtained in these full-time vocational schools.
These programs lead to a degree as `assistant' in a range of dierent occupations. For
males, the most common ones are `technical IT assistant', `commercial assistant', and
`carer for the elderly'.9
In many of the frequently chosen occupational elds, occupation-specic qualica-
tions exist in both the rm-based dual system as in the full-time vocational school.
For example, in the eld of information technology, young people could obtain an ap-
prenticeship degree as IT specialist in the rm, or a school-based degree as mentioned
above. Nonetheless, it is known that the distribution across occupational groups diers
between the two training forms; therefore one important sensitivity check investigates
how our main results change when we explicitly account for occupation xed eects.
We conclude this section by briey reviewing alternative available data sources
for the fraction of individuals who obtain dierent forms of vocational qualication.
Ocial statistics put the shares for highest vocational qualication in Germany at
19% unskilled, 61% dual apprenticeship, and 19% vocational schools.10 Troltsch et
al.(1999) survey the evidence on the share of unskilled youth without formal vocational
qualication; estimates range between 10 and 20%. Witte and Kalleberg (1995) report
that 16% of men have a school-based vocational education.11
9Figures for males from West Germany for 2006, see Federal Statistical Oce (2007).
10Own calculation based on Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (2006), exclud-
ing all individuals with college education.
11Estimates based on GSOEP. Their sample excludes unskilled workers. For women, the corre-
sponding number in their data is 23%, reecting the higher proportion of females in schools of health
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4.3 Data
The analysis in this chapter is based on a large administrative panel data set of individ-
ual employment histories for German employees, the IABS, provided by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB). The sample contains 2% of all employees who have
ever been subject to social security contributions over the period 1975 to 2001. We
provide details on the data and the sample we use in the Data Appendix 4.A.2, and
limit the discussion here to the key aspects. The data contains detailed records of both
employment and unemployment spells. Crucially for this analysis, it contains not only
regular employees, but also records rm-based apprentices. We limit our analysis to
West German males (excluding West Berlin) from the cohorts 1964 to 1975.12 To focus
on non-college bound youth we eliminate all individuals who hold a schooling degree
from the college-bound schooling track (Abitur), or who ever hold a degree from a
university (or a university of applied sciences) in our sample. As a measure of where
the young adult grows up, we record the rst employment oce district in which he is
recorded in the data.
There are two key educational variables in the data: First, there is a variable
which indicates whether the individual has obtained a vocational qualication. This is
dened more broadly than rm-based apprenticeship training, and explicitly includes
school-based degrees as long as they lead to a recognized vocational qualication.13
This variable allows us to distinguish unskilled individuals (who might have completed
lower or medium-level (general) schooling, but no vocational qualication) from skilled
individuals, who have obtained a vocational qualication through completing either
apprenticeship or a degree from a full-time vocational school.14 Second, we compute
12We restrict our analysis to males because incorporating fertility decisions would complicate the
analysis considerably, which are likely to be important during the age range we consider.
13The reporting instructions for rms explicitly clarify that the rm is to report educational qual-
ication as `completed vocational degree' for adults who have either completed a dual rm-based
apprenticeship or have obtained a recognized degree from a full-time vocational school (BA, 2008).
14Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and V olter (2005) suggest to use an imputation rule to ensure consistency
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for each individual the number of years spent in apprenticeship training (up to a given
age). Apprenticeship degrees have a regular duration of up to 3.5 years; to reect
that we top-code the number of years of apprenticeship training at this value. This
constitutes our main measure of exposure to apprenticeship training. It can be thought
of as similar to a years of education measure, but, importantly, it only refers to years
spent as apprentice in a rm.15
Our main outcomes of interest are unemployment and wages. For unemployment,
we take indicator variables for whether the individual has been registered unemployed
for at least a given number of days during the calendar year. In our main results,
we focus on unemployment for at least 30 days. For wages, we take log average daily
wages in regular full-time employment over the calendar year. We also study measures
of annual mobility, for which we dene indicators for changing industry and occupation,
respectively.
To measure availability of apprenticeships, we make use of a unique data set, which
annually records apprenticeship vacancies at a ne regional level, dividing Western
Germany into 141 local labor markets.16 This statistic contains the total number of
apprenticeship vacancies that have been reported by rms to their local employment
oce with a request for assistance with placement of the vacancy. We normalize the
vacancy data by an estimate of the number of young people who grow up in each
district. We then assign each individual this measure of apprenticeship availability at
age 16, in the relevant local labor market. | Means and standard deviations for our
sample of the relevant variables are displayed in Table 4.1.
value reported up to the age of interest.
15We discuss possible measurement error in this variable in Section 4.7.3.
16In the following, we refer to these interchangeably as employment oce districts or regions.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 125
Table 4.1: Sample summary statistics
Variable Mean St. dev.
Apprenticeship training (years) 2.182 1.239
apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) 0.622 0.254
unskilled vacancies (at age 16) 5.790 1.044
skilled vacancies (at age 16) 6.620 0.925
unskilled market wage (at age 16) 4.227 0.072
skilled market wage (at age 16) 4.372 0.069
unemployment rate (at age 16) 0.047 0.026
age (years) 24.507 1.114
German national (indicator) 0.879 0.326
Observations 242,014
Note: Table reports means and standard deviations, reported for the sample of our outcome regression
for probability of unemployment of at least 30 days, as reported in Table 4.5 below. Wages are log
daily wages. For wages and general vacancies, the skilled group refers to those with either form of
vocational degree (apprenticeship or full-time vocational schooling), and the unskilled group to those
without vocational degree. See text for details.
4.4 Identication
This section has three parts. First, we describe a small open economy setting and
incorporate educational choice between apprenticeship and vocational school. We in-
vestigate the eect of price shocks on educational choice and factor rewards to motivate
an instrumental variable strategy. Second, we discuss how treatment eect identica-
tion is aected if one recognizes that individuals can choose between three dierent
alternatives: apprenticeship training, vocational schools, or direct entry as unskilled
worker. In this multinomial choice setting, we show that under specic circumstances,
a univariate instrument continues to recover a well-dened treatment eect which is
of interest. Third, we discuss the empirical implementation in this study.
4.4.1 A small open economy model with educational choice
We begin by describing each region as a small open economy, integrated through trade,
and follow the standard assumptions of neoclassical trade models. Here, we summarize
key properties of the model; a formal description is contained in the Appendix 4.A.1.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 126
To simplify the discussion, consider an economy in which two products are produced
using two labor inputs (apprenticeship graduates and vocational school graduates).
Technology is identical across regions and characterized by constant returns to scale,
and positive and diminishing marginal productivities. Assume that products are freely
traded across regions, while factors are mobile across sectors but immobile across
regions. Product prices (1;p) are determined at the world market.
With regards to the school leaver's educational choice, young people choose be-
tween apprenticeship training and vocational schooling alternatives. This choice is
made by comparing alternative-specic utilities. These are made up of the respective
present discounted value of future wages earned in the main labor market, a random
individual-level shock which aects the utility of apprenticeship training, and a region-
specic parameter which aects apprenticeship utility. This latter parameter may be
interpreted, following Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), as the local availability of an
education-specic xed factor. This specication leads to a region-specic educational
decision rule which determines the number of apprentices as a function of the wage
dierence.17 We follow standard assumptions of neoclassical trade models by assuming
that one sector (say sector 1) is always characterized by a higher intensity of appren-
ticeship input than sector 2, and that equilibrium with incomplete specialization is
possible.
In this setting, consider an increase in the price of good 2. This leads to an in-
crease in the factor reward for the type of labor used intensively in that sector (i.e.,
the vocational school graduates). Sector 2 expands and sector 1 declines, whereby
both sectors increase their factor intensity in apprenticeship graduates. In terms of
educational choice, young people respond to this change in wages by moving into
the non-apprenticeship track. Since the function which maps wage dierences into
apprentices is location-specic as described above, the response in the number of ap-
17Since higher wages will make this option more attractive and increases the number of individuals
who choose this alternative, this speci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prenticeship graduates diers across regions. Importantly, this model is characterized
by factor-price equalization: For given product prices, factor rewards are identical
across regions. Thus, this model describes a setting where a price shock translates
into a dierential response in terms of number of apprentices, but does not lead to a
dierential response in terms of factor rewards. Thus, this economic framework gen-
erates an exclusion restriction, which motivates an instrumental variable approach for
comparing productivity across the two types of labor. Since industry price shocks and
the location-specic characteristic (interpreted as availability of an education-specic
factor) are not directly observed in this data, we implement this procedure by instead
using the number of apprenticeship vacancies in each region. We assume that the
economy adjusts quickly to changes in prices, so that the observed responses reect
movements between equilibria. { Although not explicitly modeled here, a straight-
forward comparison of means would pick up selection eects arising from individual
heterogeneity.
One important assumption of the model and the empirical strategy is that local
variation is relevant for young people, in that they cannot adjust by moving to other
regions. Regional mobility is generally thought to be low in Germany, and since ap-
prenticeship wages are low, apprentices usually have to rely on living at home, so that
factor immobility seems to be a sensible assumption for this group.
4.4.2 Identication with a univariate instrument in a multinomial
choice setting
The interest of this chapter is in comparing two alternative forms of obtaining a vo-
cational qualication. It is natural to ask whether individuals might want to adjust
to apprenticeship availability by entering the labor market as unskilled worker. This
transforms the decision problem into a multinomial choice problem. In this section,
we discuss how treatment eect identication is aected by this more general choice
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parameter of interest; the corresponding empirical analysis is found in section 4.5.2
below.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) consider identication of treatment eects in an un-
ordered multinomial choice model with a binary instrument. Dene an alternative-
specic treatment eect as dierence in outcomes between choices j and m, j;m 
Yj   Ym. Assuming that an instrument Zj aects only the utility of choice alterna-
tive j, and is excluded both from the vector of potential outcomes as from the other
choice-specic utilities, they show that the Wald estimand that arises from changing
Zj is equal to a weighted average of j;m across the other alternatives m = 1:::M.
In general, the IV estimator will not recover a comparison between two specic alter-
natives, but rather a weighted average across all possible alternatives. This reects
that in response to a change of the value of option j, `movers' respond by changing
into dierent alternatives, and the weights correspond to the probability of choosing a
particular option m as next-best alternative.18
In the context of this study, there is an important special case to this. If a change
in the instrument Zj induces all `movers' to switch into the same second-best alter-
native, then the weighted average of alternative-specic causal eects collapses into a
single alternative-specic causal eect. In this special case, the instrument Zj (which
modies the value of taking option j) recovers j;m for a specic alternative m. Thus,
there is a special case in which a univariate IV does recover one alternative-specic
causal eect in a multinomial choice setting. Whether this special case applies in a
particular application can be empirically veried: this reects that we observe individ-
uals' educational choices and can estimate how they respond to changes in the value
of the instrument. We provide empirical evidence on this below in section 4.5.2. The
evidence presented there clearly indicates that the IV estimator recovers the relative
return between apprenticeship training and full-time vocational school alternatives.
18Conceptually, this is similar to the analysis of Angrist and Imbens (1995) for the variable treatment
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In our three-alternatives model, this is shown by documenting that the probability of
working as unskilled does not respond to apprenticeship availability, which corresponds
to a weight of 0 in the discussion above. This implies that the IV estimates presented
in this chapter do recover a well-dened treatment coecient of interest even in this
generalized multinomial setting.
A related concern might be that individuals respond to shocks in apprenticeship
availability by going to college instead. The early tracking of pupils in the German
education system allows us to abstract from the college-going decision: As described
above, individuals are tracked at ages 10{12 into either a university-bound upper
track or a lower- or medium-schooling track, so that the decision to go to university is
already pre-determined through the tracking decision earlier on. Correspondingly, we
eliminate all individuals from the university-bound upper track from our sample, and
limit attention the lower- and medium level track.
4.4.3 Empirical implementation
We implement this approach in a linear empirical framework, which we now describe.
Denote Yi;cj;ta as a labor market outcome of interest for individual i, who grew up in
cohort c in region j, measured at age a in time period t. Our model for the outcome
equation is
Yi;cj;ta = 1Si + 2j + 3c + 4t + 5a + 6Xi + 7Xcj + 8j  c + i (4.1)
where Si indicates apprenticeship training, and where we think of 1 as being het-
erogeneous in the population. 2j, 3c correspond to region and cohort xed eects,
respectively, 4t and 5a to year and age indicators. Xi are individual characteristics,
and Xcj to labor market characteristics at the time and region where the individual
grew up; 8jc denote region-speci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availability, so that the corresponding rst stage is
Si = 1Zcj + 2j + 3c + 4t + 5a + 6Xi + 7Xcj + 8j  c + ui (4.2)
where Zcj denotes the availability of apprenticeships, corresponding to the cohort c in
region j. As before, 2j, 3c correspond to region and cohort xed eects, respectively,
4t and 5a to year and age indicators.19 In all regressions presented, we account for
permanent dierences with xed eects for regions, cohorts, and region-specic trends.
We also control for labor market characteristics at age 16, which we discuss below in
more detail.
Since we include district and cohort xed eects, our estimates have the inter-
pretation of di-in-di estimates, where dierential developments in apprenticeship
availability are used to identify the eect. In addition to that, our specication al-
lows for linear region-specic time trends. This more general specication allows each
district to follow a separate time trend.20
We now explain how we control for conditions in the local main labor market: rst,
we use a similar general vacancy measure, and control for the (log) number of general
vacancies in the relevant (main) labor market (at age 16 as before), by skill level.21
Second, we include local wages and unemployment rate for males (aged 25 to 40), in
the relevant labor market at age 16. These additional controls allow for a broader
description of the individual's choice problem.
19These last two sets of regressors capture year and age eects specic to the time when the outcome
is measured. The problem of separately identifying cohort, age and time eect is well known (Heckman
and Robb, 1985). Year eects would not be separately identied if the cohort and age eects were fully
interacted. Here we limit ourselves to the three additive sets of indicators, and follow the approach
taken in Hall (1971) by excluding an additional dummy to avoid perfect collinearity. No attempt is
made here to interpret the coecients on these indicator variables, so that it is not of importance
which of the indicator variables is eliminated (see Berndt and Griliches (1990)).
20We test for dierential trends in our sample, by performing an F-test on the set of region-specic
trends in the estimation equations. We nd that the region-specic trends are signicant at the 1%
level both on the rst stage and in the IV estimates. To perform this test, we cluster estimates by
region-cohort cell.
21Here, skill level refers to those with either form of vocational degree (skilled), compared to school-
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4.5 The eect of apprenticeship vacancies on educational
choice
In this section, we proceed as follows: We rst document the eect of apprenticeship
vacancies on educational choice, where we show that an increase in apprenticeship
vacancies signicantly increases the apprenticeship training undertaken. We then turn
to clarifying the margin of adjustment, and document that variation in apprenticeship
availability leads individuals to substitute between apprenticeship training and full-
time vocational schools. We validate this with a falsication exercise. Finally, we
present the rst-stage regression that corresponds to our main results.
4.5.1 Vacancies and apprenticeship training
To start with, we consider how the amount of apprenticeship training undertaken at
each age is aected by vacancies. For this purpose, we estimate equation (4.2), but take
as outcome only apprenticeship training undertaken at a specic age.22 The result-
ing coecient (1) measures the eect of apprenticeship vacancies on apprenticeship
training at a particular age, measured as a fraction of the year. We obtain a separate
coecient for each age, from 16 to 26, and plot the resulting coecients, each of which
is estimated in a separate regression. The allows to show at which ages individual
training decisions are aected. The results are shown in Figure 2(a). The gure shows
that apprenticeship availability has a pronounced and signicant eect on the time
spent as apprentice at ages 18 and 19, and the eect then declines to zero after that.
This documents that { as expected { apprenticeship availability aects the educational
choice of young adults after they leave school. We then repeat this exercise, but now
look at the total years of apprenticeship training obtained up to a particular age. The
dependent variable here varies from 0 for someone who has not (or not yet) entered the
apprenticeship system, to 3.5 for someone who has done a full-length apprenticeship
22Estimates are obtained using the same set of controls that we employ in the main results below.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 132
Figure 4.2: Eect of apprenticeship vacancies on apprenticeship training
(a) apprenticeship (in years, by age) (b) time spent as apprentice
(cumulative, in years)
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
age
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
age
Note: Standard errors are clustered by region. Graph shows point estimates and 10% condence
intervals. See the data section for the de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training. The resulting coecients are shown in Figure 2(b). At age 21, the eect of
apprenticeship vacancies is fully realized, and the eect is at afterwards. To get a
sense of the magnitudes, recall that the instrument has a standard deviation of about
0.25; thus, a one standard deviation increase in the instrument moves expected appren-
ticeship training by about 0.125 years. As can be seen from this graph, apprenticeship
vacancies at school-leaving age have a lasting eect on the individual's educational
choice.
4.5.2 Clarifying the margin of adjustment
We interpret the availability of apprenticeship places as varying the utility specic to
the apprenticeship option. In order to interpret the main results below, it is important
to clarify where these marginal individuals, who have been aected by the vacancy
variable, come from in a multinomial setting; this is the purpose of this section. Re-
call that we limit attention to non-college bound youth; then there are three potential
avenues for a young adult who leaves school: the apprenticeship system, a full-time
vocational school, or a direct entry into the labor market as unskilled worker. We
now document the substitution behavior that is associated with an increase in ap-
prenticeship vacancies. One hypothesis we investigate is that the marginal apprentice
enters as unskilled worker when apprenticeship availability is low, and as apprentice
when availability is high. We call this the substitution for unskilled work hypothesis.
Alternatively, young people at the margin who do an apprenticeship when availability
is good might be drawn from the pool of individuals who would otherwise obtain a
vocational degree in a full-time vocational school, and we term this the substitution
for full-time vocational schooling hypothesis.
To investigate this, we select all individuals aged 24, and group them into these
three categories as follows. The unskilled, i.e. those who have neither form of vocational
qualication, make up 21.5% in our sample. Second, individuals who have a vocational
qualication based on a a full-length 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dene as having a vocational degree and at least 1.5 years of apprenticeship training.23
This group (apprentices) account for 62.5% in our sample. The remaining individuals
(full-time vocational school) make up 16% in our sample.24 The proportions we obtain
in our data t well with estimates from other sources (see section 4.2.2 on page 122).
We now use this grouping to estimate a trivariate probit model, in which the main
explanatory variable is apprenticeship vacancies. We include the same set of controls
as outlined before.25 The resulting marginal eects are reported in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Trivariate probit: Marginal eect of apprenticeship vacancies
category variable Marginal
eects
group 1 apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) -0.00164
unskilled [0.0342]
group 2 apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) -0.124
vocational school [0.0386]***
group 3 apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) 0.126
apprenticeship [0.0396]***
cohort xed eects Yes
region xed eects Yes
region trends Yes
labor market conditions at entry Yes
Observations 61358
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details.
The eect of apprenticeship availability on the probability of being in the unskilled
group is small and not statistically dierent from zero. Instead, the marginal eects on
full-time vocational schooling and apprenticeship training are of similar magnitude and
opposite signs, they are both statistically signicant at the 1% level. This indicates that
the apprenticeship vacancy variation induces individuals to move between vocational
23This can be thought of as a minimum requirement. Most apprenticeship programs have a full
length of either three or three and a half years.
24Most of this third group have obtained their vocational degree entirely outside the apprenticeship
system, and some are recorded with very short apprenticeship spells only.
25Since we restrict the sample to those aged 24 in this exercise, we do not need to account separately
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schooling and apprenticeship training.
Survey evidence supports this result. Troltsch et al.(1999) report evidence from a
representative telephone survey of unskilled youth without any vocational qualication.
Of those interviewed, the majority did not search for a training position, had an oer
but rejected it, or started a training program but then dropped out. The fraction of
individuals who indicate that they searched unsuccessfully is low (14%), suggesting
that there is little room for apprenticeship vacancies to have any eect. Similarly, a
number of characteristics strongly increase the probability of being in the unskilled
group (e.g. dropping out of secondary school), which make it very dicult to enter
either apprenticeship (because of rm hiring decision) or full-time vocational schools
(because of school admission criteria).
In summary, the above estimates provide evidence in favor of the substitution for
full-time schooling hypothesis and against the substitution for unskilled work hypothesis.
We replicate this result in a linear regression framework, where we regress an indicator
for being unskilled on the vacancy measure (and the set of controls) and nd no eect,
as reported in Table 4.11 (in Appendix 4.A.3).
For further evidence, we now turn to a falsication exercise, which exploits that
our two substitution hypotheses imply dierent predictions about the age at which
individuals are rst seen in this employment data. We present these as IV estimates,
where the regressor of interest is years of apprenticeship training. First, we look
at the age at which an individual is rst seen in the data, excluding apprenticeship
spells. If individuals substitute between apprenticeship and unskilled work, we would
expect a coecient of 1: an additional year of apprenticeship training delays the rst
non-apprenticeship spell accordingly. Under the substitution for full-time vocational
schooling hypothesis, on the other hand, we would expect a coecient of 0, if the
full-time vocational schools have roughly the same length as apprenticeship training.
Estimates are found in Table 4.3.26
26The corresponding 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Table 4.3: Falsication exercise: Age at rst regular job
Age rst seen in data Age rst seen in data
(excluding apprenticeship (including apprenticeship
spells) spells)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Apprenticeship training (years) 0.183 -0.0703 -0.787 -0.969
[0.0153]*** [0.313] [0.0159]*** [0.278]***
German national (indicator) -0.353 -0.0368 -0.375 -0.149
[0.0404]*** [0.386] [0.0387]*** [0.343]
cohort xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
age xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor market controls at entry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 241585 241585 242014 242014
First stage F-statistic 24.96 25.55
First stage p-value 0.00000172 0.00000133
Mean (dependent variable) 19.62 19.62 17.50 17.50
St. dev. (dependent variable) 1.796 1.796 1.928 1.928
Hypothesis test: Substitution for unskilled work
Corresponding parameter value 1 0
F-statistic 11.68 12.16
p-value 0.000827 0.000651
Hypothesis test: Substitution for full-time vocational schooling
Corresponding parameter value 0 -1
F-statistic 0.0504 0.0121
p-value 0.823 0.913
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details. Hypothesis test
at the bottom of the table refers to the coecient of the variable 'years of apprenticeship training'.
Column (1) reports the OLS results, which suggest that in a simple comparison of
means, an additional year of apprenticeship delays the rst non-apprenticeship spell.
In column (2), we instrument using the vacancy data. The coecient is now very close
to zero and insignicant. This conrms that individuals at the margin switch between
apprenticeship training and vocational schools.
In columns (3) and (4), we repeat this exercise for the age at which the individual
is rst ever seen in the data, including in apprenticeship training. Under the unskilled
hypothesis, individuals are seen in the data at the same age as apprentices, so that4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 137
the corresponding coecient is 0. Under the full-time vocational schooling hypothesis,
individuals are seen in the data a year earlier, because the rm registers the apprentice
similar to its regular workers. The coecient corresponding to this hypothesis is then
-1. The resulting IV estimate is not statistically dierent from -1, as indicated by our
test at the bottom of the table, while we reject a coecient of 0 at the 1% level.
We conclude that the estimates which we present in the following should be inter-
preted as being the treatment eect of the individual who switches from vocational
full-time schooling to rm-based apprenticeship, depending on the local availability
of apprenticeships. Doing so we follow the work of Imbens and Angrist (1994) on
the Local Average Treatment (LATE) parameter, an interpretation that requires a
monotonicity assumption on how individuals react to changes in the instrument.
The estimates above do not only clarify the interpretation of our estimates provided
below; they also convey an important substantive point relating to economic policy.
They indicate that when full-time vocational schooling exists as alternative, measures
which increase supply of apprenticeship vacancies are likely to draw individuals from
these full-time vocational schools rather than individuals who would have entered the
labor market directly as unskilled workers. In that sense, the results suggest that poli-
cies which expand availability of apprenticeships are eective in increasing the take-up
of rm-based apprenticeship training, but they are not necessarily eective in reducing
the number of unskilled workers, when vocational schooling exists as alternative.
4.5.3 First stage results
Table 4.4 presents the rst stage results which correspond to our main outcome equa-
tion.27 The dependent variable of interest is years of apprenticeship training obtained.
As sample we select individuals aged 23 through 26. Each column in Table 4.4 corre-
27Between dierent outcomes, the available sample diers slightly. We present the rst stage here
for one of our main outcomes, unemployment for at least 30 calendar days, as reported in Table 4.5
on page 140 below. In the IV results below, we report the corresponding F-statistic along with the
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Table 4.4: First stage
Apprenticeship training (years)
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) 0.505 0.490 0.492
[0.0970]*** [0.0981]*** [0.0974]***
unskilled market wage (at age 16) -0.174 -0.166
[0.240] [0.239]
skilled market wage (at age 16) 0.248 0.235
[0.493] [0.492]
unemployment rate (at age 16) 0.438 0.435
[0.452] [0.456]
unskilled vacancies (at age 16) 0.0301
[0.0185]
skilled vacancies (at age 16) 0.000405
[0.0305]
German national (indicator) 1.243 1.243 1.243
[0.0283]*** [0.0283]*** [0.0283]***
cohort xed eects Yes Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes Yes
age xed eects Yes Yes Yes
year xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242014 242014 242014
First stage F-statistic 27.09 24.94 25.55
First stage p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mean (dependent variable) 2.182 2.182 2.182
St. dev. (dependent variable) 1.239 1.239 1.239
Minimum (dependent variable) 0 0 0
Maximum (dependent variable) 3.500 3.500 3.500
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details.
sponds to a dierent set of control variables. Column (1) only includes an indicator of
German nationality. The variable of interest measures apprenticeship vacancies. The
corresponding coecient for the apprenticeship degree indicator is 0.505, and it is sig-
nicant at the one percent level. Keeping in mind that the standard deviation of this
variable is about 0.25, a one standard deviation change in apprenticeship vacancies
increases average apprenticeship training by about 0.125 years.
In columns (2) and (3), we add further controls for local labor market conditions
at age 16, allowing us to investigate whether the rst stage coecient of interest is
sensitive to a slightly extended specication of the educational choice stage. These4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 139
variables vary at the same level as our instrument. Column (2) adds average local
wages and unemployment rates, computed for males aged 25 to 40.28 The coecient
on apprenticeship vacancies goes down somewhat, but the change is small and does
not aect the signicance of the coecient at all. In column (3) we control for the
number of all open vacancies (in logs) at age 16 in the main labor market in the relevant
region, separately by required skill level.29 Columns (1) to (3) demonstrate that shocks
in apprenticeship availability translate into dierences in educational attainment as
measured by apprenticeship training, and further that this eect is statistically strong
and robust to an extended specication of the educational decision problem.
An important concern in IV estimation is the problem of weak instruments (Bound,
Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). One
way to assess this is to consider the F-statistic from the rst stage. As indicated in the
bottom of table, the F-statistics from the instrument here are above 25, respectively,
and well above the rule of thumb of an F-statistic of 10. This suggests that weak
instruments should not be a concern in this application.
4.6 Eect of training form on labor market outcomes
4.6.1 Unemployment and wages
As outcomes, we focus on unemployment and wages. We dene an indicator for unem-
ployment of at least 30 days during the calendar year. Wages refer to log average daily
wage in full-time employment during the calendar year. We select all young adults
aged 23 to 26, and pool annual observations for eciency. All standard errors are
clustered at the region level, allowing for arbitrary within-cluster dependence in the
error term, including serial correlation. Estimates are reported in Table 4.5.
28Average wages are included separately for skilled versus unskilled workers, referring to whether
the individual has completed either form of vocational training, or no vocational training.
29Here, skill level refers to whether a position requires some form of completed vocational qualica-
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Table 4.5: Main outcomes
Indicator: Unemployed at Log average
least 30 days daily wages
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Apprenticeship training (years) -0.0355 -0.105 0.0309 0.0289
[0.00133]*** [0.0457]** [0.00133]*** [0.0501]
unskilled market wage (at age 16) 0.0183 0.00851 -0.0738 -0.0743
[0.0584] [0.0634] [0.0521] [0.0520]
skilled market wage (at age 16) -0.0474 -0.0260 -0.0822 -0.0817
[0.144] [0.152] [0.112] [0.112]
unemployment rate (at age 16) -0.384 -0.317 -0.111 -0.109
[0.117]*** [0.115]*** [0.102] [0.108]
unskilled vacancies (at age 16) 0.00679 0.00860 0.00373 0.00377
[0.00446] [0.00498]* [0.00441] [0.00454]
skilled vacancies (at age 16) -0.00124 -0.000175 -0.00185 -0.00181
[0.00638] [0.00647] [0.00777] [0.00782]
German national (indicator) -0.0127 0.0737 0.00570 0.00822
[0.00470]*** [0.0557] [0.00460] [0.0635]
cohort xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
age xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242014 242014 218438 218438
First stage F-statistic 25.55 16.43
First stage p-value 0.00000133 0.0000835
Mean (dependent variable) 0.149 0.149 4.203 4.203
St. dev. (dependent variable) 0.356 0.356 0.320 0.320
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details.
Column (1) presents the OLS estimate for the unemployment outcome. According
to this estimate, an additional year of apprenticeship training reduces the probability of
unemployment by 3.55 percentage points. Column (2) instruments for apprenticeship.
The eect goes up substantially in magnitude, and the resulting eect is 10.5 percentage
points. Although precision decreases, the eect remains signicant at the 5% level.
This evidence suggests that in this age range, former apprenticeship graduates have a
lower probability of being unemployed.
In a constant coecient framework, the dierence between OLS and IV estimates
is informative about the direction of selection bias, which here would suggest negative4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 141
selection.30 In a heterogeneous treatment eect framework, the IV estimate reects
the treatment eect of the marginally aected subgroup (who switch between ap-
prenticeship training and full-time vocational schools), indicating that this group is
characterized by a higher treatment eect.
We now turn to estimating the eect on productivity as measured by wages. The
main IV estimate is reported in column (4) of Table 4.5. Interestingly, the OLS and
IV coecients are very similar at about 3 per cent. Once we instrument, the eect on
wages is not statistically dierent from zero. This suggests that the two alternative
forms of training lead to similar levels of productivity, but it is important to keep in
mind that the standard error of this estimate is relatively large.
To the young trainee, one benet of apprenticeship training may be the access
to the rm's internal labor market, as argued for example by Soskice (1994). Our
estimates may, at least in partly, reect that a fraction of the apprenticeship graduates
may stay on in their training rm, while the vocational school graduates are more
likely to go through search unemployment at the end of their training, and then over
time catch up with apprenticeship graduates. Our data allows us to investigate this
directly by splitting up the sample by age, and estimate separately for each age. These
results are reported in Table 4.6. Columns (1) through (4) show the OLS eects by
age, which basically remain constant at 0.035. Columns (5) to (8) show the IV results.
Here, we nd a pronounced pattern over time: The eect declines rapidly with age. At
age 26, it is no longer signicant. The IV result suggests that the benecial eect of
lower unemployment probability is not permanent, but transitory.31 This is consistent
with the interpretation that the apprenticeship training smooths the initial transition
into the main labor market, but that the vocational school graduates then catch up
30A priori, the direction of selection bias is unclear. On the one hand, rms select positively from the
applicants. On the other hand, comparing vocational full-time schools and apprenticeship training, it is
possible that more academically inclined individuals have a preference for schools, and that school are
rigorous in enforcing admission standards. Bonnal, Mendes, and Sofer (2002) nd evidence of negative
selection into apprenticeship for France. Plug and Groot (1998) nd no evidence of self-selection for a
sample of Dutch young adults.
31Note that the mean of the dependent variable remains very similar across the age range.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 142
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over time.
4.6.2 Eect on mobility
We also investigate year-on-year mobility as measured by changing occupation or in-
dustry. Mobility measures inform us about transferability of skills, especially given
that one may be concerned that apprenticeship training is very specic and leads to
lock-in eects. A number of studies document an unexpectedly high fraction of former
apprentices who work in occupations dierent from the one they trained in (see e.g.
Werwatz (2002)). This has been interpreted as indicating that the training provides
more general skills, or acts as a signal for general worker quality (Heckman, 1993). Our
set-up here allows us to compare mobility rates between dierent forms of vocational
training, and we look at occupational and industry mobility. The rate of year-on-year
mobility in both dimensions is high at around 15 percent. Estimates are reported in
Table 4.7. The OLS result suggests that apprenticeship training has a negative eect
on mobility. Once we instrument, the coecient turns positive, but our results are
imprecisely estimated; we nd no signicant evidence of dierential mobility behavior
between the two groups.
4.6.3 Responsiveness to negative shocks
One of the key questions in the debate on how apprenticeship training compares to
other forms of training relates to the individual's ability to adjust to negative shocks.
For example, Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1993) suggest that narrow technical
training may reduce options later in life by introducing rigidities; an overly tight link
to a specic task or rm may result in constraints (Witte and Kalleberg, 1995).32 One
particular concern is that the benet from apprenticeship training may be very specic
32Although long-run career constraints are clearly of interest, the individuals in our sample are
still too young to be informative about that. At the same time, it is likely that the role of the
employment experience in the main labor market increases relative to initial vocational training (Witte
and Kalleberg, 1995), so that our age group should be of particular interest.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 144
Table 4.7: Mobility
change in occupation change in industry
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
apprenticeship training (years) -0.0178 0.0573 -0.0118 0.0152
[0.000953]*** [0.0637] [0.000980]*** [0.0573]
unskilled market wage (at age 16) -0.0304 -0.00302 0.0553 0.0658
[0.0442] [0.0534] [0.0470] [0.0522]
skilled market wage (at age 16) -0.0743 -0.0888 -0.0468 -0.0538
[0.108] [0.115] [0.104] [0.105]
unemployment rate (at age 16) -0.140 -0.227 -0.0495 -0.0774
[0.101] [0.138] [0.0941] [0.113]
unskilled vacancies (at age 16) 0.00332 0.000984 0.00789 0.00703
[0.00339] [0.00406] [0.00329]** [0.00409]*
skilled vacancies (at age 16) -0.00382 -0.00505 -0.00847 -0.00895
[0.00583] [0.00609] [0.00606] [0.00592]
German national (indicator) -0.0262 -0.119 -0.0125 -0.0456
[0.00387]*** [0.0786] [0.00408]*** [0.0702]
cohort xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
age xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183245 183245 183085 183085
First stage F-statistic 9.104 7.960
First stage p-value 0.00303 0.00548
Mean (dependent variable) 0.144 0.144 0.150 0.150
St. dev. (dependent variable) 0.351 0.351 0.357 0.357
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details.
to the rm, and not suciently transferable if the rm-worker match is hit by a neg-
ative shock. In this section, we assess this empirically by studying the responsiveness
of the young person to a job destruction shock. To do this, we follow the literature on
rm closures as a negative shock. This approach has been widely used as a source of
exogenous job destruction (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993; Oreopoulos, Page,
and Stevens, 2008; Sullivan and von Wachter, 2007). We implement this as follows: For
each worker, our data contains information on rm closures by recording the last year
in which employees were recorded under this rm identier. This allows us to identify
rm closures. We dene workers to be at risk if their employing rm ceases to exist in
the same or the following year. We then consider the probability of being unemployed4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 145
in period t, and investigate the eect of having been at risk in period t   1. Since we
are concerned with the dierential eect between forms of training, our coecient of
particular interest is the interaction between apprenticeship training and the indicator
for being at risk. We control for the at-risk indicator.33 Our specication now has
two endogenous variables (apprenticeship training, and the interaction between train-
ing and being at risk in the previous period), and we instrument for these variables
with apprenticeship availability, and availability interacted with the at-risk indicator.
Results are found in Table 4.8, where we present results for being unemployed for at
least 30 days, at least 45 days, and for log wages.
Columns (1) and (2) report the rst stages. As indicated in the F-statistics, both
rst stages are statistically signicant with a low p-value. Column (3) reports the
IV estimate for the indicator of being unemployed for at least 30 days. The rst
row shows the eect of apprenticeship training on unemployment. This essentially
replicates the baseline result we reported above, that apprenticeship training reduces
the probability of being unemployed. The interaction in the second row shows how the
eect diers when the individual is hit by a negative shock. Although this coecient
is not individually signicant, it indicates that the adverse eect of rm closures is
stronger for (former) apprentices. We repeat this exercise for the indicator of being
unemployed for at least 45 days, and nd essentially the same pattern, except that here
the interaction term is individually signicant at the 10% level. Column (5) considers
log wages; the coecient on the interaction is negative but insignicant.
As reported at the bottom of the table, the coecients are jointly signicant for the
unemployment outcome, indicating that the form of training matters for the pattern
of unemployment in this context. Interestingly, the two coecients are of similar
magnitude, so that the coecient on the at-risk interaction osets the benecial eect
33Thus, we follow the rm closures literature in maintaining the assumption that the rm closure is
a random event. In this context, a natural way of examining this is by regressing the at-risk indicator
on apprenticeship vacancies at age 16. We nd that apprenticeship vacancies do not have a signicant
eect on the probability of being at-risk, consistent with the interpretation of rm closures as a random
shock.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 146
Table 4.8: Responsiveness to negative shock (rm closure)
Unemployed Unemployed Log average
at least 30 days at least 45 days daily wages
First (i) First (ii) IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
apprenticeship training (years) -0.132 -0.103 0.0326
[0.0611]** [0.0533]* [0.0568]
apprenticeship * closure indicator 0.165 0.169 -0.114
[0.105] [0.0958]* [0.0887]
apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) 0.379 0.0161
[0.125]*** [0.0133]
apprent. vacancies * closure indicator -0.131 0.218
[0.0759]* [0.0898]**
closure indicator -0.0774 1.895 -0.205 -0.228 0.119
[0.0533] [0.0595]*** [0.211] [0.194] [0.180]
cohort xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
age xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor market controls at entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176492 176492 176492 176492 170140
First stage F-statistic 6.049 4.988
First stage p-value 0.00302 0.00808
Mean (dependent variable) 2.196 0.0652 0.0977 0.0849 4.235
St. dev. (dependent variable) 1.213 0.428 0.297 0.279 0.307
Hypothesis test: Joint signicance
F-statistic 4.259 3.676 1.149
p-value 0.0160 0.0278 0.320
Hypothesis test: add to zero
F-statistic 0.0650 0.339 0.518
p-value 0.799 0.561 0.473
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 147
of apprenticeship training. We formalize this by testing whether the two coecients
sum to 0. As shown at the bottom of the table, this hypothesis cannot be rejected
at any reasonable level of signicance. This implies that apprenticeship reduces the
probability of being unemployed, but this benet is lost if the worker's rm closes
down. After the worker-rm match is hit by destruction, the job nding rate is no
dierent between the two forms of vocational training.
4.7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present a number of checks to investigate the sensitivity of the
results presented in Table 4.5.
4.7.1 Grouped data
The importance of accounting for dependence in the data is well understood at least
since Moulton (1990), and all standard errors in this chapter are adjusted by clustering
on the region level. An alternative way of recognizing that the identifying variation
is on region-cohort level is to take averages in region-cohort cells, and to repeat the
analysis on this aggregated data using averages for all variables which vary within
region-cohort cells. Here, we present the corresponding estimates. Table 4.9 shows the
estimates for the unemployment and the wage outcome. As expected, the estimates
are very similar to the main estimates reported above.
4.7.2 Controlling for occupation-specic xed eects
If the distribution across occupations diers between the two tracks, one might be
worried that our results may partly pick up systematic dierences between occupa-
tions. We therefore investigate how the results change if one explicitly accounts for
occupational xed eects. The results are found in in Panel B of Table 4.10.34 They
34Panel A replicates the base case results for easy reference.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 148
Table 4.9: Sensitivity: Grouped data
Indicator: unemployed at least 30 days Average log daily wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First stage OLS IV First stage OLS IV
apprenticeship training (years) -0.0318 -0.0741 0.0359 0.0217
[0.00711]*** [0.0437]* [0.00654]*** [0.0534]
apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) 0.494 0.447
[0.107]*** [0.121]***
unskilled market wage (at age 16) -0.196 0.0146 0.0130 -0.271 -0.0819 -0.0821
[0.263] [0.0642] [0.0674] [0.268] [0.0564] [0.0569]
skilled market wage (at age 16) 0.203 -0.0548 -0.0331 0.190 -0.0855 -0.0807
[0.543] [0.157] [0.162] [0.536] [0.124] [0.122]
unemployment rate (at age 16) 0.412 -0.386 -0.335 0.437 -0.121 -0.107
[0.501] [0.127]*** [0.125]*** [0.531] [0.113] [0.120]
unskilled vacancies (at age 16) 0.0302 0.00647 0.00760 0.0257 0.00392 0.00421
[0.0204] [0.00494] [0.00523] [0.0213] [0.00482] [0.00499]
skilled vacancies (at age 16) 0.00103 -0.00128 -0.000797 0.00386 -0.00174 -0.00163
[0.0336] [0.00709] [0.00712] [0.0345] [0.00852] [0.00855]
German national (indicator) 1.242 -0.0483 0.00717 1.253 0.0414 0.0601
[0.120]*** [0.0285]* [0.0602] [0.120]*** [0.0236]* [0.0707]
cohort xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
calender year (linear) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
age (linear) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689 1689
First stage F-statistic 21.48 13.67
First stage p-value 0.000 0.000
Mean (dependent variable) 2.182 0.149 0.149 2.188 4.203 4.203
St. dev. (dependent variable) 0.269 0.0698 0.0698 0.282 0.0649 0.0649
Note: Standard errors are clustered on the region level. Data is collapsed into region-cohort cell
means. In this specication, age and time xed eects are replaced by cell-specic mean of age and
time. Observations are weighted by cell size to account for the varying precision in estimating the
corresponding means.
indicate that controlling for occupational xed eects reduces the magnitude of the
estimates for OLS and IV estimates, although the level of signicance of the estimates
is unchanged. One interesting dierence is that for the log daily wages outcome, the
IV coecient is now very close to zero. This reinforces our earlier conclusion that there
are no signicant productivity dierences between the two groups.
4.7.3 Measurement error in years of apprenticeship training
In this section we investigate one possible source of measurement error in the appren-
ticeship years data, which concerns the exact date of the transition from apprenticeship
training into full-time employment for some of the years in our data: Firms are only
required to report the exact end date of an apprenticeship training from 1992 on (Schw-4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 149
Table 4.10: Sensitivity analysis
Indicator: Unemployed at Average log
least 30 days daily wages
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Base case results
Apprenticeship training (years) -0.0355 -0.105 0.0309 0.0289
[0.00133]*** [0.0457]** [0.00133]*** [0.0501]
Observations 242014 242014 218438 218438
First stage F-statistic 25.55 16.43
First stage p-value 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Controlling for occupational xed eects (two-digit classication)
Apprenticeship training (years) -0.0287 -0.0947 0.0273 0.00515
[0.00132]*** [0.0471]** [0.00105]*** [0.0444]
Observations 239662 239662 217378 217378
First stage F-statistic 24.94 16.28
First stage p-value 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Measurement error corrected
Apprenticeship training -0.0373 -0.111 0.0331 0.0307
(years, corrected) [0.00136]*** [0.0490]** [0.00132]*** [0.0533]
Observations 242014 242014 218438 218438
First stage F-statistic 23.30 14.64
First stage p-value 0.000 0.000
Panel D: Excluding inner-German border regions
Apprenticeship training (years) -0.0346 -0.118 0.0312 0.0360
[0.00137]*** [0.0456]** [0.00139]*** [0.0544]
Observations 223315 223315 201753 201753
First stage F-statistic 28.45 18.19
First stage p-value 0.000 0.000
Panel E: Using log number of apprenticeship places as instrument
Apprenticeship training (years) -0.0355 -0.093 0.0309 0.006
[0.00133]*** [0.047]* [0.00133]*** [0.056]
Observations 242014 242014 218438 218438
First stage F-statistic 18.19 12.49
First stage p-value 0.000 0.001
Each panel in this table corresponds to a separate sensitivity analysis. Panel A replicates the base case
results for easy reference. Panel B additionally controls for occupational xed eects on a two-digit
level. Panel C uses as dependent variable the measurement-error corrected version of apprenticeship
training. Panel D replicates the results omitting all areas at the inner-German border. Panel E omits
normalization by cohort size. Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. *
indicates signicance at 10%, ** indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level.
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erdt and Bender, 2003). Before that, apprentices who stay on in their training rm
after apprenticeship training, and become regular skilled employees in the same rm
without any kind of interruption, may be reported as full-time employees for the entire
calendar year in which the transition occurs, although in fact they are apprentices in
the rst part of the year, and regular employees only after the exam. In these cases,
we will undercount the number of days spent in apprenticeship training, because we
do not observe the days in apprenticeship training in the last year of training. This
may introduce some measurement error into the apprenticeship duration data. This
is a very limited form of mis-measurement: It does not aect whether we ever see a
young adult as apprentice, but it only aects the last calendar year of apprenticeship
training. Thus, the undercount consists of either one or six to seven months, depending
on the examination date, relative to a full apprenticeship duration of typically three
(or three and a half) years.
As a sensitivity check, we use an imputed version of the apprenticeship duration
variable. All aected cases share the property that they are seen in the data as ap-
prentice until December 31, and are then reported as skilled employees from January 1
in the same company. Since the apprenticeship terminates with the nal exam, which
is typically towards the end of January (end of rst semester) or during June or July
(end of second semester), this transition at the end of the calendar year is a strong
signal for this kind of misclassication. We ag these cases, and then increase the du-
ration of apprenticeship training by four months, which is the mean number of months
expected in the last year of training between the two exam dates. We then re-run
our main specication on this imputed variable, which corrects for the undercount.
Results are found in Panel C of Table 4.10.
The estimated coecients are almost identical for both the wage and the unem-
ployment outcome. The F-statistic is marginally lower, which reduces the precision of
the main estimates somewhat, but both the size of the main coecients and the level
of signicance is unchanged when we use this imputed version.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 151
4.7.4 Further specication checks
The inner-German border opened up in 1989, within the observation window of this
study. It is known that the inner-German border regions experienced dierential de-
velopment from other parts of the country (Buettner and Rincke, 2007). In particular,
workers from the eastern part of Germany commuted to West German border areas
for better employment prospects in the face of strong economic dierentials between
east and west. To investigate whether this may have had any eect on our results,
we exclude all districts in our sample at the inner-German border. This reduces the
number of districts from 141 to 127. The results are shown in Panel D of Table 4.10.
The coecients are again virtually unchanged, which strongly suggests that our results
are not aected by any dierential behavior in the border regions.
While a normalization seems to be an appropriate way to measure the relevant
availability of apprenticeships, a natural question of interest would be to isolate the
role of the vacancy availability from the cohort size. To answer that, we re-estimate our
main results, but take as instrument the log number of reported vacancies. We report
these estimates in Panel E of Table 4.10. Without the normalization, the F-statistic is
lower, but the IV coecient on apprenticeship training in the unemployment equation
is of a similar magnitude and the estimate has a p-value of 0.051. The estimate in the
wage equation is again very close to 0. This indicates that while the normalization is
useful in measuring relative availability, the main source of variation is the number of
apprenticeship places.
4.7.5 Functional form
The empirical specication outlined in equations (4.1) and (4.2) imposes a specic
functional form on the model. In particular, it imposes that our key variable for
apprenticeship, Zcj, enters linearly in the conditional mean of the rst stage and the
outcome equation. The objective of this section is to semiparametrically investigate
whether this functional form is appropriate. For that purpose, we estimate the partially4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 152
linear model of Robinson (1988), which allows the eect of apprenticeship availability
to be completely unrestricted:
Si = f (Zcj) + 2j + 3c + 4t + 5a + 6Xi + 7Xcj + 8j  c + i (4.3)
and similarly for the reduced form equation. Here, f () can be an arbitrary smooth
function, which we estimate non-parametrically following the two-step approach from
Robinson (1988).
For this exercise, we take the sample of our regression for the outcome unemploy-
ment of at least 30 days in the calendar year, for the sample of 24-year olds. We employ
a biweight Kernel function and set the bandwidth to hz = 0:10 in this exercise. In a
preliminary experiment, we cross-validated the bandwidth and obtained values of at
least hz = 0:14, so we substantially undersmooth relative to that, which should help
to bring out any non-linearities.35 The result of this procedure { the nonparametric
estimate of f () { can be seen in Figure 4.3, together with an estimate of the density of
Z for reference. We superimpose the prediction from the linear model for comparison,
along with the corresponding 10% condence interval.36
As can be seen from the gure, the nonparametric estimate and the linear prediction
are very close together, and even in areas of low density the dierences are modest. We
conclude that the assumption of linearity appears to be appropriate in this application.
35Cross-validation suggests a bandwidth of hz = 0:14 and hz = 0:18 for the rst stage and the
reduced form, respectively. To reduce computational burden, cross-validation is done in univariate
regressions. In the cross-validation, we trim the highest and lowest one percentile in the Z dimension
to reduce the eect of outlier values in the cross-validation objective function. In the leave-one-out
prediction, we account for the dependence in the data by excluding all points with the same value of
Z.
36The partially linear model does not separately identify the intercept. We shift the estimates to
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Figure 4.3: Semiparametric analysis: The partially linear model of Robinson (1988)
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Note: Graph shows estimates over the rst to the 99th percentile range in the Z dimension
(apprenticeship availability). Density estimate is rescaled. See text for details.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 154
4.8 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to study the relative returns to apprenticeship training
relative to vocational schooling. This identies a parameter which is of substantial
interest to policy-makers, who are faced with the decision of how to design vocational
education. The diversity of vocational schooling schemes around the world may be seen
as evidence that there is no consensus on how these schemes compare. An empirical
investigation needs to take account of potentially strong selection eects. We exploit
that non-college bound young adults are subject to uctuation in the availability of
apprenticeships. We document that this aects their schooling choice, and leads them
to substitute between apprenticeship training and vocational schooling. We use this
exposure to estimate the dierential return in a rigorous empirical framework, which
accounts for permanent region and cohort eects, and allows for region-specic time
trends.
Our ndings suggest that the skills young people obtain are in fact similar between
vocational schooling and apprenticeship training, as measured by wages at ages 23 to
26. That suggests that both schemes have similar productivity eects on participants;
the benets and drawbacks of either form of instruction seem to be balancing out in
terms of eects on productivity. That is an important nding in the context of the
debate on the relative merits of these alternatives.
At the same time, we nd substantial and signicant dierences in the probability
of unemployment. Importantly though, this eect shows a strong age prole. We trace
this eect across the age of the young adult and nd that it is highest at young ages and
then declines rapidly, and becomes insignicant at age 26. Thus, the benet in terms
of lower unemployment rates is a transitory one. This suggests that apprenticeship
training provides a benet to participants in that it improves labor market attachment
early in their career. We provide further consistent evidence for this based on rm-
closures: When a young adult is hit by a negative shock through a 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benet of apprenticeship training is lost, and the job-nding rate between the two
groups is no dierent after that.
In summary, our results indicate that the two forms of vocational preparation
deliver similar skills, but the apprenticeship training aides the initial integration of
young adults into the labor market. How much weight the policy-maker places on
this dierence will depend on the emphasis on a smooth school-to-work transition,
but the evidence on problems associated with high youth unemployment suggests that
these considerations are likely to be important. Traditionally, the comparison between
vocational schooling and apprenticeship training focuses primarily on the educational
dimension; the results we obtain here underline the relevance of vocational training in
the worker-rm matching process.4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 156
4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Description of the economy
Consider an economy consisting of regions (denoted by k), in which two products are
produced (X1k and X2k), using two labor inputs (apprenticeship graduates, L
appr
k , and
vocational school graduates, Lschool
k ). Technology is identical across regions (described
by production functions F1 () and F2 ()) and characterized by constant returns to
scale, and positive and diminishing marginal productivities. Assume that products
are freely traded across regions, while factors are mobile across sectors but immobile
across regions. Product prices (1;p) are determined at the world market, where the
price of good 1 has been normalized to 1.
Now consider the educational choice of the young schoolleaver, who decides between
apprenticeship and vocational school. Specify utility from the two alternatives for
individual i as the present value of future wages:
V
appr
i =
T X
t=2

1
1 + r
t 1
w
appr
k + xk + ui (4.4)
V school
i =
T X
t=2

1
1 + r
t 1
wschool
k (4.5)
where r is the discount rate, ui is a person-specic random utility shock; T denotes the
length of the working life, so that the income stream in the main labor market is from
t = 2 (after the initial training period) to t = T (assuming that income during the
training period is negligible). Annual factor rewards for apprenticeship graduates and
vocational school graduates, respectively, are denoted by w
appr
k and wschool
k . Further-
more, xk is a region-specic parameter which aects the apprenticeship option, which
we interpret as local availability of an education-specic factor. Individuals choose the
alternative with the higher utility, so that the resulting number of individuals who4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 157
enter apprenticeship training is
L
appr
k =
X
i
1
(
T X
t=2

1
1 + r
t 1 
w
appr
k   wschool
k

+ xk + ui > 0
)
(4.6)
 gk

w
appr
k   wschool
k

; (4.7)
where gk() is an educational decision function satisfying g0
k  0, which implies a
normal factor supply.37 Given a xed number of schoolleavers in region k, Lk, we have
Lschool
k = Lk   L
appr
k .
The economy can be described by the following set of equations:
X1k = F1

L
appr
1k ;Lschool
1k

(4.8)
X2k = F2

L
appr
2k ;Lschool
2k

(4.9)
L
appr
k = L
appr
1k + L
appr
2k (4.10)
Lschool
k = Lschool
1k + Lschool
2k (4.11)
L
appr
k = gk

w
appr
k   wschool
k

(4.12)
Lschool
k = Lk   L
appr
k (4.13)
Dene factor intensities 1k =
L
appr
1k
Lschool
1k
, 2k =
L
appr
2k
Lschool
2k
, and assume 1k > 2k. Dene
intensive production functions f1(1k) = F1(1k;1), f2(2k) = F2(2k;1). Assume
no complete specialization: equilibrium is possible in which all regions produce both
goods.
The marginal value of each type of labor must be equal across sectors:
f0
1(1k) = p f0
2(2k) (4.14)
f1(1k)   1kf0
1(1k) = p
 
f2(2k)   2kf0
2(2k)

(4.15)
37Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) describe an educational choice setting between skilled and un-
skilled work in which education is provided by a specic factor which is competitively rewarded; their
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Now (4.14) and (4.15) determine 1k and 2k. Since the system (4.14{4.15) is the same
across regions, we have that all regions choose the same optimal factor intensities:
1k = 1 (4.16)
2k = 2 (4.17)
This in turn pins down factor rewards:
w
appr
k = wappr = f0
1(1) (4.18)
wschool
k = wschool = f1(1)   1f0
1(1): (4.19)
Thus, factor price equalization holds: In equilibrium, although the educational
decision rule (4.12) is region-specic, there are no dierences in factor rewards across
regions.
The setting described here is an extension of the model described in Kemp (1964).
Using activity analysis, McKenzie (1955, Theorem 2") proves that factor price equal-
ization extends to the variable factor supply case if factor supplies are normal, a re-
quirement satised by equations (4.12) and (4.13).4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 159
4.A.2 Data appendix
The analysis in this chapter is based on a large administrative data set of individual
employment histories for German employees, the IABS, provided by the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB). A description of this data can be found in Bender, Haas,
and Klose (2000). The sample contains 2% of all employees who are ever subject to
social security contributions over the period 1975 to 2001. It excludes data on the
self-employed, civil servants, and the military. We limit our analysis to West German
males (excluding West Berlin) from the cohorts 1964 to 1975. For each individual, we
record the labor market status on a reference day, June 30, of each year. We then
dene our sample of interest as all those individuals who are in the labor force on
June 30. To focus on non-college bound youth we eliminate all individuals who hold a
schooling degree from the college-bound schooling track (Abitur), or who ever hold a
degree from a university (or a university of applied sciences) in our sample. We exclude
individuals who enter the labor market later than age 24. As a measure of where the
young adult grows up, we record the rst employment oce district in which he is
recorded in the data.
Apprentices in the dual system are are a clearly identied group in the data and can
be distinguished from regular workers. Since we observe the full employment history
of each sampled individual, it is straightforward to establish whether an individual has
ever been an apprentice, and if so, for how long. For this purpose, we compute for
each calendar year whether a given individual has had the apprentice status during this
year, and if so, for what fraction of the year. We also compute a cumulative version of
this variable, which indicates the years of apprenticeship training up to a given age.
We compute the number of days an individual is unemployed during each calendar
year, and then dene an indicator which takes the value 1 if the individual has been
unemployed for at least 30 calendar days. We compute log average daily wages as fol-
lows: We divide total wages (in prices of 2000) earned in full-time regular employment
on a calendar year basis by the number of days spent in full-time regular employment,4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 160
and then take logs. We eliminate observations which would imply a wage rate of below
1 Euro per hour (in prices of 2000), assuming an eight hour day. Wage reports in the
data are generally top-coded at the social-security contribution limits, but since we
focus on young workers and exclude all individuals with a college degree and from the
upper schooling track, this is unlikely to be relevant for our sample. | We measure
change of occupation as an indicator for a change in occupation on two consecutive
reference dates, limiting attention to moves into regular full-time employment. We
dene industry movers similarly, and both industries and occupations are coded on
a two-digit level. A key advantage of this administrative data set relative to survey-
based data is that we can expect to have little measurement error; this is especially
important for measures of mobility (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008).
Apprenticeship vacancies are published annually by the German Federal Employ-
ment Oce. From 1991 onwards, this data is published on the website of the Federal
Employment Oce. For previous years, we collect the information from annual pub-
lications of the Federal Employment Oce (see, e.g. BA (1991)). We normalize the
vacancy data by an estimate of the number of young people who grow up in each
district. For that purpose, we compute cohort sizes at the level of the Land based on
the number of seventeen year olds, as published by the national Statistical Oce. To
obtain the number of young people on the ner district level, we split this based on the
district level share of 15-19 year olds in each Land, for which we use the 1988 shares
as reported in BMBF (1992, pp.206-208).4 Vocational Schooling versus Apprenticeship Training 161
4.A.3 Further tables
Table 4.11: Apprenticeship vacancies and educational choice
apprenticeship vocational degree
training (years) (indicator)
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
apprenticeship vacancies (at age 16) 0.492 0.0197
[0.0974]*** [0.0251]
cohort xed eects Yes Yes
region xed eects Yes Yes
region trends Yes Yes
age xed eects Yes Yes
year xed eects Yes Yes
labor market controls Yes Yes
Observations 242014 242014
Mean (dependent variable) 2.182 0.796
St. dev. (dependent variable) 1.239 0.403
Note: Standard errors reported in brackets, clustered by region. * indicates signicance at 10%, **
indicates signicance at 5%, *** indicates signicance at 1% level. See text for details.Chapter 5
Measuring the Price
Responsiveness of
Gasoline Demand
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a new method for estimating a demand function for gasoline
and the welfare costs of changes in gasoline prices. The method is also applicable to
other goods. In the U.S., as in many other countries, the price of gasoline rose rapidly
from 1998 until mid 2008. Figure 5.1 shows the how the average price of gasoline in
the U.S. has varied over the last three decades. Prices began rising steeply in about
1998 following a period of price stability that began in about 1986. Between March
2007 and March 2008, the average gasoline price increased by 25.7 percent in nominal
terms.1 In real terms, gasoline prices reached levels similar to those seen during the
second oil crisis of 1979-1981. Although prices have decreased since mid 2008, due at
least in part to the global economic downturn, many observers expect prices to rise
again in the future as economic activity increases. The measurement of the welfare
1Own calculation based on EIA (2008b, Table 9.4).
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Figure 5.1: Retail Motor Gasoline Price 1976-2007 (Unleaded Regular)
Retail Motor Gasoline Fuel Prices 1976-2007 (Unleaded Regular)
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Source: EIA (2008b, Table 5.24). Note: U.S. city average gasoline prices. Real values are in chained
(2000) dollars based on GDP implicit price deators. See source for details.
consequences of price changes begins with estimating the demand function for the
good in question. This is often done by using a linear model in which the dependent
variable is the log of demand and the explanatory variables are the logs of price and
income. This model is easy to interpret because it gives constant income and price
elasticities, but it is rejected by our data. Table 5.1 presents the results of estimating a
constant elasticity model of gasoline demand for a class of households in the U.S. The
data are from the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). We describe the NHTS
further in Section 5.3. RESET specication tests reject the constant-elasticity model.
Further analysis that is described in Section 5.4 reveals that adding an interaction
term to the constant elasticity model does not correct the specication error. This
motivates us to use nonparametric estimation methods. Hausman and Newey (1995)
also used nonparametric methods to estimate gasoline demand. Deviations from the5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 164
Table 5.1: OLS regression and specication test
dependent variable: log gasoline demand
log price -0.885
[0.157]**
log income 0.292
[0.015]**
constant 4.226
[0.166]**
N 5,257
RESET3: F-stat 5.522
RESET3: p-value 0.004**
RESET4: F-stat 4.034
RESET4: p-value 0.007**
Note: Dependent variable is log of annual household gasoline demand in gallons. * indicates signicance
at 5%, ** indicates signicance at 1% level. The bottom panel reports results from the F-test of two
Ramsey RESET specication tests. RESET3 refers to including second and third polyonomials of
the predicted values of the dependent variable, and RESET4 refers to including second to fourth
polynomials. See text for details.
constant-elasticity model are not simply a technical concern. It is likely to matter
greatly how peoples' responses to prices vary according to the price level and over the
income distribution. Therefore, a exible modeling approach such as nonparametric
regression seems attractive. However, nonparametric regression can yield implausible
and erratic estimates. Figure 5.2 shows nonparametric estimates of gasoline demand
as a function of price at three points across the income distribution. The estimates
are obtained from the NHTS data. Details of the estimation method are presented
in Section 5.2 of this chapter. The gure gives some overall indication of downward
sloping demand curves with slopes that dier across the income distribution but there
are parts of the estimated demand curves that are upward sloping and, therefore,
implausible. We interpret the implausible shapes of the curves in Figure 5.2 as indi-
cating that fully nonparametric methods are too imprecise to provide useful estimates
of gasoline demand functions with our data. One way of dealing with this problem is
to impose a parametric form such as log-log linearity on the demand function. But
any parametric form is essentially arbitrary and, as will be discussed further in Sec-5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 165
Figure 5.2: Unconstrained nonparametric demand estimates
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tion 5.4, may be misspecied in ways that produce seriously erroneous results. As a
compromise between the desire for exibility and the need for structure, one may use
a semiparametric model, such as a partially-linear or single-index model. These im-
pose parametric restrictions on some aspects of the function of interest but leave other
parts unrestricted. In this chapter, we take a dierent approach and impose struc-
ture through shape restrictions based on economic theory. Specically, we impose the
Slutsky restriction of consumer theory on an otherwise fully nonparametric estimate
of the demand function. We show that this approach yields well-behaved estimates
of the demand function and price responsiveness across the income distribution while
avoiding the use of arbitrary and possibly misspecied parametric or semiparametric
models. We implement our approach by making use of a kernel-type estimator in which5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 166
observations are weighted in a way that ensures satisfaction of the Slutsky restrictions.
This maintains the exibility of nonparametric regression while using restrictions of
economic theory to avoid implausible estimation results. The constrained nonparamet-
ric estimates are consistent with observed behavior and provide intuitively plausible,
well-behaved descriptions of price responsiveness across the income distribution. One
important use of demand function estimates is to compute deadweight loss (DWL)
measures of tax policy interventions. For some interventions, we show that reliance
on the unrestricted nonparametric estimate results in DWL estimates that have in-
correct signs and are, therefore, nonsensical. Our constrained estimator deals with
this problem in a way that is consistent with economic theory. We nd that there is
substantial variation in price sensitivity across both price and income. In particular,
we nd that price responses are non-monotonic in income. Our estimates indicate
that households at the median of the income distribution respond more strongly to an
increase in prices than do households at the lower or upper income group. We do not
speculate on why this is the case, but we show that it implies that our DWL mea-
sure is typically higher at the median of the income distribution that in the lower or
upper income group. Section 5.2 explains our approach to nonparametric estimation
of demand functions and DWL subject to the Slutsky shape restrictions. Section 5.3
describes the NHTS data. Section 5.4 presents the estimates of the demand function
and shows how price responsiveness varies across the income distribution. Section 5.4
also presents the DWLs associated with several price changes and shows how they vary
across the income distribution. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Shape Restrictions and the Estimation of Demand
and Deadweight Loss
We begin this section by describing our approach to estimating the demand function
subject to the Slutsky shape restriction. Then we describe how we estimate the DWL5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 167
of a tax-induced price increase. The Slutsky condition is an inequality constraint on the
demand function. Our method for estimating the demand function nonparametrically
subject to this constraint is adapted from Hall and Huang (2001), who present a non-
parametric kernel estimator of a conditional mean function subject to a monotonicity
constraint. We replace their monotonicity constraint with the Slutsky condition. To
describe our estimator, let Q, P, and Y , respectively, denote the quantity of gasoline
demanded by an individual, the price paid, and the individual's income. We assume
that these variables are related by
Q = g (P;Y ) + U (5.1)
where g is a function that satises smoothness conditions and the Slutsky restric-
tion but is otherwise unknown, and U is an unobserved random variable satisfying
E (UjP = p;Y = y) = 0 for all p and y. Our aim is to estimate g (p;y) nonparametri-
cally subject to the Slutsky constraint
@g(p;y)
@p
+ g(p;y)
@g(p;y)
@y
 0: (5.2)
The data are observations fQi;Pi;Yi : i = 1;::::;ng for n randomly sampled individuals.
A fully nonparametric estimate of g that does not impose the Slutsky restriction can
be obtained by using the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson,
1964). The properties of this estimator are summarized in H ardle (1990). We call it the
unconstrained nonparametric estimator, denoted by ^ gU, because it is not constrained
by (5.2). The estimator is
^ gU(p;y) =
1
nhphy ^ f(p;y)
n X
i=1
QiK

p   Pi
hp

K

y   Yi
hy

, (5.3)
where
^ f(p;y) =
1
nhphy
n X
i=1
K

p   Pi
hp

K

y   Yi
hy

, (5.4)5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 168
K is a bounded, dierentiable probability density function that is supported on [-1,1]
and is symmetrical about 0, and hp and hy are bandwidth parameters.
Owing to the eects of random sampling errors, ^ gU does not necessarily satisfy
(5.2) even if g does satisfy this condition. Following Hall and Huang (2001), we solve
this problem by replacing ^ gU with the weighted estimator
^ gC(p;y) =
1
hphy ^ f(p;y)
n X
i=1
wiQiK

p   Pi
hp

K

y   Yi
hy

, (5.5)
where fwi : i = 1;:::;ng are non-negative weights satisfying
Pn
i=1 wi = 1 and the
subscript C indicates that the estimator is constrained by the Slutsky condition. The
weights are obtained by solving the optimization problem
minimize :
w1;:::;wn
D(w1;:::;wn) (5.6)
subject to
@^ gC(pj;yj)
@p
+ ^ gC(pj;yj)
@^ gC(pj;yj)
@y
 0; j = 1;:::;J; (5.7)
n X
i=1
wi = 1 , (5.8)
and
wi  0; i = 1;:::;n; (5.9)
where fpj;yj : j = 1;:::;Jg is a grid of points in the (p;y) plane. The objective function
is the following measure of the 'distance' of the weights from the values wi = 1=n
corresponding to the Nadaraya-Watson estimator:
D(w1;:::;wn) = n  
n X
i=1
(nwi)1=2 (5.10)
When wi = 1=n for all i = 1;:::;n, ^ gC(pj;yj) = ^ gU(pj;yj) for all j = 1;:::;J. Thus,5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 169
the weights minimize the distance of the constrained estimator from the unconstrained
one. The constraint is not binding at points (pj;yj) that satisfy (5.2). In the empirical
application described in Section 5.4, we solve (5.6) by using the nonlinear programming
algorithm E04UCF from the NAG Library. The bandwidths are selected using a
method that is described in Section 5.4. In some applications, it may be desirable
to impose the restriction that the good in question is normal. This can be done by
adding the constraints @^ gC(pj;yj)=@y  0 to (5.6), but we do not take this step here.
We now describe our method for estimating the DWL of a tax. Let E(p) denote
the expenditure function at price p and some reference utility level. The DWL of a
tax that changes the price from p0 to p1 is
L(p0;p1) = E(p1)   E(p0)   (p1   p0)g

p1;E(p1)

: (5.11)
We estimate this by
^ L(p0;p1) = ^ E(p1)   ^ E(p0)   (p1   p0)^ g

p1;E(p1)

; (5.12)
where ^ E is an estimator of the expenditure function and ^ g may be either ^ gU or ^ gC.
We obtain ^ E by solving the dierential equation
d ^ E(t)
dt
= ^ g
h
p(t); ^ E(t)
i dp(t)
dt
; (5.13)
where
h
p(t); ^ E(t)
i
(0  t  1) is a price-(estimated) expenditure path. We solve this
equation along a grid of points by using Euler's method (Ascher and Petzold, 1998).
We have found this method to be quite accurate in numerical experiments.
Inference with the constrained estimator ^ gC is dicult because the estimator's
asymptotic distribution is very complicated in regions where (5.2) is a binding con-
straint (strict equality). However, if we assume that (5.2) is a strict inequality in
the population, then violation of the Slutsky condition by ^ gU is a nite-sample phe-5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 170
nomenon, and we can use ^ gU to carry out asymptotically valid inference. We use the
bootstrap to obtain asymptotic joint condence intervals for g(p;y) on a grid of (p;y)
points and to obtain condence intervals for L. The bootstrap procedure is as follows.
1. Generate a bootstrap sample fQ?
i;P?
i ;Y ?
i : i = 1;:::;ng by sampling the data
randomly with replacement.
2. Use this sample to estimate g(p;y) on a grid of (p;y) points without imposing
the Slutsky constraint. Also, estimate L. Denote the bootstrap estimates by ^ g?
U
and L?.
3. Form percentile condence intervals for L by repeating steps 1-2 many times.
Also, use the bootstrap samples to form joint percentile-t condence intervals for
g on the grid of points fpj;yj : j = 1;:::;Jg.
The joint condence intervals at a level of at least 1    are
^ gU(pj;yj)   z(pj;yj)^ (pj;yj)  g(pj;yj)  ^ gU(pj;yj) + z(pj;yj)^ (pj;yj); (5.14)
where
^ 2(p;y) =
BK
[nhphy ^ f(p;y)]2
n X
i=1
^ U2
i K

p   Pi
hp

K

y   Yi
hy

; (5.15)
with BK =
Z
K(v)2dv and ^ Ui = Qi   ^ gU(Pi;Yi) ; (5.16)
is a consistent estimate of Var[^ gU(p;y)]. The coecient z(pj;yj) is chosen following
the approach in H ardle and Marron (1991) for computing joint condence intervals.
For this purpose, we partition the grid into intervals of 2hp. Within each of these M
neighborhoods, z(pj;yj) is the solution to
P?

j^ g?
U(pj;yj)   ^ gU(pj;yj)j
^ ?(pj;yj)
 z(pj;yj)

= 1   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where P? is the probability measure induced by bootstrap sampling, and ^ ?(p;y) is
the version of ^ (p;y) that is obtained by replacing ^ Ui, Pi, and Yi in (5.15) by their
bootstrap analogs, and  is a parameter. We then choose  such that the simultaneous
size in each neighborhood equals 1   
M. As H ardle and Marron (1991) show using
the Bonferroni inequality, the resulting intervals over the full grid form simultaneous
condence intervals at a level of at least 1   . Hall (1992) shows that the bootstrap
consistently estimates the asymptotic distribution of the Studentized form of ^ gU. It is
necessary to undersmooth ^ gU and ^ g?
U (that is, use smaller than asymptotically optimal
bandwidths) in (5.14) and step 2 of the bootstrap procedure to obtain a condence
interval that is centered at g. We discuss bandwidth selection in Section 5.4.
5.3 Data
Our analysis is based on the 2001 National Household Travel Survey. The NHTS
was sponsored by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and the Federal Highway
Administration. The data were collected through a telephone survey of the civilian,
non-institutionalized population of the U.S. The survey was conducted between March
2001 and May 2002 (ORNL, 2004, Ch. 3). The telephone interviews were comple-
mented with written travel diaries and odometer readings.
The variables used in our study are annual gasoline consumption, the gasoline price,
and household income. Gasoline consumption is derived from odometer readings and
estimates of the fuel eciencies of vehicles. Details of the computations are described
in (ORNL, 2004, Appendices J and K). The gasoline price for a given household is the
average price in dollars per gallon, including taxes, in the county where the household
is located. This price variable is a county average, rather than the price actually paid
by a household. It precludes an intra-county analysis (see Schmalensee and Stoker
(1999)) but does capture variation in prices consumers face in dierent regions.
Household income in dollars is available in 18 groups. In our analysis, we assign each5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 172
household an income equal to the midpoint of its group. The highest group, consisting
of incomes above $100,000, is assigned an income of $120,000.2 To investigate how price
responsiveness of gasoline demand varies across the income distribution, we focus on
three income levels of interest: a middle income group at $57,500, which corresponds
to median income in our sample, a low income group ($42,500), which corresponds to
the rst quartile and a high income group ($72,500)3. To obtain gasoline demand at
the household level, we aggregate vehicle gasoline expenditure in dollars and gasoline
consumption in gallons over multi-car households. We divide the household gasoline
expenditure by the quantity of gasoline consumed to obtain the household's gasoline
price. We do not investigate the errors-in-variables issues raised by the use of county-
average prices or the interval censoring issues raised by the grouping of household
incomes in the data. These potentially important issues are left for future research.
We exclude from our analysis households where the number of drivers is zero or
whose income, gasoline cost, or annual gasoline consumption is not reported. We also
exclude households that are located in Hawaii. In addition, we restrict our sample to
households with a white respondent, two or more adults, and at least one child under 16
years of age. We take vehicle ownership as given and do not investigate how changes
in prices aect vehicle purchases or how vehicle ownership varies across the income
distribution (Poterba (1991), West (2004), Bento, Goulder, Henry, Jacobsen, and von
Haefen (2005), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen (2009)). The results of
Bento, Goulder, Henry, Jacobsen, and von Haefen (2005) indicate that over 95 percent
of the reduction in gasoline demand in response to price changes is due to changes in
miles traveled rather than eet composition. We limit attention to vehicles that use
2Assuming log-normality of income, we have estimated the corresponding mean and variance by
using a simple tobit model, right-censored at $100,000. Excluding households with very high incomes
above $150,000, the median income in the upper group corresponds to about $120,000.
3The income point $72,500 occupies the 59.6-63.3th percentile. This point was chosen to avoid the
problems created by the interval nature of the income variable which becomes especially important in
the upper quartile of the income distribution: income brackets are relatively narrow (with widths of
$5,000) up to $80,000, but substantially wider for higher incomes. However, estimates using higher
quantiles yielded similar results and did not change our conclusions on price responsiveness across the
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gasoline as fuel, rather than diesel, natural gas, or electricity. The resulting sample
consists of 5,257 observations. Table 5.2 shows summary statistics.
Table 5.2: Sample descriptives
log gasoline demand 7.168
[0.679]
log price 0.287
[0.057]
log income 10.954
[0.613]
N 5,257
Note: Table shows means and standard deviations.
5.4 Estimates of Demand Responses
5.4.1 The constant elasticity model
We begin by using ordinary least squares to estimate the following log-log linear de-
mand model:
logQ = 0 + 1 logP + 2 logY + U; E (UjP = p;Y = y) = 0: (5.18)
This constant elasticity model is one of the most frequently estimated (e.g., Dahl
(1979), Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2008)). It has been criticized on many grounds
(e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)) but its simplicity and frequent use make it a
useful parametric reference model. Later in this section, we compare the estimates
obtained from model (11) with those obtained from the nonparametric analysis.
The estimates of the coecients of (5.18) are shown in Table 5.1. They imply a
price-elasticity of demand of -0.88 and an income elasticity of 0.29. These estimates
are similar to those reported by others. Hausman and Newey (1995) report estimates
of -0.81 and 0.37, respectively, for price and income elasticities based on U.S. data
collected between 1979 and 1988. Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) report price elastici-5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 174
ties between -0.72 and -1.13 and income elasticities between 0.12 and 0.33, depending
on the survey year and control variables, in their specications without regional xed
eects. Yatchew and No (2001) estimate an income elasticity of 0.27 using Canadian
data for 1994-1996 and a model that does not include the price of gasoline. West
(2004) reports a mean price elasticity of -0.89 using 1997 data.
Although the estimates we obtain from model (5.18) are similar to those reported by
others, there is evidence that (5.18) is misspecied. We tested (11) for misspecication
with Ramsey's (1969) RESET test. This test consists of adding powers of the predicted
values of logQ to the model, re-estimating the resulting augmented model, and testing
the hypothesis that the coecients of the additional regressors are zero. Rejection
of this hypothesis indicates that the original model is misspecied. We carried out
this test twice, once with the squares and cubes of the predicted log Q values added
to the model (RESET3 in Table 5.1) and once with the squares, cubes, and fourth
powers of the logQ's added (RESET4). As can be seen from Table 5.1, both versions
of RESET reject model (5.18) at the 0.05 level. Thus, we conclude that model (5.18)
is misspecied.
West (2004) found evidence for dependence of the price elasticity on income. Ac-
cordingly, we added the interaction term (log P)(logY ) to model (5.18). The resulting
augmented model is also rejected at the 0.05 level by the RESET tests. Conceivably
adding further powers and interactions of logP and logY would yield a model that is
not rejected by RESET. However, this kind of informal specication search leads to
inconsistent estimators whose properties are unknown. Nonparametric estimators, by
contrast, are consistent.
5.4.2 Unconstrained nonparametric estimates
Our unconstrained nonparametric estimates of the demand function, ^ gU, are displayed
in Figure 5.2. They were obtained by using the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator
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applying least-squares cross-validation (H ardle, 1990) to the entire data set, but this
yields bandwidths that are strongly inuenced by low-density regions. To avoid this
problem, we used the following method to choose hp and hy. We are interested in g(p;y)
for y values corresponding to our three income groups and price levels between the 5th
and 95th percentiles of the observed prices. We dened three price-income rectangles
consisting of prices between the 5th and 95th percentiles and incomes within 0.5 of
each income level of interest (measured in logs). We then applied least-squares cross-
validation to each price-income rectangle separately to obtain bandwidth estimates
appropriate to each rectangle. This procedure yielded (hp;hy) = (0:0431;0:2143) for
the lower income group, (0.0431, 0.2061) for the middle income group, and (0.0210,
0.2878) for the upper income group. The estimation results are not sensitive to modest
variations in the dimensions of the price-income rectangles. As was discussed in Section
5.2, ^ gU and ^ g?
U must be undersmoothed to obtain properly centered condence intervals.
To this end we multiplied each of the foregoing bandwidths by 0.8 when computing
condence intervals.
Figure 5.2 shows several instances in which the nonparametric estimate of the
(Marshallian) demand function is upward sloping. This anomaly is also present in
the results of Hausman and Newey (1995). The theory of the consumer requires the
compensated demand function to be downward sloping. Combined with a positive
income derivative, an upward-sloping Marshallian demand function implies an upward-
sloping compensated demand function and, therefore, is inconsistent with the theory of
the consumer. At the median income, our nonparametric estimate of @g=@y is positive
over the range of prices of interest except for the two lowest grid points. Therefore,
the nonparametric estimates are inconsistent with consumer theory. As is discussed
in more detail in Section 5.4.3, we believe this result to be an artifact of random
sampling errors and the consequent imprecision of the unconstrained nonparametric
estimates. This motivates the use of the constrained estimation procedure, which
increases estimation precision by imposing the Slutsky condition.5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 176
5.4.3 Nonparametric estimates under the Slutsky condition
Figure 5.3 shows the nonparametric estimates of the demand function, ^ gC, at each
of the three income levels of interest (solid dots). These estimates are constrained
to satisfy the Slutsky condition and were obtained using the methods described in
Section 5.2. For comparison, the gure also shows the unconstrained nonparametric
estimates, ^ gU (open dots). The solid lines in Figure 5.3 connect the endpoints of
joint 90% condence intervals for g(p;y). These were obtained using the bootstrap
procedure described in Section 5.2.
In contrast to the unconstrained estimates, the constrained estimates are downward
sloping everywhere. The constrained estimates are also less wiggly than the uncon-
strained ones. In contrast to ad hoc `ironing procedures' for producing monotonic
estimates, ^ gC is consistent with the theory of the consumer and everywhere dieren-
tiable. This is important for estimation of DWL. The 90% condence bands shown
in Figure 5.3 contain both the constrained and unconstrained estimates. This is con-
sistent with our view that the anomalous behavior of the unconstrained estimates is
due to imprecision of the unconstrained estimator. It also indicates that the Slutsky
constraint is consistent with the data.
The results in Figure 5.3 indicate that the middle income group is more sensitive to
price changes than are the other two groups. In particular, the slope of the constrained
estimate of g is noticeably larger for the middle group than for the other groups. This,
in turn, suggests that the DWL of a tax increase is larger for the middle income group
than for the others. We investigate this further in Section 5.4.4.
5.4.4 Estimates of deadweight loss
We now investigate the DWLs associated with several increases in gasoline taxes. The
increases considered in the literature typically are quite large and often out of the
support of the data. We start with an intervention that moves prices from the 5th to
the 95th percentile of the price distribution in our sample. Historically observed tax5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 177
Figure 5.3: Demand estimates and simultaneous condence intervals at dierent points
in the income distribution
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b) middle income group
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c) lower income group
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Note: Income groups correspond to $72,500, $57,500, and $42,500. Condence intervals shown refer
to bootstrapped symmetrical, studentized simultaneous condence intervals with a condence level of
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changes in the U.S. tend to be much smaller than this, possibly due to the political
diculty of implementing large tax increases. To reect the kind of intervention a
legislature might actually consider, we also look at smaller interventions in which the
price increases by $0.05. As is well known, DWL increases with the square of the tax
rate (e.g., Auerbach (1985)), so the DWL estimates are very dierent for the two types
of interventions.
We compute DWL as follows. Over the range of the intervention, we evaluate the
Marshallian demand estimates presented in the previous section for the three estima-
tors (parametric, unconstrained nonparametric, and constrained nonparametric) on a
grid of 61 points. We then use this demand estimate and the corresponding derivatives
to compute the expenditure function and DWL by following the methods described in
Section 5.2.
We study DWL relative to tax paid, which we interpret as a 'price' for raising
tax revenue. We refer to this measure as relative DWL. Results are shown in Table
5.3.4 Each panel of the table corresponds to one intervention. Intervention I moves
prices from the 5th to the 95th price percentile in our data. The dierences in the
demand estimates between the dierent estimation methods translate into dierences
in relative DWLs. Comparing across income levels, the log-log linear model estimates
relative DWL to be almost identical for the three income groups and indicates that
the cost of taxation is about 7.6% of revenue raised for intervention I, irrespective of
income level. In contrast, the constrained nonparametric estimates indicate that the
cost of taxation is higher for the middle income group than for the other two groups.
This result is consistent with our earlier nding that the middle income group is more
responsive to price changes than are the other groups. The result also illustrates how
the functional form assumptions of the parametric model aect estimates of consumer
behavior and the eects of taxation.
4Condence intervals for the unconstrained and the parametric model are reported in Table 5.5 in
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Table 5.3: Relative Deadweight Loss estimates
Income DWL (as % of tax paid)
unconstrained constrained log-log
(1) (2) (3)
$72,500 10.09 % 10.18 % 7.59 %
Intervention I ($1.215 { $1.436) $57,500 10.09 % 11.92 % 7.58 %
$42,500 6.40 % 6.70 % 7.56 %
$72,500 4.20 % 3.27 % 1.80 %
Intervention II ($1.22 { $1.27) $57,500 3.08 % 4.50 % 1.80 %
$42,500 -1.33 % 0.72 % 1.79 %
$72,500 -1.06 % 0.84 % 1.73 %
Intervention III ($1.27 { $1.32) $57,500 6.42 % 5.74 % 1.73 %
$42,500 3.86 % 2.82 % 1.72 %
$72,500 -3.02 % 0.49 % 1.67 %
Intervention IV ($1.32 { $1.37) $57,500 2.61 % 2.07 % 1.66 %
$42,500 -2.23 % 0.77 % 1.66 %
Note: For each intervention, the price change considered is indicated in round brackets (in U.S.
dollars). Intervention I corresponds to moving prices from the 5th to the 95th percentile in the data.
Interventions II, III and IV each increase price by ve U.S. cents. Deadweight Loss is shown as
percentage of tax paid after the (compensated) intervention. See text for details.
We also estimate the DWLs associated with taxes that increase the price by $0.05
from several dierent initial values. Intervention II increases the price from $1.22 to
$1.27, Intervention III from $1.27 to $1.32, and Intervention IV from $1.32 to $1.37.
The results are shown in Table 5.3. The DWLs obtained from the log-log linear para-
metric model of the demand function are virtually constant across incomes. The
DWLs obtained from the unconstrained nonparametric estimate of demand are some-
times negative. This anomalous result occurs because, due to random sampling errors,
the unconstrained estimate of the demand function does not decrease monotonically
and does not satisfy the integrability conditions of consumer theory. The constrained
nonparametric model yields DWL estimates that are positive and, in some cases, more
than double those obtained from the parametric model.
One can also study DWL relative to income so as to reect the household's utility
loss relative to available resources. The results for this analysis are shown in Table 5.4.
The estimates from the parametric model and constrained nonparametric model give5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 180
Table 5.4: Deadweight Loss estimates relative to household income
Income DWL (relative to income) * 104
unconstrained constrained log-log
(1) (2) (3)
$ 72,500 4.11 4.14 3.01
Intervention I $ 57,500 4.89 5.69 3.54
($ 1.215-1.436) $ 42,500 3.80 3.97 4.37
$ 72,500 0.43 0.34 0.18
Intervention II $ 57,500 0.41 0.59 0.21
($ 1.22-1.27) $ 42,500 -0.20 0.11 0.26
$ 72,500 -0.11 0.09 0.17
Intervention III $ 57,500 0.74 0.67 0.20
($ 1.27-1.32) $ 42,500 0.54 0.40 0.24
$ 72,500 -0.32 0.05 0.16
Intervention IV $ 57,500 0.29 0.23 0.18
($ 1.32-1.37) $ 42,500 -0.32 0.11 0.23
Note: For each intervention, the price change considered is indicated in round brackets (in U.S.
dollars). Intervention I corresponds to moving prices from the 5th to the 95th percentile in the data.
Interventions II, III and IV each increase price by ve U.S. cents. Deadweight Loss is shown relative
to baseline income. See text for details.
dierent indications of the eects of the tax increase across income groups. The para-
metric estimates indicate that the relative utility loss increases as income decreases.
However, the constrained nonparametric estimates indicate that the relative utility
loss is greater for the middle income group than for the other groups.
5.5 Conclusions
Simple parametric models of demand functions can yield misleading estimates of price
sensitivity and welfare measures such as DWL, owing to misspecication. Fully non-
parametric estimation of demand reduces the risk of misspecication but, because of
the eects of random sampling errors, can yield imprecise estimates with anomalous
properties such as non-monotonicity. This chapter has shown that these problems can
be overcome by constraining nonparametric estimates to satisfy the Slutsky condition
of economic theory. This stabilizes the nonparametric estimates without the need for5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 181
parametric or other restrictions that have no basis in economic theory.
We have implemented this approach by using a modied kernel estimator that
weights the observations so as to satisfy the Slutsky restriction. To illustrate the
method, we have estimated a gasoline demand function for a class of households in the
U.S. We nd that some simple parametric specications are rejected by a specication
test, whereas a fully nonparametric estimate of the demand function is non-monotonic.
In contrast, the estimate that is constrained to satisfy the Slutsky condition is well-
behaved. Moreover, the constrained nonparametric estimates show patterns of price
sensitivity that are very dierent from those of the simple parametric model. We nd
price responses vary non-monotonically with income. In particular, we nd that low-
and high-income consumers are less responsive to changes in gasoline prices than are
middle-income consumers.
We have also computed the DWLs of several increases in the price of gasoline. We
nd that the unconstrained nonparametric estimates sometimes yield negative DWLs,
which are inconsistent with economic theory and presumably caused by imprecision of
the unconstrained estimates. The constrained nonparametric estimates of DWL are
positive and, in many cases, quite dierent from those obtained with the parametric
model. Mirroring the results on price responsiveness, the DWL estimates are highest
for middle income groups. These results illustrate the usefulness of nonparametrically
estimating demand functions subject to the Slutsky condition.5 Measuring the Price Responsiveness of Gasoline Demand 182
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.Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis applies microeconometric methods to understand determinants and eects
of individual behavior relating to both educational choices and consumer demand. The
work reported in Chapter 2 adds to our understanding of intergenerational eects of
education by emphasizing the role of potential transmission channels in translating
the eect of maternal education to the child. The results indicate that children from
more educated mothers benet from additional investments in a number of dimensions.
The chapter also documents how the home environment in which children grow up is
aected by maternal education, and shows that the eects of mother's education persist
into early adulthood.
The work in Chapter 3 documents how mobility investments during higher edu-
cation aect future international labor market mobility, and highlights that mobility
programs can have long-lasting eects. The outcomes are measured one to ve years
after graduation, which is still relatively early in the individuals' labor market careers.
In future research, it would be of interest to investigate how the eect evolves through-
out the career of these university graduates. In particular, it would be of interest to
investigate what fraction of the individuals who have moved abroad following their
graduation eventually return to their home country.
Chapter 4 compares two types of vocational training forms which are of particular
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relevance for non-college bound youth. This question is important to policy-makers
because governments can substitute between apprenticeship training and full-time vo-
cational school, and the heterogeneity across countries in the design of vocational
schooling systems is evidence for that. The key result in this work is that (former)
apprentices have an advantage compared to vocational school graduates, but this ad-
vantage is transitory and fades out over time.
The evidence presented in Chapter 5 indicates that imposing economic restrictions
is an attractive alternative to functional form assumptions or other semiparametric
estimators. The constraint removes the erratic variation in the unconstrained esti-
mate, and can be thought of as a potential substitute to bandwidth smoothing. Inter-
estingly, the results indicate that the price responsiveness of gasoline demand varies
non-monotonically with income: price responsiveness is highest for the middle income
group, and lower for both the low-income and the high-income group. Since many
of the frequently chosen functional forms impose a form of monotonicity on the price
eect, these approaches would not be able to accurately represent the pattern found
using the nonparametric approach. While we apply this method to study gasoline
demand, the approach taken can be applied much more widely in the context of the
study of consumer demand.Bibliography
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